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ABSTRACT 
Recent scholarship demonstrates that the metaphor of taste, which 
represents aesthetic discernment as gustatory sensation, foregrounds 
ideologically laden questions of individual and cultural identity across a wide 
swath of literary history. But critics have yet to discover that taste is but one 
component of a much broader network of metaphors that figure the mind as a 
human body that eats and digests the world of objects and ideas. Using two 
approaches to metaphor from cognitive science, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of 
“conceptual blending,” I relate metaphors like reading-is-eating, ideas-are-food, 
and contemplation-is-digestion within a metaphor system that I call “the 
digesting mind.” Applying this insight to organic aesthetics, I argue that poets 
 vi 
expand organicism’s metaphorical basis beyond the familiar poem-as-plant by 
introducing a mind that consumes plantlike poems. Coleridge, Wordsworth, 
Emerson, Whitman, and William Carlos Williams link writers and readers in an 
ideational economy figured as nutritional exchange. As each poet negotiates 
questions of creativity and literary influence, his biological, philosophical, 
political, and aesthetic beliefs converge in metaphors of the digesting mind. 
After introducing my approach in chapter one, I examine the digesting 
mind’s importance in the evolution of organic aesthetics from English 
romanticism to American modernism. In chapter two, the digesting mind 
destabilizes Coleridge’s influential distinction between mechanism and 
organicism by revealing, in Biographia Literaria, his anxiety that a diet of 
mechanistic literature will reduce the organic mind to a machine. Chapter three 
reads Wordsworth’s Prelude in similar terms, as an allegory representing mental 
development as nutritional growth, in which the imagination requires an organic 
diet of poetry and nature. In chapter four, Whitman’s Leaves of Grass 
Americanizes the digesting mind with an Emersonian aesthetic that locates 
power in the poet’s present transformation of the literary past into future mental 
nourishment. In chapter five, Williams adapts Emerson’s digesting mind with a 
pragmatic aesthetics of experience. By representing his Objectivist poems as fruit, 
 vii 
as in “This is Just to Say,” Williams relocates the organic ideals of vitality and 
unity from the poem, as aesthetic object, to the audience’s felt experience of 
reading-as-eating.  
 viii 
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1. Introduction: The Organic Metaphor of the Digesting Mind  
Ink runs from the corners of my mouth. 
There is no happiness like mine. 
I have been eating poetry.  
             Mark Strand, “Eating Poetry” 
 
Poetry enlarges the circumference of the 
imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of 
ever new delight, which have the power of 
attracting and assimilating to their own nature 
all other thoughts, and which form new 
intervals and interstices whose void forever 
craves fresh food.  
             Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defense of 
Poetry” 
A meditation rose in me that night 
Upon the lonely mountain when the scene 
Had passed away, and it appeared to me 
The perfect image of a mighty mind, 
Of one that feeds upon infinity, 
That is exalted by an under-presence, 
The sense of God, or, whatsoe’er is dim 
Or vast in its own being . . .    
               William Wordsworth, The Prelude 
 
Across a wide variety of contemporary discourses, from casual 
conversation, to advertising, to academic argumentation, speakers of English are 
accustomed to representing the mind as a body that chews, swallows, and 
digests the world of objects and ideas.  We devour novels, savor music, ruminate 
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on propositions, and digest problems.  We become starved for attention, fed up 
with each other’s nonsense, or unable to stomach unpleasant ideas.  Sometimes 
we have to eat our words or swallow an insult.  And such metaphors frequently 
appear in literature, as in the epigraphs above, and in literary criticism, as when 
Lawrence Buell claims that Emerson “imbibed . . . Unitarian pantheisms as 
digested and transmitted by Coleridge” (emphasis added, 149).  Given the 
ubiquity and diversity of these decidedly unliterary expressions, it is little 
wonder that critics have overlooked the important function of the digesting mind 
in literature and in their own disciplinary enterprise.   
A basic assumption of this study, borrowed from cognitive linguistics, is 
that metaphors matter—even the toothless old saws that have come to feel like 
literal expressions.  Commonplace metaphors instantiate value-laden patterns of 
thought.  For example, although each italicized phrase above pairs a different 
tenor and vehicle, all perform the same basic function: they represent an abstract 
mental process in the more concrete terms of ingestion and digestion.  Because 
these metaphors take the human body as their vehicle, they tend to privilege 
vitality, strength, and sensory pleasure.  Other vehicles invoke different sets of 
values.  For instance, if we represent the mind as a mechanism, as when we say, 
“His mind is a steel trap,” “The puzzle got my gears turning,” or “My brain is not 
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firing on all cylinders,” we privilege dynamism, efficiency, and accuracy, instead.  
As a result, patterns or inconsistencies in the vehicles we choose to represent a 
particular tenor reveal tacit values and attitudes.  
The same is true for many poets.  In each of the epigraphs above, for 
instance, an alimentary metaphor conveys a particular relation between the mind 
and the world, whether the latter is represented by a poetic text or a natural 
landscape.  Whereas Mark Strand celebrates poetry as a feast of sensuous 
pleasure, Percy Shelley values it as nourishment that strengthens the 
imagination.  And William Wordsworth, at the climax of his masterpiece, exalts 
the poetic imagination as an infinite capacity to digest the object world.  What 
and how the mind eats, as well as the nutritional effects of its food, offer insight 
to the ways in which poets negotiate questions of subjectivity, agency, creativity, 
and literary influence. 
Although Western literature is liberally peppered with metaphors of the 
digesting mind, critics have overlooked most of them, with the notable exception 
of aesthetic discernment as gustatory “taste.”  Diverse theoretical and cultural 
approaches have been applied to the metaphor of aesthetic taste, especially in 
romantic and subsequent literatures, in order to explore issues of personal and 
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cultural identity.1  But for all of this rich critical work, taste has yet to be 
recognized as a subset of the digesting mind, a much broader and more complex 
metaphorical tradition that extends at least as far back as Plato, who, in the 
Republic, bans the poet on the grounds that his work “nourishes” the irrational 
parts of the soul (1209).  Within this tradition, taste frequently overlaps and 
cooperates with an array of related tropes such as literature-as-food, reading-as-
eating, and contemplation-as-digestion.  Recognizing these relations allows us to 
study not only how individual metaphors contribute to larger families, but also 
how they participate in broader interactions between families of metaphors.  
Throughout this study, for example, aesthetic taste will repeatedly emerge at 
points of contention between the digesting mind and its nemesis, the mind-as-
mechanism. 
To demonstrate that metaphors like taste jointly constitute a systematic 
and intertextual discourse of mental digestion, I formulate a new 
interdisciplinary approach to poetic metaphor.  In this chapter, I use cognitive 
linguistic theories of metaphor to identify and to relate the digesting mind’s 
                                                 
1 In addition to the essays collected by Timothy Morton in Cultures of Taste / Theories of Appetite 
(2004), important studies of the metaphor of aesthetic taste include Morton’s Shelley and the 
Revolution in Taste (1994); Jocelyne Kolb’s Ambiguity of Taste (1995); Carolyn Korsmeyer’s Making 
Sense of Taste (1999); Denise Gigante’s Taste (2005); de Bolla, Leask, and Simpson’s edited 
collection, Land, Nation and Culture, 1740-1840: Thinking the Republic of Taste (2005); and Michel 
Delville’s Food, Poetry, and the Aesthetics of Consumption (2008). 
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component metaphors on the basis of the types of conceptual work that they 
perform.  Then, in subsequent chapters, I locate patterns of these metaphors 
within the work of particular poets, asking what they reveal about each poet’s 
understanding of the mind’s relation to the world.  As each negotiates questions 
of creativity and literary influence, his biological, philosophical, political, and 
aesthetic beliefs converge in metaphors of the digesting mind. 
To give shape and focus to this study, I have selected five poets and 
essayists, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Walt Whitman, and William Carlos Williams, who invoke the 
digesting mind in the service of organic aesthetics.2  In keeping with the 
metaphorical basis of organicism, these poets conceptualize literature through 
analogy with biological structures and processes, often representing the text as a 
plant that shapes itself through natural growth.  By reading the digesting mind 
in the context of organicism’s spread from English to American romanticism and 
then to American modernism, I deepen our understanding of this tradition’s 
historical and ideological scope by expanding its metaphorical basis beyond the 
familiar text-as-plant.  The digesting mind, although not limited to organic 
                                                 
2 I examine organicist poetry, but the digesting mind might be studied in other contexts, such as 
the prologue in early-modern drama, which frequently figured the playwright as a cook (Meads 
145). Likewise, other metaphorical patterns in various literary traditions might be investigated 
with a similar interdisciplinary and intertextual approach.   
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aesthetics, is itself an organic metaphor; it roots itself, like the poem-as-plant, in 
the biological structures and processes that supply its vehicles.  When organicism 
turns the text into a plant, the poets in this study frequently summon the 
digesting mind to consume it.  In this way, the metaphors of the text-as-plant and 
the digesting mind link texts and minds within in an economy of experiences 
and ideas figured as organic nutritional exchange.   
Moreover, the digesting mind allows each poet to understand creativity as 
a transformative synthesis of his diverse experiences of the world, including 
bodily sensations, spiritual energies, and abstract ideas.  The imagination 
metaphorically takes all of these in, digests them, and ultimately, uses them in 
poetic composition.  Because these inputs include reading materials and other 
works of art, the digesting mind becomes a way to negotiate questions of 
influence, tradition, and innovation as poets situate their work in relation to that 
of others.  And by figuring their works as food for other minds, poets imagine 
their own influence on subsequent poets and on the reading public present and 
future.  In short, the digesting mind reveals that, in addition to conceiving of the 
poem as a living whole, organic poets frequently represent literary history as an 
organic process, a dynamic whole of which individual poets conceive of their 
minds and works as active parts.  
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By joining self and world in reciprocal exchange, the digesting mind also 
represents subjectivity itself as an organic part of a larger whole.  But this unity 
differs from the static closure of an achieved ideal, such as the New Critics 
looked for in organic poetic form, in that it enacts a dynamic and iterative 
process of adjustment.  Because the digesting mind models subjectivity on what 
Michel Delville terms the “unfinished body,” which continually modifies itself 
through material exchanges across the boundaries of the alimentary canal, it 
renders subjectivity an environmentally contingent open system, whose organic 
unity is vulnerable but also dynamic and flexible (9). 
 
A Cognitivist Approach to Metaphor 
Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating since the 1990s, developments 
within the field of cognitive science have prompted reexamination of diverse 
literary phenomena from fresh perspectives,3 resulting in the emergence of a new 
field of literary study, most commonly called “cognitive poetics” or “cognitive 
                                                 
3 Far too numerous to list here, cognitivist approaches have been applied to a wide range of 
literary concerns such as period, genre, style, narrative perspective, affect, and characterization. 
These approaches include, among others, conceptual integration network or “blending” theory, 
conceptual metaphor theory, embodied cognition, deictic shift theory, protoypicality, and 
possible worlds theory. For a concise overview, see Margaret Freeman’s “Cognitive Linguistic 
Approaches to Literary Studies” and Alan Richardson’s “Studies in Literature and Cognition: A 
Field Map.” The first textbook in this emerging field, Stockwell’s Cognitive Poetics: An 
Introduction, also offers concise overviews of select approaches. 
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literary studies.”4  Two of its most promising approaches offer the alternative but 
compatible theories of metaphor that I use to characterize the digesting mind: 
conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and conceptual blending theory.5  Together, 
these frameworks broaden the scope of metaphors that are relevant to literary 
study.  They also furnish a more nuanced understanding of how metaphor 
works, both on its own and in conjunction with other tropes, along with a more 
precise descriptive vocabulary.  But perhaps most importantly for this project, 
cognitive theory provides a systematic way of studying families of metaphors, 
like the digesting mind and the poem-as-plant, as they recur throughout various 
texts and even entire discourses spanning multiple historical periods. 
Traditionally, literary scholars think of metaphor as a figure of speech that 
refers to one thing (the tenor) as another thing (the vehicle) that resembles it in 
some way.6  In Kenneth Burke’s influential terms, we consider it “a device for 
                                                 
4 The name and scope of this emerging field are still actively contested. Although most scholars 
refer to it as “cognitive poetics,” Rueven Tsur originally used this term for his own research on 
the ways in which literature exploits or disrupts ordinary cognitive processes for aesthetic effects 
(see Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics, 1-4). But others have used the terms “cognitive stylistics” 
(Semino and Culpeper ix-x) or “cognitive literary studies” (Richardson, “Studies” 2; Bruhn, 
“Exchange Values” 405). For further discussion of the contested name of this field, see 
Richardson (“Studies” 5-11). For an overview of some of the central debates about how cognitive 
science and literary studies should interact in the interdiscipline, see Bruhn’s “Exchange Values.” 
5 For further discussion of the relations between CMT and blending theory, see Fauconnier & 
Turner (Way We Think 179-81) and Grady et al. (“Blending and Metaphor”). 
6 Although literary criticism’s traditional terms “tenor” and “vehicle” come from I. A. Richards’s 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (96), Richards understands metaphor in a more nuanced way that 
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seeing something in terms of something else,” which, along with metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony, constitutes one of “four master tropes” (Burke’s italics, 
421).7  Following Roman Jakobson, we usually treat metaphor as the polar 
opposite of metonymy, a relation of contiguity rather than similarity, associating 
metaphor primarily with romanticism and poetry and metonymy with realism 
and prose.8  Because metaphor is hierarchical and unidirectional in structure, we 
mine it for information about its tenors, discounting its vehicles as merely 
instrumental or, worse, decorative.  And for the most part, we only analyze 
metaphors that strike us as novel or imaginative, treating them as isolated 
rhetorical figures.  But theorists of conceptual metaphor argue that this type of 
expression “is the smallest tip of the iceberg” and that “[t]he true intricacy and 
power lies in [the] background conceptual system” that structures metaphorical 
language in highly conventional ways (Turner, Reading Minds 151). 
                                                                                                                                                 
anticipates two of the insights of contemporary conceptual metaphor theory: that metaphor 
belongs to all language, not just literature, and that metaphor is primarily a matter of thought 
rather than of expression (D. West 3). For a discussion of the conceptual consequences of the shift 
from Richards’s “tenor and vehicle” to the cognitivist idea of “source and target,” see Fludernik 
et al. (“Metaphor and Beyond” 386-87). 
77 For example, Mutlu Konuk Blasing’s American Poetry and the Rhetoric of its Forms (1987) carves 
up American poetry according to these four tropes. 
8 Jakobson first distinguished metaphor from metonymy in his 1956 essay, “Two Aspects of 
Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” in Fundamentals of Language. In 1977, David 
Lodge expanded Jakobson’s distinction into a comprehensive literary taxonomy in The Modes of 
Modern Writing.  
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Based on foundational work by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark 
Turner, and others,9 CMT holds that metaphor operates jointly on two levels:10 
within the particular expressions of individual speakers and writers and within 
the “common conceptual apparatus” shared by these individuals as members of 
a language community (Lakoff and Turner 51).  Literary criticism usually treats 
only a small portion of the former.  But the intelligibility of these metaphors 
often depends upon the conceptual level, where metaphor activates a deeply 
ingrained, highly systematic, and largely unconscious thought structure that is 
revealed by metaphorical expressions.  This thought structure comprises an 
intricate, hierarchical network of “conceptual metaphors,” which function as 
cognitive tools.  Most conceptual metaphors let us understand a less concrete 
concept, known as the “target domain,” through analogy with a more concrete 
concept, known as the “source domain.”11  Henceforth I will refer to the terms of 
metaphor as “source and target” rather than “vehicle and tenor” in order to 
                                                 
9 Foundational studies of conceptual metaphor include Lakoff’s Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things (1987) and “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” (1993), Lakoff and Johnson’s 
Metaphors We Live By (1980), Lakoff and Turner’s More that Cool Reason (1989), Eva Feder Kittay’s 
Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure (1987), and Raymond Gibbs’s Poetics of Mind 
(1994). 
10 Lakoff and Turner (50-55) and Steen (Understanding 6-10) frame their discussions of the 
relationships between the cognitive and linguistic dimensions of metaphor in ways that are 
particularly helpful for literary scholars.  
11 For a concise introduction to the vocabulary and typographical conventions of CMT, see 
Kövecses (chapter 1). 
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signal an awareness of the conceptual dimension of metaphor that underlies its 
particular expressions in literary or other discourses.   
The overarching conceptual metaphor of interest here, which I have 
called, “the digesting mind,” lets us understand mental processes and 
experiences (the target domain) through a system of analogies with the body’s 
digestive system (the source domain).  By typographical convention, CMT uses 
small capitals to denote the underlying linkage between two conceptual domains 
and italics to denote particular metaphorical expressions.  For instance, the 
conceptual foundation of the digesting mind, which may be given as THE MIND IS 
A DIGESTING BODY, gives rise to Strand’s claim, “I have been eating poetry,” 
Shelley’s imagination, which “forever craves fresh food,” and Wordsworth’s 
“mighty mind . . . that feeds upon infinity.”  But it also gives rise to commonplace 
expressions such as, “He will cram his ideas down your throat,” “I’m fed up with 
you,” and “She’s hungry for an opportunity.”  Taken individually, these 
statements seem insignificant and, in many cases, no longer even feel like 
metaphors.  But together, they reveal that we tend to map various elements from 
the domain of digestion onto that of the mind, as shown in Table 1.  The very 
banality of the expressions in the right hand column bespeaks the extent to 
which digestive analogy structures our concept of the mind and its interaction 
12 
 
with the world.  Because CMT in this way reveals the active, conceptual 
instrumentality of conventional expressions, Lakoff heralds “The Death of Dead 
Metaphor,” in an article of that title.12  
 
Table 1: THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, A Conceptual Metaphor13 
 Source Domain: 
DIGESTING BODY 
Target Domain: 
MIND 
Example Linguistic 
Expressions 
(a) digestive system mind I cannot stomach the 
thought of it. 
(b) appetite for food & drink desire for mental stimulation 
(ideas, perceptions, texts, etc.) 
We’re hungry for answers. 
(c) food mental stimulation (ideas, 
perceptions, texts, etc.) 
Books are good brain food. 
(d)   • flavor of food quality of stimulation He made an unsavory 
proposal. 
(e)   • quantity of food quantity of stimulation It was a feast for the mind.   
(f)   • nutritional value of food impact of stimulation on 
mental well-being 
The park provides 
wholesome family fun. 
(g)   • cooking preparing to communicate 
ideas 
He salted the novel with 
incident and leavened it 
with humor. 
(h)   • serving food conveying stimulation  They fed me lie after lie. 
(i) ingestion, eating, swallowing perception (sensation, 
reading, etc.) 
He devoured the book. 
(j)   • swallowing whole accepting without considering He swallowed the whole 
argument. 
(k)   • tasting assessing/evaluating 
stimulation 
I tasted the book and 
quickly put it down. 
(l)   • chewing considering stimulation Let me chew on the idea. 
                                                 
12 For an earlier formulation of the “life” of dead metaphors, see Lakoff and Johnson (Metaphors 
55). 
13 The mappings and expressions in this table draw on and modify accounts of IDEAS ARE FOOD in 
Lakoff and Johnson (Metaphors 46-47, 147-48; Philosophy 241-43); Grady (“Foundations” chapter 
3); Lakoff et al. (84-85); and Kövecses (6, 34, 44, 83-84), and of READING IS EATING in Lakoff et al. 
(84-85). 
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 Source Domain: 
DIGESTING BODY 
Target Domain: 
MIND 
Example Linguistic 
Expressions 
(m) digestion mental processing I need to digest your 
proposal. 
(n)   • absorption of nutrients accepting ideas I've assimilated his theory 
in mine. 
(o)   • purging  (vomiting, 
excreting) 
rejecting ideas The very idea makes me 
want to puke. 
(p) effect of the food on the body effect of stimulation on the 
mind 
He thrives on theory. 
(q)   • promotion of strength promotion of mental power The book nourished his 
mind. 
(r)   • nutritive growth learning We have grown as 
scholars. 
(s)   • indigestion, sickness mental malfunction The idea made him 
nauseous.  
(t)   • malnourishment lack of mental stimuli We are attention starved. 
  
If, as Paul de Man argues, literary critics have tended to treat metaphor as 
a symbolic and organic “synthesis” of its terms, CMT offers an alternative, more 
allegorical and mechanistic concept of metaphorical relation (193).  By defining 
metaphor in terms of its cognitive instrumentality, CMT perpetually reminds us 
of the gap between source and target across which metaphor operates.  
Moreover, it reveals the systematicity of metaphor; each of the expressions in the 
rightmost column above instantiates the same tendency to conceive of the mind 
as a digesting body according to a highly formulaic logic.  Like many conceptual 
metaphors, the logic of THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY is sequential because its 
source domain is a finely articulated temporal process with a beginning and an 
end and various intermediate stages.  As a result, the expressions of the digesting 
14 
 
mind within a given text tend to form allegorical subtexts with predictable plots.  
First, the body, which stands for the mind, ingests food, which stands for ideas.  
Then the mind-as-body digests these ideas, incorporating them into its own 
structure or rejecting them as waste.  In effect, Wordsworth’s “mighty 
mind . . . that feeds upon infinity” does not symbolize the romantic imagination, 
it allegorizes it.  We all know what happens next. 
Although THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY has not been discussed in the 
literature of cognitive linguistics, it reformulates two well-documented 
conceptual metaphors: THE MIND IS THE BODY and its subset, IDEAS ARE FOOD.  My 
aim is not to discover a new metaphor, but rather to posit an intermediate level 
of specificity between these established metaphors in order to optimize their 
applicability to the organic poetics at hand.  First characterized by Eve Sweetser, 
THE MIND IS A BODY14 is a metaphorical “equation of the physical self and the inner 
self [that] is pervasive in English and in the Indo-European family [of languages] 
at large” (31).  Through this elaborate system of conceptual metaphors, we 
understand the mind by analogy with the human body, as when we use “taste” 
for personal preference, “listen” for “obey,” or “see” for understand.  IDEAS ARE 
                                                 
14 Sweetser refers to this metaphor as the “Mind-as-Body metaphor,” but I follow the naming of 
Lakoff et al. (80-99). In addition to Lakoff et al. and Sweetser, see Lakoff and Johnson (Philosophy 
chapter 12) for a clear and concise discussion of this conceptual metaphor. 
15 
 
FOOD15 is a more specific instance of THE MIND IS THE BODY (Lakoff and Johnson, 
Philosophy 241), which finds expression in commonplaces such as,  
What he said left a bad taste in my mouth.   
All this paper has in it are raw facts, half-baked ideas, and warmed over 
theories.   
There are too many facts here for me to digest them all.   
I just can’t swallow that claim.   
(Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors 46) 
THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, as I formulate it, occupies a level of specificity 
between THE MIND IS A BODY and IDEAS ARE FOOD such that the latter is comprised 
within it, as in Table 1 (mapping (c)).  Like IDEAS ARE FOOD, it designates a subset 
of THE MIND IS A BODY, but a broader one that uses sources from throughout the 
domain of digestion, not just food.  Whereas IDEAS ARE FOOD focuses on 
ideational content, THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY focuses on the agency of the 
mind as it creates, processes, or consumes this content.  The greater breadth of 
the latter permits a fuller examination of the questions of sensuous experience, 
imagination, and literary influence that concern the poets in this study.  
                                                 
15 For discussion of IDEAS ARE FOOD, consult the sources listed in the note to Table 1 above. 
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In addition to grouping large families of expression according to 
underlying conceptual linkages, CMT explains the ubiquity of conceptual 
metaphors by rooting them in our basic embodied experience.16  Although 
expressions of metaphorical concepts vary according to culture, Joseph Grady 
explains that “the recurrence of particular metaphorical patterns across cultures 
is so striking that any experiences which could give rise to these metaphors must 
be fundamental to human life in general, rather than based on any particular, 
local, culturally bound types of experience” (“Typology” 80-81).  These “primary 
metaphors,” which many leading theorists consider “universal” or nearly so,17 
are motivated by close correlations in our everyday experience.  They combine 
with other primary metaphors and with perceived structural similarities between 
domains in order to form complex conceptual metaphors such as IDEAS ARE FOOD 
and THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY.  For example, “I just can’t swallow that claim,” 
                                                 
16 Since Lakoff and Johnson influentially claimed that “no metaphor can ever be comprehended 
or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis,” many theorists have 
explored the phenomenological and embodied motivation of conceptual metaphor (emphasis 
omitted, Metaphors 19). For a concise overview of this discussion, see Kövecses (chapters 6 and 8). 
For a more detailed discussion, see Joseph Grady’s pioneering theory of primary metaphor in 
“Foundations of Meaning,” especially chapter 3 on IDEAS ARE FOOD, and his article, “A Typology 
of Motivation for Conceptual Metaphor.” In Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson fold 
Grady’s theory of experiential motivation into an “Integrated Theory of Primary Metaphor” 
(chapter 4). Other discussions of the experiential motivation of conceptual metaphors include 
Turner’s analysis of symmetry (Reading chapter 4); Lakoff and Turner (113-14); and Johnson (Body 
15-17, 114-17). 
17 For instance, Lakoff and Johnson claim that “when the embodied experiences in the world are 
universal, then the corresponding primary metaphors are universally acquired” (Philosophy 56).  
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expresses the primary metaphor ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING,18 which originates in 
the correlation between the routine act of swallowing food and the felt absence of 
resistance that accompanies it; the concrete lack of resistance experienced in 
swallowing comes to stand for less concrete mental forms of acceptance (Grady, 
“Foundations” 84).  Other primary metaphors that contribute to IDEAS ARE FOOD 
include:19 
APPEALING IS TASTY, as in “a delicious poem”  
DESIRE IS HUNGER, as in “starved for attention”  
ANALYZING IS TAKING APART, as in “digesting the facts”  
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, as in “a concoction of theories” 
LEARNING IS ABSORPTION, as in “absorbing the implications of an argument” 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, “[w]e acquire a large system of primary 
metaphors automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most 
ordinary of ways in the everyday world” (Philosophy 47).  And although each 
primary metaphor that contributes to THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY is motivated 
                                                 
18 Grady also gives this primary metaphor as ACQUIESCING IS SWALLOWING (“Foundations” 294). 
19 These primary metaphors, which Grady explicitly links to IDEAS ARE FOOD, are given in 
(“Foundations” 87-98); the example expressions are mine. In addition, several other primary 
metaphors listed in Grady’s appendix are likely involved in the digesting mind: PROCESSES ARE 
LIVING FORCES, THE NECESSARY MATERIAL FOR A PROCESS IS FOOD, EFFECTS ARE OBJECTS WHICH 
EMERGE FROM CAUSES, and CONSIDERING IS CHEWING (“Foundations” 282-98). 
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independently by a different correlation between experiential domains, together 
they reveal that our understanding of the mind is deeply informed by our 
corporeal experiences of ingestion and digestion.  
Because CMT links particular expressions within a broader conceptual 
framework, it allows literary scholars to identify patterns of figuration, such as 
the digesting mind, within and among literary texts and to contextualize those 
patterns in relation to the cultural discourses that inform them.  Whereas critics 
traditionally analyze metaphors individually, CMT groups them on the basis of 
similarities in the cognitive work that they perform.  However, Gerard Steen 
rightly cautions that conceptual metaphors are “social and cultural patterns” 
abstracted from the speech of individual language users (Understanding 16); they 
represent “the conceptual system underlying the speech of an idealized native 
speaker,” not an identical conceptual system that every language user shares 
(Lakoff’s emphasis, “A Figure” 223).  Conceptual metaphors may be more 
elaborately fleshed out for some individuals than others.  Moreover, as Steen 
argues, when language users process metaphorical expressions, they draw on the 
underlying conceptual basis of the metaphor to varying degrees.  Sometimes 
highly conventional metaphors are understood directly, as literal expressions 
that are instances of polysemy rather than metaphor.  And when a language user 
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recognizes metaphor as such, he or she may either retrieve its mappings “as 
already available conceptual representations,” or actively engage in seeking out 
relevant mappings or forging new ones (Understanding 16-20).  But despite these 
variables in the ways that individual readers process metaphorical expressions, 
CMT gives literary scholars a framework through which to recognize and to 
discuss the ways in which novel metaphors often depend upon and exploit the 
conceptual apparatus behind conventional expressions.  For instance, Strand’s 
statement, “I have been eating poetry,” figures a literary text as food and reading 
as eating (mappings (c) and (i) in Table 1).  By invoking a familiar conceptual 
metaphor, Strand allows us to read between the lines of his expression, 
discovering other relevant mappings that are implied.  He mentions neither 
hunger nor desire to read, yet we might conclude that Strand indulges an 
“appetite” for poetry (mapping (b)).  And although he doesn’t mention the flavor 
of the text, we might conclude from his evident pleasure that it is “delicious” 
(mapping (d)).  The underlying metaphorical concept, familiar to us from 
countless dead metaphors, helps to explain how Strand’s unconventional 
expression can mean more than it says, depending on the extent to which the 
individual reader is willing and able to access the information structure of 
conceptual metaphors stored by long-term memory. 
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Conceptual blending theory, also known as conceptual integration 
network theory, situates CMT within a broader theory of creativity that includes 
many imaginative processes, such as counterfactual reasoning, categorization, 
personification, and metonymy.20  Its greater flexibility enables it to account for 
our ability to merge metaphors or mix them seamlessly with other tropes in 
imaginative ways.  An account of Strand’s “eating poetry” metaphor from the 
perspective of blending theory will illustrate the differences and overlaps 
between these two frameworks. 
Whereas CMT describes a one-way mapping of characteristics from a 
source domain onto a target domain, blending theory allows for a greater variety 
of relations by positing a broader range of “mental spaces”21 that make up a 
“conceptual integration network.”  In contrast to a domain, which is a relatively 
stable concept, such as “flower” or “digestion,” a “mental space” is a more 
flexible, temporary mental construct that is assembled and modified on the fly 
for the purpose of thinking about a particular real, remembered, or hypothetical 
                                                 
20 Foundational accounts of blending theory include Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner’s 
“Conceptual Integration Networks” (1999) and The Way We Think (2002). See also Grady et al., 
“Blending and Metaphor” (1999). 
21 In contrast to a domain, which is a relatively stable concept, such as “flower” or “digestion,” a 
“mental space” is “a partial and temporary representational structure which speakers construct 
when thinking or talking about a . . . . situation.” Mental spaces are constructed and modified on 
the fly and are often structured by one or more domains (Grady et al., “Blending and Metaphor” 
102). 
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situation.  Most mental spaces are structured in part by multiple domains that 
are relevant to the situation, but in the case of conventional metaphors, domains 
can operate as mental spaces.22  For example, a basic conceptual integration 
network, such as Strand’s “eating poetry,” includes four mental spaces: two 
input spaces (the source domain of EATING FOOD and the target domain of 
READING POETRY), a generic space, which contains the structural similarities 
between the source and target that make the comparison possible, and a blended 
space, in which the imagination carries out the logic of the metaphor, recruiting 
other conventional metaphors, metonymic associations, and ideas that are 
implicitly invoked by the metaphor.  Using the diagrammatic conventions 
outlined by Fauconnier and Turner (Way We Think 40-47), we might represent 
Strand’s expression as shown in Figure 1.  
  
                                                 
22 For a clear discussion of the relationship between domains and mental spaces, see Grady et al. 
(“Blending and Metaphor” 102). 
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Figure 1: “Eating Poetry,” A Conceptual Integration Network 
 
The generic space represents the ground of the metaphor, the similarity 
that makes eating a fit analog for reading: in both activities, an agent processes 
input.  These roles (agent, process, and input) are populated by different 
elements in the two input spaces.  The solid lines connecting elements in one 
input space to analogous elements in the other are called “counterpart 
connections.”  In the case of a conventional conceptual metaphor, such as this 
instance of READING IS EATING, the counterpart connections correspond to 
mappings between the source and target domains as described by CMT.  Hence, 
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the counterpart connection between “Eater” and “Reader” in Figure 1 
corresponds to mapping (i) in Table 1, that between “Food” and “Poetry” 
corresponds to mapping (c), and so on.  But by designating a separate mental 
space where the metaphor “happens,” blending theory allows us more precisely 
to articulate how concepts interact when we interpret a metaphorical expression.  
For instance, the dashed lines in Figure 1 indicate that the blend is composed 
using select elements from each of the input spaces.  The process (“eating”) is 
projected into the blend from the source and the input (“poetry”) is projected 
from the target.  The agent (“I”) fuses the reader from the target with the eater 
from the source as both are projected into the blend.23  
A particular expression of a conceptual metaphor, as described by CMT, 
may be described in more detail by blending theory.  Indeed, Fauconnier and 
Turner suggest that conventional conceptual metaphors arise from blends that 
have become sufficiently entrenched in our thought processes that they can 
function as a sort of shortcut: a direct mapping of the source onto the target 
domain that does not require the activation of the generic and blended spaces.  
But the blended space is always available whenever one uses or interprets a 
                                                 
23 Metaphoric blends, as opposed to other kinds of blends, characteristically have one element in 
the blended space that fuses a pair of counterparts from the two input spaces: “Intuitively 
speaking, the point of metaphors is precisely that one thing is depicted as or equated with 
another” (Grady et al., “Blending and Metaphor” 114). 
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conventional metaphor (Fauconnier and Turner, “Conceptual” 181).  As a result, 
conventional metaphorical mappings often operate as a starting point for more 
complex conceptual blends (Grady et al., “Blending and Metaphor” 113).   
For the purposes of this study, the greatest advantage of blending theory 
over CMT is that it lets us understand how particular metaphorical expressions 
take on a logic of their own as our imagination works during interpretation.  For 
instance, in Strand’s metaphor, neither source nor target domain calls for liquid 
ink; eating involves fluids, such as saliva and juices from the food, but reading 
poetry involves no fluids—only dry ink.  As a result, Strand’s claim that “Ink 
runs from the corners of my mouth. / There is no happiness like mine,” cannot be 
directly explained by any of the mappings in Table 1.  In this respect, CMT leaves 
us at a loss.  Nevertheless, the image makes sense, given the logic of READING IS 
EATING, when we play the scenario in our minds.  When we imagine Strand 
literally tearing pages out of a book and chewing them with abandon, we might 
envision his saliva mixing with the ink and making it run.  This playing through 
of the scenario set up in the blended space is commonly referred to as “running 
the blend” (Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think 44-49).  Most literary critics are 
well practiced in “running the blend,” which we perform whenever we explore 
the implications of metaphor through visualization or by recruiting other 
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knowledge into our textual interpretations, such as historical context, formal 
conventions, traditional metaphors, metonymies, ironic undertones, or other 
literary tropes.  But blending theory allows us more precisely to articulate how 
we perform this imaginative feat and how it can result in diverse readings, even 
for the same reader.   
Moreover, blending theory explains how complex metaphorical 
expressions “tend to operate on the basis of an interbraiding of metonymic and 
metaphoric strategies, similarity and contiguity” (Fludernik, “Metaphorics” 236).  
Cognitive linguists have argued that just as conventional expressions reveal 
underlying conceptual metaphors, they also reveal conceptual metonymies 
(Gibbs 324-32).  The basic difference is that whereas metaphor substitutes one 
thing for another in a different domain, metonymy substitutes one thing for 
another within the same domain (Gibbs 321-22).24  Following Jakobson’s 
influential distinction, many literary critics have treated these tropes as mutually 
exclusive opposites.  But cognitivist approaches have loosened the distinction 
partly by demonstrating that most conceptual metaphors are based on 
                                                 
24 For helpful discussion of the relationship between cognitive metaphor and cognitive 
metonymy, see Gibbs (319-58), Kövecses (171-94), and Barcelona’s introduction to Metaphor and 
Metonymy at the Crossroads, a collection of essays that explores the relations between these 
conceptual structures in greater depth.  
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metonymic relations between experiential domains,25 and partly by 
demonstrating how metaphor and metonymy seamlessly interact, especially in 
blended mental spaces. 
For example, envisioning Strand’s inky chin, we might interpret it as a 
metonym for animality by recruiting into the blend our knowledge of how 
animals eat—an idea that we find reinforced and developed by the poem’s 
subsequent canine imagery.  In effect, Strand’s extended metaphor works on the 
basis of partly metonymic relations.  And if we imagine Strand eating poetry as a 
dog might wolf down raw meat, we might recognize the implicit metaphor of ink 
as blood, which invites a number of possible interpretations, given our cultural 
associations with blood and our familiarity with the history of its use in various 
literary tropes and conventional expressions, such as “the pen is mightier than 
the sword.”  By setting up a blended space with a logic of its own, or an 
“emergent structure” (Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think 42-43), which 
comes from neither the source nor the target domain, blending theory allows us 
                                                 
25 For example, the primary metaphor ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING is metonymically motivated 
insofar as the felt lack of resistance that is correlated with the experience of swallowing comes to 
stand metonymically for other experiences involving a less concrete lack of resistance, as in 
“swallowing a defeat” or “swallowing one’s pride.” For more on metonymy as a basis for 
conceptual metaphor, see Barcelona’s “On the Plausibility of Claiming a Metonymic Motivation 
for Conceptual Metaphor” in Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads. For further discussion of 
the cognitivist challenge to the metaphor vs. metonymy opposition, see Fludenik et al. 
(“Metaphor and Beyond” 386). 
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to go beyond the mappings of CMT to account for our own imaginative 
contribution to our interpretations of metaphorical expressions. 
Blending theory also accommodates a wider range of metaphorical 
expressions, including those involving multiple source domains or even blends 
of multiple blends.26  And whereas CMT can treat unconventional metaphorical 
expressions only as “one-shot” images that stand apart from conceptual 
metaphors or as modifications of conventional metaphors, 27 blending theory can 
treat radically novel metaphors more directly and in greater depth.  For instance, 
confronted with an unusual expression like “his chocolate donut eyes,” blending 
theory prompts us first to locate the ground of the metaphor in a generic space 
(concentric circular shapes), and then to project the brown color of the donut in 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Fauconnier and Turner’s account of the metaphorical expression, “Prayer is 
the echo of the darkness of the soul,” which includes multiple source domains and two blends 
that contribute to what they call a “megablend” (Way We Think 154-59). 
27 Theorists of conceptual metaphor have tended to downplay the novelty of poetic metaphor in 
order to emphasize its participation in conventional cognitive structures. See for example, 
Turner’s Reading Minds (especially chapter 3). The standard CMT account of novel or creative 
metaphors, as given by Lakoff and Turner in More than Cool Reason, explains them as either 
standalone images or modifications of conventional conceptual metaphors. The former, which 
Lakoff and Turner call “one-shot” image metaphors, map elements of one image (rather than 
elements of a conceptual domain) onto those of another, resulting in radically novel expressions 
such as “My wife . . . whose waist is an hourglass” (89-100), or my example below, “his chocolate 
donut eyes.” The latter type of metaphor exploits entrenched, conventional mappings between 
domains through strategies of elaboration, extension, questioning, or combination (67-72). To this 
list, Elena Semino adds the choice of unconventional source and target domains and the creation 
of novel metaphorical patterns throughout and between texts (49-55). Fludernik adds 
contextualization (Beyond Cognitive Metaphor Theory 6). In Death is the Mother of Beauty, Turner 
further argues that metaphors are creative when they challenge or modify our entrenched 
conceptions of the target domain (20, 155).  
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the input space onto the eyes in the blended space.  But then, by further running 
the blend, we might interpret the donut as a metonym for a sweet flavor, 
recruiting sweetness into the blend and projecting it onto a metaphorical, 
affective quality expressed in the eyes.  Thus, blending theory helps us to 
articulate how complex metaphorical expressions may invoke multiple tropes of 
various types, which, even if implicit, contribute to the expression’s rich 
metaphorical meaning. 
Although CMT and blending theory have been fruitfully applied to 
metaphorical expressions in literature, both separately and jointly,28 the 
relationship between literary and nonliterary metaphor remains a contested 
issue.  To emphasize the indispensability of metaphor on the conceptual level, 
early proponents of CMT insisted on a continuity between literary and 
nonliterary metaphor, echoing Lakoff and Johnson’s claim that metaphor goes 
beyond decorative effect profoundly to shape the way we think.  But more 
recently, as theorists of metaphor have increasingly focused on the level of 
linguistic expression, insisting on the importance of particular word choices 
embedded in a multi-layered context that informs the meaning of each 
expression, some have questioned the assumption of a continuity between 
                                                 
28 M. Freeman provides a wide-ranging and relatively recent overview of such studies, which are 
too numerous to list here (“Cognitive Linguistic Approaches” 1182-87). 
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literary and non-literary metaphors.29  Reuven Tsur, who studies the ways in 
which literature achieves aesthetic effects by disrupting or defamiliarizing the 
routine cognitive processes that we have evolved for survival, cautions that CMT 
oversimplifies literary metaphor.  By reducing a wide variety of expressions to a 
single underlying conceptual comparison, Tsur worries, CMT promotes stock 
responses to literature by substituting “rapid cognition” for a slower but more 
flexible form of “delayed cognition” that better tolerates uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and a multiplicity of meanings (Toward 577-85). 
Even if empirical data suggests that “different brain centers are involved 
in the understanding of novel and conventional metaphors” (Tsur, Toward 593), 
delayed cognition is literary criticism’s stock-in-trade and we are unlikely to 
exchange it for the vacuous conveniences of stock response.  In fact, CMT 
actually disrupts what has long been our stock response to conventional 
metaphor—namely, to ignore it.  By challenging prevailing assumptions about 
what kinds of figurative expression matter, CMT might, as in the present study, 
                                                 
29 For example, Steen uses empirical research to study the ways in which readers process 
metaphor in literary discourses differently than in nonliterary discourses. See Steen’s 
Understanding Metaphor in Literature (1994), and his articles, “Literary and Nonliterary Aspects of 
Metaphor,” and “Analyzing Metaphor in Literature.” See also Steen and Gibbs’s “Some 
Questions about Metaphor in Literature,” which calls for a quantitative, corpus-linguistic 
approach to assess the frequency and distribution of metaphors in literary and non-literary 
discourses. 
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provide a starting point for the application of delayed cognition to a previously 
neglected dimension of literature.  Not all poetic metaphor is novel.  Poets might 
use a higher proportion of novel to conventional metaphors than members of 
other discourse communities, but like most of us, they freely intermingle the two.  
And often, as in the case of Strand’s “eating poetry,” novel metaphors rely on 
their more familiar cousins in ways that aid our comprehension of them.  But 
conventional expressions go unremarked by critics—even when they occur in 
famous passages such as the epigraphs above.  They do not challenge our 
entrenched ways of thinking (Turner, Death 20, 155) and so they appear empty or 
transparent.  But CMT brings these expressions to light, revealing the conceptual 
work that they perform as they contribute to “megametaphors” or “chains,”30 
extended metaphors that inform the range of a text’s overall meanings.  And by 
illustrating the similarities and differences between conventional and novel 
expressions, CMT and blending theory together allow us to recognize that 
conventional expressions, when situated in the context of a poem, can bear just 
as much meaning potential as their novel cousins.   
                                                 
30 “Megametaphor” is Paul Werth’s term for an extended metaphor that permeates a literary text 
with an undercurrent of meaning (79). Finding a similar phenomenon across a wider range of 
discourses, Semino refers to metaphor “chains,” which result from the recurrence and extension 
of metaphorical expressions (226).  
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Take, for example, the contrast between two expressions of the digesting 
mind, one more conventional than the other.  In an oft-quoted set of lines from 
“Expostulation and Reply,” Wordsworth maps ingestion onto perception, in a 
manner consistent with Table 1, mapping (h): “we can feed this mind of ours, / In 
a wise passiveness” (emphasis added, Lyrical 148).  These lines express the 
conventional mapping that might be given as SUPPLYING IDEAS IS SERVING FOOD.  
In Spring and All, Williams gives us a less familiar metaphor when he associates 
New York with “John Marin: / skyscraper soup” (Collected Poems 1: 200).  In 
comparing Marin’s cityscape paintings to soup,31 Williams expresses the 
conceptual mapping in Table 1, line (c), which might be given as PERCEPTIONS ARE 
FOOD.  Although both poets map the source domain of eating onto the target 
domain of perception, Williams’s metaphor might, at first glance, strike us as 
more innovative because it seems further removed from the types of expressions 
we use in everyday speech.   
This difference results partly from Williams’s choice of more specific 
conceptual domains, which allows the reader to identify a more detailed set of 
analogical mappings between the two.  Wordsworth’s target domain, perception 
                                                 
31 As Williams’s editor notes, Marin was a painter who “produced a number of expressionistic 
views of the New York skyline that might well be called ‘skyscraper soup’” (Collected Poems 1: 
503). 
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(of nature), is abstract in the sense that it might include various parts of nature 
perceived by any or all of the senses.  His source domain, feeding, is equally 
generic; we don’t know what kind of food the mind eats, or how it tastes.  
Because this metaphor operates on a generic level, similar to everyday 
expressions such as “food for the mind,” and “mental nourishment,” it does not 
challenge our conventional system of mappings.  For this reason, we may not 
even activate the generic or blended spaces of the conceptual integration 
network.  We simply retrieve a ready-made conceptual mapping and consider 
this stock response sufficient.  Indeed, although critics frequently invoke these 
lines to explain Wordsworth’s attitude toward nature, few—if any—address the 
metaphor of feeding.  Instead, they treat it as transparent.  In contrast, Williams’s 
more specific domains invoke more detailed concepts with a greater number of 
elements for potential mappings.  His target is the appearance of a Marin 
painting of the New York skyline and his source is soup: a brothy mixture of 
various foods that have been combined and cooked.  Because these two domains 
are seldom compared, the reader must engage in delayed cognition, performing 
an unfamiliar set of mappings in order to understand Williams’s expression.  The 
pieces of ingredients floating in the soup might suggest the visual effects of 
fragmentation and fluid movement.  The watery consistency of the broth might 
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refer to the watery colors and indistinct edges that we associate with an 
impressionistic style.  And the cooked quality of the soup may suggest that, 
although the painting appears loosely arranged, perhaps even random, this 
looseness is a deliberate effect.  When we run the blend, imagining what these 
elements might look like all together, we probably arrive at a reasonable 
approximation of a Marin canvas.  And if we recruit into the blend our 
knowledge of the ways in which people typically interact with soup, then Marin 
becomes the cook or chef and Williams the diner.  Perhaps the museum or 
gallery even becomes a restaurant.  By challenging us to figure out how a 
painting can resemble soup, Williams’s metaphor requires that we use our 
imaginations, activating the generic and blended spaces of a conceptual 
integration network.  It therefore strikes us as interesting, novel, and creative. 
Although my discussion of the difference between these two metaphors is 
partly informed by Turner’s distinction between “creative metaphors,” which 
require us to reconceive the target domain, and “non-creative ones,” which do 
not (Death 20, 155), I mistrust these labels.  To call Wordsworth’s metaphor less 
“creative” would be to discount the equally important work that it performs 
within its poetic context.  Whereas Williams characterizes a particular painter’s 
style, Wordsworth justifies the poet’s idling in nature.  His argument hinges on a 
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metaphor chain that juxtaposes two kinds of mental food.  When urged to go 
indoors and read, to “drink the spirit breath’d / From dead men to their kind,” 
the Wordsworth persona frames the sensuous experience of nature as a more 
substantial and vital mental food, the ingestion of which requires no unpleasant 
effort and yields spiritual in addition to intellectual benefits: 
"The eye it cannot chuse but see, 
“We cannot bid the ear be still; 
“Our bodies feel, where'er they be, 
“Against, or with our will. 
 
"Nor less I deem that there are powers, 
“Which of themselves our minds impress, 
“That we can feed this mind of ours, 
“In a wise passiveness.   (emphasis added, Lyrical 148) 
The generality of Wordsworth’s “feed” enacts his argument on a conceptual 
level: any kind of sensuous perception of nature will nourish the mind.  And 
moreover, the willingness to accept whatever mental food nature might provide, 
leaves the mind open to the influx of even more abstract spiritual “powers.”  In 
addition to contributing to the poem’s relaxed, carefree tone, Wordsworth’s 
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conventional expression helps, in a highly creative way, to establish the poem’s 
overall conceit and to advance its claim for a broader, more abstract and 
spiritually engaged notion of learning.  Moreover, if we choose to engage in 
delayed cognition, we might run the blend, imagining Wordsworth feeding on 
nature’s abundant food.  If so, we enhance our understanding of the poem’s 
spiritual dimension by recognizing its implicit comparison of nature to the 
manna of Exodus.  Hence, when William Hazlitt remarked that Wordsworth 
“gathers manna in the wilderness,” he may have had “Expostulation and Reply” 
in mind (349).  To use cognitive theory to sort metaphors into the categories of 
creative and non-creative would simply reproduce traditional literary-critical 
assumptions about what kinds of figurative language matter, when instead, we 
might use it to reevaluate these assumptions.  
In addition to widening the scope of metaphors that merit critical 
attention, cognitive theories can enable us to study patterns of metaphorical 
expressions at the textual level and beyond.  Lynne Cameron identifies three 
levels of metaphorical systematicity: the “local” level of individual texts or 
writers; the discourse” level, where intertextual patterns emerge among 
members of a particular discourse community; and the “global level,” which 
spans multiple discourses (16).  To date, most cognitivist approaches to literary 
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metaphor have focused on the local level, teasing out patterns of metaphor in 
particular novels, poems, or plays.32  A notable exception is Turner’s Death is the 
Mother of Beauty, a treatment of kinship metaphor at the global level, which 
ranges synchronically throughout the English language, drawing examples from 
literary and other texts.  But critics have yet to apply cognitive theories at the 
discourse level, where intertextual patterns emerge through the interaction of the 
members of a particular discourse community,33 such as a literary movement or 
particular poetic tradition.  As a result, they have underutilized many of the 
literary critic’s tools such as historical, ideological, and biographical context, 
literary influence, and allusion.  Moreover, as Richardson points out, cognitive 
approaches to literary metaphor “rarely engage with recent criticism on the text 
or author in question in the jousting manner of much professional literary 
criticism and their intended audience does not seem to include fellow specialists” 
(“Studies” 6).  It is not surprising, then, that few of their insights have been taken 
up and put to use by their fellow critics.  
                                                 
32 Although too numerous to list here, some exemplary cognitivist studies of metaphor in 
particular texts include Paul Werth’s analysis of E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India and Dylan 
Thomas’s Under Milk Wood, in “Extended Metaphor-A Text-World Account”; M. Freeman’s 
readings Emily Dickinson in “Cognitive Mapping and Literary Analysis” and “Poetry and the 
Scope of Metaphor”; and Semino’s treatment of metaphors for migraine in Ian McEwan’s 
Atonement (chapter 2). 
33 For example, drawing on Cameron’s distinction, Semino studies metaphors at the level of 
discourse systematicity in political debate and in science and education (chapters 3 and 4). 
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This study begins to remedy this disconnection by working across all 
three levels while focusing on discourse systematicity within the tradition of 
organic poetics.  Each subsequent chapter works on the local level by asking 
what intertextual patterns of digestive metaphor reveal about a particular poet’s 
conception of the mind and its relation to the world around it.  In addition to 
contextualized close readings of select poems, I draw evidence from prose essays 
and letters, where poets tend more directly to discuss their aesthetic values and 
aims.  But unlike most cognitivist approaches to local systems of literary 
metaphor, each chapter engages with other non-cognitive specialists, building on 
their work and “jousting” with them in ways that advance the broader critical 
understanding of each poet.   
This approach further underpins this study’s examination of the digesting 
mind at higher levels of systematicity.  I have chosen Coleridge, Wordsworth, 
Whitman, Emerson, and Williams because their organicist aesthetics participate 
in a tradition with a robust critical history of its own, in which we have already 
been treating them as a sort of discourse community: a group of people who 
discuss shared concerns based on similar sets of assumptions and values.  By 
focusing on its expression within the context of the development of organic 
aesthetics from English romanticism through American modernism, I examine 
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the digesting mind on the discourse level.  Each chapter places its poet in dialog 
with other organicists, examining how he takes up or alters their digestive 
imagery in ways that illuminate his unique aesthetic vision and relationship to 
the poetic tradition.  But the digesting mind is not limited to poetry.  From 
philosophy, to physiology, to psychology, many thinkers invoke this conceptual 
metaphor as they grapple with the mind and its relationship to the body and to 
the world around it.  By placing each poet in dialog with key contemporaries in 
other disciplines, whose work informs his aesthetics, this study uses global-level 
systematicity to contextualize the digesting mind at the local and discourse 
levels.  
 
Organicism as Conceptual Metaphor 
In addition to balancing its historical sweep with focused particularity, 
this study uses metaphorical systematicity at the discourse and global levels to 
advance a broader argument about the status of organic metaphor in literary 
criticism.  In the first half of the twentieth century, the New Critics helped to 
establish the modern-day English department based, in part, on the organicist 
claim that literature “produce[s] the truth in and of its own activity—the truth of 
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autopoesis” (Youngquist, “Romanticism” 185, 193).34  But as New Criticism fell out 
of fashion, so did organic aesthetics.  Since then, organicism has been widely 
dismissed as a facile reliance on vitalist metaphors that may conceal a potentially 
repressive—even totalitarian—imperative toward unity and closure.  As David 
Fairer explains, idealist organicism’s “uncompromising image of a life force or 
inner necessity” tends to obscure the artist’s agency, rendering the artwork a 
product of necessity:35  
[T]he coerciveness of the idea is clear, . . . the quirky, odd, sportive, or 
deformed will be dispensed with.  When this ‘unity’ is troped as 
organism, and thus given a dynamic aspect, it can appear more benign, 
even providential, with the necessity internalised.  It seems now that an 
inner law or determining principle is literally expressing itself, pushing 
outwards.  (22)  
Accordingly, Jerome McGann censures literary scholars for their uncritical 
absorption of organicism as one of the chief elements of romantic ideology.36  
                                                 
34 On the New Critics’ appropriation of organicism in the service of the professionalization of 
literary criticism, see Poovey (431-33).  
35 It should be noted that Fairer does not consider all organicism repressive in this way; here he 
critiques idealist organicism in order to argue for an alternative, empirical organicism, which he 
traces to the eighteenth-century philosophy of John Locke, as discussed in chapter 2 below. 
36 McGann writes, “When reading Romantic poems, then, we are to remember that their ideas—
for example, ideas about . . . the organic and processive structure of natural and social life, and so 
forth—are all historically specific . . . In the Romantic Age these and similar ideas are represented 
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And de Man argues that the New Critics, in mistaking the literary work for a 
natural object, sought in vain to locate its unity in a reified, sensuous notion of 
form, rather than in the intentional structure of form as it unfolds through the 
hermeneutic circle of the critical process (31).  Although it seeks a singular 
meaning for each poem, de Man claims, New Criticism generates “a plurality of 
significations that can be radically opposed. . . . Almost in spite of itself, it pushes 
the interpretative process so far that the analogy between the organic world and 
the language of poetry finally explodes” (28).37   
However, organicism has always had champions, who maintain that such 
opposition oversimplifies the complex structures, paradoxical dynamics, and 
internal tensions upon which organic unity depends.  In the 1980s, during the 
height of anti-organic sentiment, Murray Krieger argued that “Organicism’s call 
for unity . . . occurs only in the company of its opposite, the call for variety that 
gives to any attempted unity a dynamics that threatens its stability.”  Hence, 
organic unity “is always unsettled and in motion, . . . in imitation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
as trans-historical—eternal truths which wake to perish never. The very belief that transcendental 
categories can provide a permanent ground for culture becomes, in the Romantic Age, an 
ideological formation—another illusion raised up to hold back an awareness of the contradictions 
inherent in contemporary social structures . . .” (134). 
37 In “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” de Man also targets the valorization of the symbol, “the 
product of the organic growth of form,” over its mechanical sibling, allegory, because the former 
typifies the romantic temptation to find solace in a mystified, intersubjective unity with the world 
(191). For more detailed discussion of deconstruction’s attempt to “overthrow the notion of 
organic unity,” see Shusterman (63). 
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continually proliferating energies of the natural order as a biological order” 
(Krieger’s emphasis, Reopening 41).  Fully committed to a “duplicitous 
organicism” that perpetually exposes its own illusions, Krieger argues that his 
version of organic aesthetics “works to be ideology-free” (“My Travels” 225, 224). 
More recently, critics have reclaimed “the latent monstrosity of 
organicism,” its “tendency to overflow preconceived boundaries” in defense of 
its continued relevance to discussions of aesthetic form (Armstrong’s emphasis, 
6).  One of several to argue that organicism need not be incompatible with 
poststructuralist thought,38 Charles J. Armstrong offers a deconstructive account 
of its inherent instabilities and contradictions in Romantic Organicism (2003).39  He 
characterizes his subject as a necessarily problematic attempt to transcend the 
                                                 
38 In addition to Armstrong, many have argued for organicism’s relevance to poststructuralist 
thought in lively and compelling ways. Richard Shusterman contends that Derridean “différance 
is essentially a version . . . of the older [Hegelian] notion of radical organic unity” (70). Paul 
Youngquist demonstrates that like New Criticism and historicism, deconstruction is authorized 
by the truth claims of autopoesis, which depend upon the treatment of literature as “a natural 
organism that out of itself to its own unique ends” (“Romanticism” 185). Tilottama Rajan argues 
that a recovery of the romantics’ uncertainties about the structure and organization of organic life 
might be used to deconstruct the oversimplified aesthetic ideology of organicism of the New 
Critics (47). Mary Poovey identifies five characteristics of contemporary criticism that suggest 
that the trope of the organic whole remains the governing metaphor for the field, including 
poststructuralist approaches (432-35). Even Krieger, who, in the 1980s, vigorously defended his 
organic aesthetics in debates with de Man (Donoghue 101), acknowledges several similarities 
between his approach and poststucturalist thinking in general (“My Travels” 222-23). 
39 Although it does not approach the depth of Armstrong’s book-length argument, Jonathan 
Culler’s brilliant but brief reading of M. H. Abrams’s The Mirror and the Lamp, in “The Mirror 
Stage” (1981), anticipates several of Armstrong’s key ideas, such as “the revelation of a self-
deconstructive movement within the Romantic theoretical discourse, whose major insights are 
aporias revealed by the very attempt to conceal them” (Culler 152). 
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dichotomy between subject and object (4) and distills, from Kant, its three “main 
principles”: “hierarchical totalisation, interdependence of parts and external 
delimitation” (6).  In attempting to unify heterogeneous elements, this dynamic 
inevitably ends in aporia as it bumps up against “the internal tensions of this 
structure—including those between individual autonomy and totalising unity, 
and between full unity and mere balance” (9).  Likewise reclaiming organicism’s 
resistance to closure, Denise Gigante’s Life (2009) counters the new historicist 
charge of escapism or evasion with “a methodology for reading . . . seemingly 
‘formless’ forms,” such as Blake’s Jerusalem and Shelley’s Witch of Atlas, “as 
manifestations of an epigenesist poetics,” according to which poetry, like life, 
gradually shapes itself from within (6).  These poets, Gigante claims, share “a 
strong conviction that aesthetic power can have real-world transformative 
capacity.  The concept of vital power on which they relied made possible a world 
in which material structures were plastic and subject to ongoing change” (Life 
48).  This study continues the work of Fairer and Gigante by likewise taking 
organicism seriously, as a system of aesthetics that can, and frequently does, 
confront and wrestle with its boundless aspirations, limitations, and self-
contradictions.   
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But from a cognitivist perspective, organicism is not limited to a particular 
romantic theory of art; it constitutes a global-level metaphor system that actively 
shapes our thought within and beyond literary-critical discourse.  Recognizing 
organic aesthetics as an application of a more fundamental conceptual 
framework helps to explain its tenacity and allows critics—even those most 
averse to organicism—to recognize and to account for their own reliance on 
organic metaphors.  Organicism, as I use the term, denotes a conceptual 
metaphor that maps biological processes onto any complex structure that is 
characterized by dynamic, internally driven interdependencies among parts and 
wholes.  It is “a grounding systematics for understanding all holistic structures . . . to 
put matters simply, a way of thinking meaningfully about wholes” (Armstrong’s 
italics, 2).40  In the case of organic aesthetics, the holistic structure is the work of 
art. 
                                                 
40 Although my definitions draw on Armstrong’s, I insist, along with Krieger, that “organicism 
begins and ends as metaphor” (Reopening 5). Armstrong objects that “Such reductions of 
organicism [as Krieger’s] to a metaphor . . . that can be handled as rhetorical instrument, are 
questionable at best” (8). But what he objects to is evidently not the treatment of organicism as 
metaphor per se—for him, it remains a “figure”—but rather its treatment as a mere “rhetorical 
instrument” that yields isolated expressions. Organicism, he claims, verges on what Martin 
Heidegger calls “ontotypology,” “a comprehensive figure” through which each age addresses its 
primary concerns across various discourses such as poetry and philosophy (Armstrong 5). By 
framing organicism as a comprehensive “way of thinking” in addition to a “rhetorical 
instrument,” Armstrong effectively advances the cognitivist critique of the traditional literary-
critical view of metaphor—but without the cognitive framework; he uses Heidegger whereas I 
use CMT. But his deconstruction of organicism’s aporetic relations between parts and whole is 
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More precisely, organicism is a subset of the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING 
metaphor system, as characterized by Lakoff and Turner.41  The GREAT CHAIN 
metaphor “occurs not only in Western culture but throughout a wide range of 
the world’s cultures,” and like many conceptual metaphors, “is largely 
unconscious and so fundamental to our thinking that we barely notice it” (Lakoff 
and Turner 167).  It is based on a folk theory of “the nature of things,” as 
organized very broadly by the complexity of their characteristic attributes and 
behaviors (Lakoff and Turner 170).  The basic version includes the following, in 
order of decreasing complexity: 
Humans: higher-order attributes and behavior 
Animals: instinctual attributes and behavior 
Plants: biological attributes and behavior 
Complex objects: structural attributes and behavior 
Natural physical things: natural physical attributes and behavior 
   (Lakoff and Turner 170-71) 
Each thing includes the characteristic properties of things at lower levels but is 
set apart from them by its highest properties, which characterize its level.  For 
                                                                                                                                                 
useful for my cognitivist approach precisely because it treats metaphor as both a linguistic and a 
conceptual instrument. 
41 The GREAT CHAIN metaphor is also discussed by Turner (Reading 167-69). 
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example, humans have instincts like animals and they grow like plants, but they 
are characterized by reason, which lower-level things do not possess.  The 
extended version of the GREAT CHAIN expands upward from humans to include 
complex systems (such as society), the cosmos, and divinity, which we tend to 
conceptualize metaphorically, in terms of the more concrete lower levels (Lakoff 
and Turner 204).  
When something on one level is metaphorically figured as something on 
another level, it is understood that the characteristic (i.e. highest) attributes and 
behaviors of the source are mapped onto the target (Lakoff and Turner 173).  
Hence, to call someone a “vegetable” is to grant them the plant’s characteristic 
vital growth, but to deny them the agency of an animal and the reason and 
personality of a human.  Or, to call a man “a god” is to attribute to him a 
supernatural power.  Thus, we routinely use the GREAT CHAIN to compare or 
contrast a thing’s attributes with what we might expect to find at its level.  But a 
metaphorical comparison up or down the chain need not correspond, 
respectively, with a favorable or adverse value judgement.  For example, in 
Lakoff and Turner’s example, “Achilles is a lion,” demotes a human to the 
animal level in order to praise his more-than-typically-human ferocity and 
bravery (195).   
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As a subset of the GREAT CHAIN, organicism is a conceptual metaphor that 
maps the characteristics of any of the three living levels (plants, animals, or 
humans) onto its target.  It can work up or down the chain.  In the case of organic 
aesthetics, the target is a complex object (the work of art), which acquires the 
higher characteristics of a living thing, usually the self-shaping growth of a plant.  
But other organic metaphors work downward, mapping simpler characteristics 
onto more complex things.  For example, Zoltán Kövecses identifies two subsets 
of the great chain metaphor that I consider organic: COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS 
ARE PLANTS and COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE THE HUMAN BODY (chapter 9).  In 
addition to underpinning philosophic or theological systems that conceive of the 
universe as a living thing, these conceptual metaphors give rise to commonplace 
expressions, such as “this sector of the economy is branching out” and “The 
President is the head of the body politic.”  So ubiquitous are these organic 
metaphors that it is difficult to think about abstractions, such as social structures, 
systems of thought, and historical processes, without them.  Political ideas take 
root or die out, nations evolve and mature, and we poison our environment. 
Given organic metaphor’s indispensability to our conceptual system on 
the global level, it is not surprising that it continues to crop up in literary 
criticism—even in those fields where heavy theoretical machinery has been used 
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to mow it down.  For example, McGann writes of the melancholic movement of 
Coleridge’s poetry, “this negative pattern grew more firmly rooted in the poetry” 
(emphasis added, 97).  And de Man writes of the “blossoming of the novel” as a 
genre (emphasis added, 210).  By implicitly locating agency within the changing 
entity itself, McGann’s and de Man’s expressions demonstrate the internally 
driven formation, which, since classical antiquity,42 has been a hallmark of the 
organic.  Although we no longer believe, with the romantics, that literary works 
are endowed with metaphysical vitality, we continue to discuss literary 
processes and relationships in biological terms, much as they did.  The living text 
is continually re-introduced through organic models of historical change upon 
which literary-critical discourse continues to depend.   
But this is not to suggest that we avoid organic metaphor altogether; given 
its conceptual instrumentality, it seems unlikely that we could.  Rather we 
should examine the metaphoric language upon which our critical discourse 
depends, the better to understand our relationship to the intellectual history that 
we study.  For contemporary critics, organic metaphors retain cognitive use 
value that is not altogether discontinuous with romantic organic aesthetics.  For 
                                                 
42 Abrams cites Aristotle’s distinction between the eternal agency that forms artificial things from 
the internal agency that forms natural things as the source of organicism’s self-shaping 
characteristic (185). 
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instance, in locating agency within the novel genre as a living thing that 
naturally shapes itself, de Man deemphasizes the human agency that underlies 
artistic creation.  A genre, as de Man undoubtedly knows, is not a physical thing 
that springs from the soil; it is an abstract concept, a category discursively 
constructed and continually contested and revised by a diverse and dispersed 
group of countless writers, critics, and readers.  The organic metaphor replaces 
this mind-bogglingly complex, and, for the purposes of de Man’s argument, 
distracting, system of agencies with nature—that ultimate agency, which eludes 
complete comprehension yet remains intuitively accessible based on our 
sensuous experience.  As Lakoff and Johnson point out, conceptual metaphors 
hide as much as they reveal because the comparison between the source and 
target shifts our attention toward some aspects of the target and away from 
others (Metaphors 10).  Herein lies the source of much of the organic mystification 
that its critics would unmask—the vital metaphor’s ability to cover over 
difference with images of continuity.  And yet it is precisely this masking that de 
Man finds useful in reducing the tangled and contentious history of the novel to 
the simple and unified image of a blooming flower. 
A cognitivist approach allows critics a more pragmatic stance toward 
metaphor that acknowledges its use value and contextual contingency even as it 
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remains alert to what it hides.  Instead of identifying ideologically suspect tropes 
in the futile hope of quarantining them within the porous bounds of period, 
genre, or style, we might ask what historical patterns or shifts in the expression 
of a given conceptual metaphor reveal about the past and about our own relation 
to it.  As a result, a cognitivist approach might allow a more precise and a more 
self-reflexive characterization of the relationships between metaphor and 
ideology.  If CMT teaches us that abstract thought is unthinkable without the aid 
of metaphor and that primary metaphors recur nearly universally across a wide 
temporal and geographical range of cultures, it would seem that these primary 
metaphors must exist, at least in some sense, anterior to ideology, or perhaps that 
they arise in conjunction with the rudiments of ideology.  How, then, and when 
do these primary metaphors contribute to or become absorbed by the value-
laden metaphor systems of aesthetic discourse?  If THE MIND IS THE BODY 
originates in basic correlations in embodied experience, at what point and how 
does this primary conceptual metaphor give rise to the digestive organicism 
characterized here, with its privileging of certain types of literature as more 
natural and therefore more wholesome than others?  Similarly, if KNOWING IS 
SEEING throughout the Indo-European languages,43 how might this primary 
                                                 
43 Turner discusses the deep entrenchment of this metaphor in our culture (Death 19-20). Sweetser 
50 
 
metaphor “illuminate” the traditional contrast, as outlined by M. H. Abrams, 
between art treated as a mimetic mirror or as an expressive lamp?  How might it 
“shed light” on the sight-based metaphors that pervade contemporary critical 
discourse, the present study not excluded?  Although the answers to such 
questions are beyond the scope of this study, organic aesthetics is not the only 
theory of art that relies on a system of conceptual metaphors that remains current 
in critical and theoretical discourses.  And any attempt to debunk such a theory 
must remain incomplete unless it takes into consideration its own expressions of 
the conceptual metaphors that underpin the ideologically-laden figures it would 
discredit. 
At the same time, a cognitivist approach can prevent us from literalizing 
metaphors for art.  We should mistrust any theory of art, including organic 
aesthetics, that grounds itself in a single metaphor.  The literary work is, after all, 
not a plant.  Nor is it a machine, or a mirror, or a lamp.  It is something else 
entirely: an intentional, linguistic structure that can only ever be glancingly and 
imperfectly described by metaphor, or for that matter, by any language other 
than itself.  To forget the conceptual gaps that such metaphors are designed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
identifies it as a subset of THE MIND IS A BODY that, accordingly, occurs in each of the Indo-
European languages (33). Grady lists KNOWING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING as a primary metaphor 
(“Foundations” 296).  
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span is to mistake them for symbols; it is to forgo a tool’s utility in order to 
enshrine it as an idol.  Krieger attempts thus to idolize organicism by permitting 
himself temporarily to forget these gaps.  Metaphor, he argues, is a secular 
version of Christian transubstantiation, which requires the reader’s faith, 
momentarily granted, in its gesture of equation.  Organic aesthetics likewise 
requires a willing suspension of disbelief in the text’s illusions of totality and 
closure.  In other words, Krieger treats both metaphor and organic unity as 
symbols of the aesthetic, and he conflates all three accordingly (“My Travels” 
219-31).  As a result, when he extolls “the verbal sign that has for now captivated 
us by invoking a special magic,” he ends in the kind of metaphysical diffusion 
for which organic aesthetics has often been faulted (“My Travels” 231).   
The aesthetic is a real phenomenon, as Krieger claims, and its paradoxical 
tensions do empower us to resist the ideological impositions thrust upon us by 
our social structures (“My Travels” 224-31).  But marveling at “aesthetic magic” 
with a quasi-religious awe will not get us very far in explaining or enhancing 
these effects, or, for that matter, making them available to our students (“My 
Travels” 220).  Krieger’s mysticism, which stems partly from his Christian 
ideology, also results from his treatment of the aesthetic as antithetical to the 
conceptual, the systematic structures of language and reason that art 
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productively destabilizes (“My Travels” 230).  But cognitivist approaches to 
literature are beginning to reveal that the conceptual, with all of its myriad gaps 
and limitations,44 is integral to the phenomenon of aesthetic experience.  By 
treating the digesting mind as a cognitive tool as well as a rhetorical trope, this 
study explores this relationship as it informs how poets represent their own 
creativity and how we experience its results.   
The following chapters examine individual writers’ uses of the digesting 
mind variously to conceive of the relationships between the mind and the world, 
especially among readers, writers, and texts.  Chapter 2 begins with Coleridge, 
who is widely credited with introducing organicism to English and American 
aesthetics.  In Biographia Literaria and other prose works, metaphors of the 
digesting mind destabilize his influential distinction between mechanism and 
organicism by revealing an anxiety that the organic mind easily sickens if fed 
unwholesome literature.  If dieted on the mechanistic contrivances of the fancy 
rather than the organic produce of the imagination, Coleridge worries, the minds 
                                                 
44 I am thinking specifically of the work of Ellen Spolsky and Alan Richardson, who have argued 
that the limitations as well as the capabilities of the human conceptual system are responsible for 
aesthetic experience. Spolsky’s Gaps in Nature (1993) contends that literary and critical innovation 
result from attempts to bridge the gaps in our modular cognitive structure, which has evolved to 
process information through several distinct channels. In The Neural Sublime (2010), Richardson 
posits a version of the romantic sublime that results from a “cognitive breakdown” that leaves 
the subject “stunned by the capacity and complexity of the human brain” (28-29). 
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of the reading public will be stripped of reason and rendered capable only of a 
recklessly automatic association of ideas.  In chapter three, Wordsworth 
examines the consequences of his own mental diet in the Prelude, which 
represents creative maturation allegorically as nutritional growth.  To attain his 
mature imaginative power, the young poet must learn, largely by trial and error, 
to feed his mind an organic diet of poetry and nature while drawing sustenance 
from his memory, figured as a nutrient-laden bloodstream.  In effect, 
Wordsworth expands the source domain of the digesting mind to include the 
vascular system, which absorbs nutrients from the alimentary canal and 
distributes them throughout the body. 
The next chapter follows the digesting mind across the Atlantic with the 
influence of Coleridgean organicism.  There, Emerson’s essays and Whitman’s 
Leaves of Grass Americanize the digesting mind by combining it with the 
metaphor of literary history as cultural composting.  This metaphor 
conceptualizes American culture as organic soil, a store of rich potential that 
continually replenishes its nutrients through a digestive decomposition within 
the bowels of the earth.  For Emerson and Whitman, the poet’s digesting mind 
not only transforms the English literary past into fresh food for today’s minds, 
but also contributes to a collective and decentralized form of mental digestion 
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that lets him influence American culture in perpetuity.  Finally, in chapter five, 
Williams modernizes Emerson’s digesting mind with a pragmatic aesthetics of 
experience similar to that of John Dewey.  By representing his Objectivist poems 
as fruit, as in “This is Just to Say” and “To a Poor old Woman,” Williams 
relocates the organic ideals of vitality and unity from the poem, as aesthetic 
object, to the audience’s felt experience of reading-as-eating.  In poems such as 
“The Dish of Fruit” and “Fine Work with Pitch and Copper,” he juxtaposes this 
organic experience of reading with the mechanical form of the poem as a 
“machine made of words” (Selected Essays 256).  In this way, Williams brings 
Coleridgean organicism into the twentieth century by combining it with a 
modernist aesthetics of the machine. 
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2. Incorporating Mechanism in Coleridge’s Organic Mind 
 
In Biographia Literaria, when Coleridge excoriates Charles Maturin’s 
tragedy Bertram, his visceral invective takes the form of an extended metaphor of 
the digesting mind—or rather, the indigestive mind: 
I want words to describe the mingled horror and disgust with which I 
witness the opening of the fourth act, considering it as a melancholy proof 
of the depravation of the public mind.  The shocking spirit of jacobinism 
seemed no longer confined to politics.  The familiarity with atrocious 
events and characters appeared to have poisoned the taste, even where it 
had not directly disorganized the moral principles, and left the feelings 
callous to all the mild appeals, and craving alone for the grossest and most 
outrageous stimulants.  (emphasis added, Collected 7.2: 229) 
With its politically-charged, class-based condemnation of public “taste” as toxic 
addiction, this passage exemplifies what Paul Youngquist calls “Romantic 
dietetics,” a cultural politics of eating according to which nineteenth-century 
England made “moral health a correlative of bodily process” and proper 
digestion the key to producing socially healthy subjects (“Romantic Dietetics” 
249).  Passages like this, where aesthetic taste spills over into extended 
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metaphors of the digesting mind, recur throughout Coleridge’s prose, whenever 
he evaluates the mental effects of literature through analogy with the effects of 
food on the body.  As several historicist approaches have demonstrated, 
Coleridge’s lifelong fascination with the post-Cartesian mind-body problem 
fueled his wide reading in theology, philosophy, psychology, science, and 
medicine.  As a result, his understanding of the mind is thoroughly imbricated 
with his ideas about the body.1  Expanding on what Jennifer Ford calls 
Coleridge’s “medical imagination” (5), Gavin Budge demonstrates that Coleridge 
“applied to the mind and its perceptions ideas about the fundamental role of 
digestion in organic processes which were current in vitalist medical theory” 
(79).  But if Coleridge’s vitalistic perception suggests a mind conceived as an 
organism analogous to the human body, what does this organic mind mean for 
Coleridge’s aesthetics and especially for his highly influential distinction 
between organic and mechanical form?   
By illuminating the conceptual metaphors that underlie patterns in 
Coleridge’s figurative language, a cognitivist approach folds his images of the 
digesting mind into his theory of aesthetic form.  If, for Coleridge, THE MIND IS A 
                                                 
1 See for instance, Alan Richardson’s British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (chapters 1-2), 
Jennifer Ford’s Coleridge on Dreaming: Romanticism, Dreams and the Medical Imagination, Gavin 
Budge’s Romanticism, Medicine and the Natural Supernatural (chapter 3), and Neil Vickers’s 
Coleridge and the Doctors: 1795-1806. 
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DIGESTING BODY, then the health of this mind-as-body depends upon the quality 
of the texts that it metaphorically consumes.  The Coleridgean mind is what it 
eats.  Works of the organic imagination, such as those of Shakespeare and 
Wordsworth, nourish the reader’s mind, unifying its faculties by suffusing them 
with the vital power of the reason.  Often, Coleridge represents this organizing 
activity metaphorically as “assimilation,” which, in romantic-era parlance, refers 
to the incorporation of nutritive matter by a living thing.2  For example, in 
Biographia Literaria, organic unity operates through the metaphor of digestive 
assimilation: “I adduce the high spiritual instinct of the human being impelling 
us to seek unity by harmonious adjustment, and thus establishing the principle, 
that all the parts of an organized whole must be assimilated to the more important 
and essential parts” (Coleridge’s emphasis, Collected 7.2: 72).  The Coleridgean 
mind is itself such a vital whole, and organic literature operates as mental 
digestif, promoting the organization of its faculties, that is, the subordination of 
                                                 
2 “Assimilation” could signify either the entire nutritive process from ingestion, through 
digestion, to growth, or its later stages, in which the organism uses the materials it has refined to 
build or repair itself. Citing examples this usage from the early-seventeenth to the late-nineteenth 
century, the OED defines “assimilation” as follows: “Conversion into a similar substance; esp. the 
process whereby an animal or plant converts extraneous material into fluids and tissues identical 
with its own; absorption of nutriment into the system. (By some physiologists restricted to the 
final stage of this conversion, which takes place after the absorption of digested fluids by the 
lymphatics and blood vessels.)” (“assimilation, n.”). As Coleridge’s editors note, he would have 
been familiar with this term through various German writings and possibly through the 
“eccentric work of his friend Richard Saumarez” (Collected 11.1: 490 n. 2) 
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their separate functions to the larger whole.  Conversely, the mechanical 
products of the fancy, such as Maturin’s artificial contrivance, disorganize the 
mind, letting the mechanical faculties such as memory and fancy run amok with 
their dangerously automatic associations.  Time and again, such works enfeeble 
the will, cramp the brain, corrupt morals, and otherwise sicken the digesting 
mind.   
These anxieties about the mental diet of the reading public likewise apply 
to the man of genius as one of its members.  Hence, Coleridge must carefully 
moderate his own mental diet in order to yield wholesome, organic literary 
produce.  As Budge demonstrates, Coleridge equates genius with a “superior 
power of mental digestion,” an ability to “assimilate[e] . . . perceptions into the 
living whole of the mind” (82).  But the digestive functions of the Coleridgean 
mind are not limited to perception; assimilation figures the overall self-
organizing and self-regulating power that enables the mind to be a “living 
whole.”  The processes of material exchange and transformation across the 
material boundaries of the body’s digestive tract operate, for Coleridge, as a 
conceptual model for the dynamics of organic unity itself.  But because the 
Coleridgean mind includes mechanical and organic faculties, it must continually 
and actively assimilate the former to the latter, otherwise it risks degenerating 
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into a mere mechanism.  As a failure of mental digestion, this degeneration 
produces various symptoms such as mental constipation, diarrhea, nausea, or 
unwholesome craving.  In light of these recurring metaphors, Coleridge’s need to 
assert his “disgust” at Bertram is more than a snobbish disparagement of 
bourgeois taste levels, it is a defensive assertion that his organic mind has so far 
resisted the mechanizing influence of popular literature.  
Coleridge’s digestive metaphors reveal the tenuousness and 
environmental contingency of his notion of the organic mind of genius.  If it is a 
unified, self-shaping whole, it does not reside eternally in an ideal realm apart 
from the material world.  Rather, the mind struggles to realize and to sustain 
itself through continuous self-adjustment and interaction with an environment 
that includes material and social influences of variable quality.  By revealing the 
dynamic, environmentally contingent process of organic unity, Coleridge’s 
expressions of THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY collectively destabilize the rigid 
distinction between mechanism and organicism as mutually exclusive opposites, 
which contemporary literary critics have inherited through oversimplified 
readings of Coleridge.  Before demonstrating how Coleridge uses metaphors of 
the digesting mind to merge mechanism and organicism, I will use conceptual 
60 
 
metaphor theory to illustrate the common ground that allows him to treat these 
two paradigms as potentially compatible, if perpetually competitive. 
 
Organicism vs. Mechanism: Twin Conceptual Metaphors 
Most critics think of organic and mechanical aesthetics largely in terms of 
Coleridge’s influential distinction between organic and mechanical form.  
Although they disagree on the extent of his philosophical originality, most 
rightly credit Coleridge with introducing a systematic organic-“ism” to English 
aesthetics,3 citing the following adaptation from August Wilhelm Schlegel:4 
The form is mechanic when on any given material we impress a pre-
determined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the 
                                                 
3 Among the most influential accounts of Coleridge’s introduction of organicism to English 
aesthetics are those of Abrams and Wellek. Abrams credits Coleridge with revolutionizing 
criticism; although few of his ideas weren’t anticipated by the Germans, Abrams insists, “he 
succeeded better than any of his predecessors in converting the organic concept of the 
imagination into an inclusive and practicable method for specifically literary analysis” (Mirror 
218). Less inclined to credit Coleridge with originality—or even intellectual honesty—Wellek 
nevertheless agrees that organicism originates with the German Idealists and “reaches England 
with Coleridge,” from there spreading to the United States (1, 2). Murray Krieger, who traces 
organicism not from the Germans but from the Christian mysteries of incarnation and 
transubstantiation, identifies Coleridge as the concept’s point of entry into English aesthetics 
(Reopening 31). And more recently, David Fairer locates Coleridge at the center of a circle of 
intellectuals who traced their “native eighteenth-century organicism” through Lockean 
empiricism as well as through German idealism (16).  
4 Compare Coleridge’s formulation to Schlegel’s: “The form is mechanical when through outside 
influence it is imparted to a material merely as an accidental addition, without relation to its 
nature (as e.g. when we give an arbitrary shape to a soft mass so that it may retain it after 
hardening). Organic form, on the other hand is innate; it unfolds itself from within and acquires 
its definiteness simultaneously with the total development of the germ” (quoted Wellek 2: 48). 
61 
 
material—as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish 
it to retain when hardened—The organic form, on the other hand, is 
innate, it shapes, as it developes [sic] itself from within, and the fullness of 
its development is one & the same with the perfection of its outward 
Form.  Such is the Life, such the form . . . –each Exterior is the 
physiognomy of the Being within, its true Image reflected & thrown out 
from the concave mirror. . . . (Collected 5.1: 495) 
Coleridge draws a clear line in the sand: mechanical form is imposed ab extra 
whereas organic form arises from within.   
The continuing impact of this binary on subsequent literary scholarship 
can hardly be overstated.  Susan Wolfson explains that in the mid-twentieth 
century, formalist critics characterized a coherent “Romanticism” largely based 
on Coleridgean organicism, rendering the latter a “synecdoche” for the former 
and rendering both “targets” for subsequent demystifying critiques (64).  These 
critics told and retold the now-familiar story of the organism’s triumph over the 
machine.5  For Enlightenment thinkers such as Newton, Locke, and Hobbes, the 
                                                 
5 Among the most influential versions of this history are those of René Wellek and Morse 
Peckham. Wellek’s two articles in the first and second issues of Comparative Literature (1949) 
argue that romanticism is a coherent historical and literary phenomenon characterized in part by 
organicism. Peckham distills Wellek’s and Lovejoy’s lists of romantic criteria into the single 
defining characteristic of a “dynamic organicism” that opposes the static mechanism of the 
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universe had been an orderly system, perpetually operating according to the 
laws of an external, divine agency.  But by the late-eighteenth century, others, 
mostly in Germany, had begun to challenge this model on the grounds that its 
determinism left little room for God’s agency, denied the individual free will, 
and foreclosed the possibility of social progress (Eichner 12).  These thinkers 
looked to living things, endowed with an immaterial and divinely granted 
vitality, as more fitting models for the unity, complexity, and changeability of the 
universe.  The organic metaphor opened space for mystery, self-determination, 
and progress, and thus liberated mankind—and even God—from the constraints 
of mechanism.  The organism and its living processes, from that point forward, 
became a treasure trove of analogies that could be used to explain systems large 
and small.   
As useful as this story is for highlighting the major differences between 
the mechanical and organic paradigms, it reduces them to good and evil, 
masking their underlying similarities and mutual imbrications.  Organicism and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Enlightenment: “What then is Romanticism? . . . . it is the revolution in the European mind 
against thinking in terms of static mechanism and the redirection of the mind to thinking in terms 
of dynamic organicism. Its values are change, imperfection, growth, diversity, the creative 
imagination, the unconscious” (14). Based on the view, received from Peckham, of this diametric 
opposition between organicism and mechanism, Hans Eichner later erroneously characterizes 
romanticism as “a desperate rearguard action against the spirit and implications of modern 
science” (8). 
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its somewhat stiffer sibling were not always enemies—nor are they, necessarily, 
now.  A cognitivist approach to metaphor reveals that, as subsets of the same 
metaphor system, they have a long history of competition, overlap, and even 
cooperation. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, organicism is that subset of the 
extended GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor system that takes anything from the 
three living levels (plants, animals, or humans) as its source domain.  Organic 
aesthetics is that subset of organicism that takes the work of art as its target.  
Mechanism and mechanical aesthetics are also subsets of the GREAT CHAIN OF 
BEING metaphor, but their source domain comes from the level immediately 
below plants: complex objects.  When a target on one level of the great chain is 
metaphorically represented as a source on another level, it is the characteristic 
properties that distinguish the source from lower levels in the chain that are 
mapped onto the target.  Given that the defining characteristic of complex objects 
is “structural attributes and behavior” (Lakoff and Turner 70-71), mechanistic 
metaphors map these attributes onto their targets.  For example, when we say 
that “The company is a well-oiled machine,” we characterize the company in terms 
of the structural complexity, dependability, and smooth functioning of an engine.  
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By contrast, when we say that “The company is branching out into new markets,” 
we invoke the living, organic growth of a tree. 
As these expressions show, organicism and mechanism overlap.  In fact, it 
is not unusual to mix organic and mechanical metaphors for the same target: 
“Now that we are a well-oiled machine, it’s time to start branching out.”  This 
sentence makes sense because, as subsets of the same metaphorical system, 
organicism and mechanism are mutually coherent.  They share the same range of 
potential targets: anything that can be positioned in the great chain of being can 
be figured as either a live being or a machine.  As a result, most organic 
conceptual metaphors have mechanistic counterparts.  For instance, if, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, Zoltán Kövecses’s COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS 
ARE PLANTS is organic, his COMPLEX ABSTRACT SYSTEMS ARE MACHINES is 
mechanical (159-61).  Other pairs of mechanical and organic conceptual 
metaphors for the same target include: PEOPLE ARE PLANTS vs. PEOPLE ARE 
MACHINES6 and THE MIND IS THE BODY vs. THE MIND IS A MACHINE.7  In each pair, the 
difference is in the source domain, which carries the characteristic attributes of its 
                                                 
6 For PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, see Lakoff and Turner (6, 12-14, and elsewhere) and Lakoff et al. (191). 
For PEOPLE ARE MACHINES, see Lakoff and Turner (132) and Lakoff et al. (191). 
7 For THE MIND IS THE BODY, see Sweetser, who refers to this metaphor as the “Mind-as-Body 
metaphor”; Lakoff et al. (80-99); and Lakoff and Johnson (Philosophy chapter 12). For THE MIND IS A 
MACHINE, see Lakoff and Johnson (Philosophy 247-57) and Lakoff et al. (138). 
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level in the great chain.  But because each level includes the attributes of lower 
levels, in addition to its defining attributes, the source domains of organic and 
mechanical metaphor overlap.  An organism, like a machine, is a complex 
structure, a whole that comprises functionally differentiated parts.   
In effect, mechanism and organicism are alternative and overlapping 
conceptual metaphors that are usually used to characterize intricate systems such 
as the work of art, the human body, the state, and the physical universe.  The 
basic difference between them corresponds to that which elevates living things 
over complex objects in the great chain: whether structure comes from human 
design or biological growth.  Mechanical things are predictable and 
understandable because they are man-made; they keep performing the same 
instrumental function until an external agent interferes.  Organisms, in contrast, 
continually change—actively, from within, and in ways we often cannot explain.  
As Hans Eichner writes, “Machines do not grow, organisms do” (15).  Hence, 
whereas mechanism connotes man’s full control over the structure in question, 
organicism’s shift up the chain widens the potential scope of agency to include 
biological processes, divine telos, and spiritual forces.  This tendency to let 
agency remain shrouded in mystery accounts for much of the mystifying 
potential of organic metaphor, and hence, for much of its critics’ mistrust.  
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Mechanical and organic aesthetics, as I define them, are those subsets of 
the organic and mechanical conceptual metaphors that take the work of art as 
their target.  In the great chain of being, a work of art belongs on the same 
general level as a machine or other man-made device; it is a complex, non-living 
object.  To compare a work of art to an organism is thus to promote it up the 
chain in terms of complexity.  But within the level of complex objects, a work of 
art is usually ranked higher in complexity than a machine.  This is not to suggest 
that any work of art is more complex than any machine—a space shuttle is in 
many ways more complex than one of Marcel Duchamp’s “readymades” for 
instance—but rather to illustrate that the folk theory of the great chain tends to 
rank art above other man-made things in terms of complexity.  To say that “The 
space shuttle is a work of art” is to emphasize its extraordinary complexity 
whereas to say that “The sculpture has mechanical lines” connotes the simplicity 
of geometrical abstraction.   
Coleridge’s influential distinction implicitly uses THE GREAT CHAIN OF 
BEING metaphor to categorize artworks along precisely these lines.  Mechanical 
form is “pre-determined . . . . not necessarily arising out of the properties of the 
material.”  It is “impress[ed]” by a human who molds the materials of his world 
like clay.  Organic form is at least partly beyond man’s control.  It is “innate, it 
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shapes, as it developes itself from within.”  The difference, for Coleridge, boils 
down to an immaterial vital power that orders materials as it incorporates them.  
This is the power that, as I will argue, Coleridge often represents as a 
metaphorical digestion or assimilation of nutrients.  Because mechanical form 
lacks this self-organizing agency, Coleridge elsewhere aligns mechanism with a 
dangerous entropic pressure—a tendency toward fragmentation and spiritual 
emptiness that would leave the world “a lifeless Machine whirled about by the 
dust of its own Grinding” (Collected 9: 400-01).  Throughout his prose, Coleridge 
develops this binary by situating it within an elaborate system of related pairs of 
opposites including genius vs. talent, fancy vs. imagination, and, most 
importantly, reason vs. understanding.  Aligned with the vital power of the 
organic, the first term in each pair is elevated above the second based on the logic 
of the great chain. 
The conceptual overlap between the organic and the mechanical is also 
revealed in their etymological history.  In their classical beginnings, these terms 
shared semantic territory as both referred to an arrangement of parts for 
instrumental purposes.  Aristotle uses both “organic” (ὀργανικός) and 
“mechanical” (μηχανικά), but in different contexts and not as a pair of opposites 
(Eucken 165, 168).  “Mechanical,” for Aristotle, refers to the properties of a man-
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made machine or invention (Eucken 165).  “Organic” has one of two meanings.  
In the sense that is closest to the idealist-informed meaning that predominates 
today, “organic” refers to a purposefully arranged, living whole, such as a 
human body.  But more often, it means “instrumental,” in the sense that a bodily 
organ performs a particular function (Eucken 167).  In effect, as Eucken points 
out, “there are passages in Aristotle in which ὀργανικός can hardly be translated 
except by the word mechanical” (168).  Through the Latin noun form, organicus 
(Greek ὀργανον), meaning “mechanical, relating to a musical instrument,” or 
“having an organized physical structure” (OED, “organic, adj. and n.,” 
Etymology), traces of this more mechanistic, Aristotelian meaning persist in the 
modern-day usages of “organ,” to designate a musical instrument or body part, 
and “organize,” to designate the act of purposely arranging parts to create or 
modify a meaningful structure.  Moreover, this etymology demonstrates that 
from its earliest beginnings, the word “organic” has had two antithetical 
meanings: it can signify a specialized part, such as the head or the heart, or it can 
signify the structure, the organization, of the living whole.   
In addition to organicism’s mystification of agency, its hidden mechanism 
and its inherent tension among parts and between parts and wholes help to 
account for its tendency to negate difference, which contemporary critics have 
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justifiably regarded askance.  Organicism would be everything at once: both part 
and whole, creature and machine.  But this totalizing tendency amounts to yet 
another similarity with mechanism, for as M. H. Abrams points out, the 
synecdochal structure that underlies both metaphors would encompass the 
whole universe either way: 
Since both mechanism and organicism (implicitly asserting that all the 
universe is like some one element in that universe) claim to include 
everything in their scope, neither can stop until it has swallowed up the 
archetype of the other.  In consequence, as the extreme mechanist claimed 
organisms to be higher-order machines, so the extreme organicist, in his 
philosophical counter-attack, maintained that physical things and 
processes are simply more rudimentary forms of organism. (Mirror 186) 
Mutually imbricated though they are, these adversaries are unequal for Abrams, 
who subtly privileges organicism.  If each seeks to “swallow” the other, the 
former must inevitably win.  From a slow, creeping plant-like encroachment to 
the animalistic engulfment of Abrams’s image, organicism’s menagerie of 
metaphorical vehicles renders it particularly apt for this type of activity—this 
absorbing or subsuming of the other.  Plants and animals can ingest, swallow, 
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absorb, and substantially transform objects into themselves.  Machines cannot.  
Organicism, Abrams implies, has more teeth.  
But clockwork gears have teeth too.  And mechanism is equally capable of 
using the organism as another cog in its vast conceptual apparatus.  Descartes, 
for example, treats animals as automata.  Given that organicism and mechanism 
overlap as subsets of THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor, this competition 
between totalizing metaphors is unavoidable and, ultimately, undecidable.  The 
great chain includes organisms and mechanisms, so if either is to stand 
synecdochically for the entire chain, it must operate as a metaphor for the other.  
As a result, an organic paradigm necessarily includes mechanical elements and 
vice versa.   
 
Organ-izing the Coleridgean Mind 
Given the mutual imbrication of these two metaphorical paradigms, it is 
not surprising that Coleridge’s organic model of the mind includes mechanical 
elements.  On the most basic level, his use of “organic” preserves Aristotle’s 
more materialistic and mechanistic definition the word.  According to Alan 
Richardson, Coleridge contributed to a shift in the English meaning of “organic” 
during the early-nineteenth century.  In the more familiar “post-Coleridgean” 
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sense, which is heavily informed by Coleridge’s reading in German idealism, 
“organic” becomes what it largely remains for scholars of romanticism today: “a 
specialized term freighted with metaphysical import” and connotations of an 
idealistic and transcendental unity (Richardson, British 70).  But in earlier years, 
“organic” meant something much closer to organ-like, in Aristotle’s sense of the 
material arrangement of body parts.8  Although Coleridge helped to spread the 
idealist definition, he did not abandon its predecessor.  In Biographia Literaria, for 
example, he invokes the older meaning when he refers to “the marvelous 
organization and organic movements of my body” (Collected 7.2: 139).  Moreover, 
on the page preceding his idealist definition of organic form, he characterizes 
that form in terms of a more mechanistic structure:  
The Spirit of Poetry, like all other living Powers, must of necessity 
circumscribe itself by Rules . . . . It must embody in order to reveal itself; 
but a living Body is of necessity an organized one—& what is 
organization, but the connection of Parts to a whole, so that each Part is at 
once End & Means!  (Collected 5.1: 494) 
                                                 
8 For example, “The phrase ‘organic sensibility,’ in the context of the late 1790s, . . . . implies a 
mind shaped by and realized in bodily organs” (Richardson, British 71). 
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The vitality of idealist organic form requires Aristotelian material organization.  
That Coleridge uses “organic” and its related forms in both senses suggests that, 
for him, mechanism and organicism converge in the notion of organization.   
Moreover, Coleridge’s organic model of the mind is informed by the 
mechanistic theories of thinkers such as John Locke and David Hartley.  David 
Fairer demonstrates that in the 1790s, before his exposure to German idealism, 
Coleridge was influenced by the mechanistic version of organic structure that he 
found in Locke’s theory of identity and Hartley’s associationist psychology.  For 
Locke, and for Hartley after him, personal identity was a continuous, mechanical 
process of linking ideas and experiences in order to reconcile the present self 
with its various and discontinuous memories of its past.  Whereas idealist 
organicism requires temporal continuity to fulfill a teleological and holistically 
structured self, Fairer claims, its Lockean predecessor gets by with “continuity 
without continuousness” (37), by constructing a semblance of unity through life’s 
fragmented train of experiences.  The Coleridge of the 1790s “had known” a 
more flexible, tentative, and empirical organicism, but when he came under the 
spell of German idealism, he forgot all of this: “[h]is drift away from this 
knowledge has for too long been seen as a measure of his maturity as a thinker” 
(Fairer 21).  Hence, Fairer proclaims that “the old binary of mechanistic 
73 
 
empiricism against a dynamic ‘romanticism’ [understood as synonymous with 
idealist organicism] should now be laid to rest” (56).  But to bury this binary now 
would be premature—if for no other reason than that it was very much alive for 
Coleridge, who formulated his aesthetics precisely in terms of the opposition 
between a vital, dynamic organicism and a rigid, rationalist mechanism.  To 
dismiss this binary without examining its relationship to the newly identified, 
yet older, mechanistic strain of organicism would be to foreclose the possibility 
that the two concepts interact, for Coleridge, in any way.   
The persistence of Hartley’s influence reveals that for Coleridge, the two 
strains of organicism are not necessarily incompatible and that together, they 
enable him to fold mechanism into an organic model of the mind using the 
faculties of the reason and the imagination.  So ardent was Coleridge’s early 
enthusiasm for the doctrine of association that he named his firstborn son David 
Hartley.  But by 1801, he had begun to distance himself from his idol on the 
grounds that his version of associationism left little room for free will or the 
soul.9  “I have . . . overthrown the doctrine of Associationism as taught by 
Hartley,” he writes to Thomas Poole, “and with it all the irreligious metaphysics 
                                                 
9 For an account of Coleridge’s enchantment and subsequent disenchantment with Hartleyan 
associationism, see Richardson (British 9-12). See also Jonathan Wordsworth’s introduction to the 
Woodstock edition of Hartley’s Observations on Man and Jerome Christensen’s chapter, “Hartley’s 
Influence on Coleridge.” 
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of modern Infidels—especially, the doctrine of Necessity” (Collected Letters 2: 
letter 387, 706).  Despite this claim to the contrary, as Jerome Christensen 
convincingly argues, Coleridge never rejected Hartley’s ideas wholesale; he 
continued to share his desire for a fundamental principle that could uniformly 
explain the full range of mental phenomena (75).   
Instead, he used three chapters of Biographia Literaria explicitly to separate 
the associationist wheat from Hartley’s materialist and necessitarian chaff.  
Hartley had erred, Coleridge argues, in hypothesizing a material mechanism—a 
system of “vibrations and vibratiuncles”—to explain mental association: “from 
this results inevitably, that the will, the reason, the judgment, and the 
understanding, instead of being the determining causes of association, must 
needs be represented as its creatures, and among its mechanical effects” 
(Coleridge’s italics, Collected 7.1: 110).  Hartley’s doctrine amounts to a materialist 
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s “true practical general law of association,” 
according to which, “whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more 
vivid or distinct from the rest, will determine the mind to recall these in 
preference to others equally linked together by the common condition of 
contemporaneity or . . . of continuity” (Collected 7.1: 126, 127).  In this version of 
associationism, Aristotle’s law becomes the “universal law of the passive fancy 
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and mechanical memory; that which supplies to all other faculties their objects” 
(Coleridge’s italics, Collected 7.1: 104).  The Coleridgean mind still depends on the 
mechanism of association.  But whereas for Hartley, association unifies the mind 
as the physiological basis of all of its functions, for Coleridge, it performs a more 
limited, instrumental role confined to the memory and fancy, which process 
perceptions into objects upon which other faculties can operate.   
According to Abrams, Coleridge’s influential distinction between the 
fancy and the imagination allows him “to save, and to incorporate into his own 
theory, the mechanical philosophy he so violently opposed” (Mirror 175).10  
Indeed, the fancy is a thoroughly Hartleyan mechanism in that it “must receive 
all its materials ready made from the law of association.”  It is “no other than a 
mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space,” and therefore 
“has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites” (Collected 7.1: 305).  
In contrast to this “aggregating faculty,” the imagination has radically creative 
powers; it is “the modifying, and co-adunating Faculty” (Coleridge’s italics, 
Collected Letters 2: 458-59).  Moreover, the imagination is an organic union of two 
parts.  Whereas the primary imagination is “the living Power and prime Agent of 
                                                 
10 Similarly, although less willing than Abrams to grant Coleridge original thought, Wellek claims 
that “The preservation of fancy and talent is [an] attempt to keep empirical and associationist 
thought undisturbed in a subordinate position below an idealistic system” (2: 164). 
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all human Perception, and a . . . repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM,” the secondary imagination, that responsible for 
artistic creation, is “an echo of the former,” identical in kind but differing in 
degree.  As Richardson puts it, the Coleridgean imagination “set out to reclaim” 
from Hartley a space for human agency and for the soul (British 12).   
But this very absorption of associationist mechanism within the organic 
structure of the mind suggests that Coleridge was not “violently opposed” to 
mechanism itself, as Abrams claims.  It would be more accurate to say that he 
was deeply wary of mechanism but regarded it as an instrumental part of 
organic unity.  Coleridge values mechanism’s power; the mind could not operate 
without memory and fancy.  But he worries that, once set in motion, a 
mechanism can operate in perpetuity, without human or divine guidance.  
Accordingly, the associative faculties can run away with the mind, leading it into 
delusion and moral error.  By compartmentalizing mechanism within dedicated 
faculties and then subordinating them to an overall organic mental structure, as 
effected by the reason and imagination, Coleridge manages this danger.   
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The role of unifying the mind, which, in Hartley’s system, had been 
performed by association, is taken over by that “unseen Agent,” the reason:11  
the REASON without being either the SENSE, the UNDERSTANDING, or the 
IMAGINATION, contains all three within itself, even as the mind contains its 
thoughts, and is present in and through them all. . . . It cannot in strict 
language be called a faculty, much less a personal property, of any human 
mind!  He, with whom it is present, can as little appropriate it, whether 
totally or by partition, as he can claim ownership in the breathing air, or 
make an inclosure [sic] in the cope of heaven.  (Coleridge’s emphasis, 
Collected 6: 69-70) 
Analogous to vital power, which cannot be said to inhere in any particular 
substance, but rather to infuse and animate living things, the reason suffuses the 
mental faculties.  It coordinates their mechanical functions, subordinates these 
faculties within the mind as an organically unified whole.  In effect, Coleridge 
                                                 
11 Based on Immanuel Kant’s Vernunft (reason) and Verstand (understanding), Coleridge 
distinguishes between the Reason and the Understanding: “Reason is the knowledge of the laws 
of the WHOLE considered as One: and as such it is contradistinguished from the Understanding, 
which concerns itself exclusively with the quantities, qualities, and relations of particulars in time 
and space. The UNDERSTANDING therefore is the science of phenomena . . . The REASON, on the 
other hand, is the science of the universal, having the ideas of ONENESS and ALLNESS as its two 
elements or primary factors” (Coleridge’s emphasis, Collected 6: 59-60). For an account of the 
chronological development of Coleridge’s distinction, see John Beer’s “Editor’s introduction” 
(Collected 9: lxxix-lxxxiv). For a helpful discussion of how Coleridge’s terms differ from Kant’s, 
see Patrick J. Keane’s chapter, “Intuitive Reason: The Light of All Our Day” (57-61).  
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promotes the mind upward in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor system from 
complex object to organism, thus opening space for immaterial vitality and 
spiritual agency.   
But the mind’s mechanical components must be continually kept in check: 
“The man of healthful and undivided intellect uses his understanding . . . only as 
a tool or organ: even as an arithmetician uses numbers, that is, as the means not 
the end of knowledge . . . as an instrumental faculty belonging to reason” 
(Collected 6: 68-69).  The understanding is a dangerous tool that must be 
subordinated to a “healthful” mind that is “undivided” under the purview of 
reason.  This passage bespeaks Coleridge’s wariness of mental mechanism but it 
also shows him working to harness its power by folding the older mechanistic 
organicism into his newer idealist model.  First he represents the understanding 
as a “tool” and then as an “organ,” effectively aligning the more materialist sense 
of “organic” with the empiricism and instrumentality characteristic of 
mechanism.  But by conceiving of mental faculties through analogy with bodily 
organs, Coleridge also allows these parts to be animated by the vital power of the 
mind as an idealist-organic whole.  By thus organ-izing the mind, Coleridge 
preserves the instrumental utility of mechanism by allowing it to function as a 
vital part within a larger organic whole.  
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“An Alchemy Still More Stupendous”: Assimilation as Organic Unification  
If this organ-ization of the faculties reveals that mechanism and 
organicism can be compatible for Coleridge, the metaphor of the mind as an 
organism with mechanistic parts is deeply consistent with his scientifically 
informed beliefs about the source domain of life itself.  Mechanistic structures 
and processes, Coleridge argues, underpin biological life at the most basic 
material levels.  And the digestive process of assimilation performs the work of 
translating immaterial vitality into a materially embodied organism.  When the 
organ-ized body becomes a metaphor for the Coleridgean mind, digestive 
assimilation performs an analogous mediating and unifying role within the 
target domain.  In effect, the recurring metaphor of mental assimilation, which 
Budge and Abrams have noted,12 signals the unifying activity of the reason as it 
incorporates mechanical and organic elements within the mind as a vital whole.  
As a result, the mind’s metaphorical digestive health indicates the extent to 
which it subordinates its mechanisms to the reason.  The healthy organic mind of 
                                                 
12 According to Budge, the “[i]magination for Coleridge enables the assimilation of perceptions 
into the living whole which is the mind” (82). Similarly, Abrams identifies Coleridge’s 
imagination as “an assimilating power” and notes “the affinity of this synthesis with the organic 
function of assimilating nutriment” (Mirror 169, 175). 
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a genius, such as Shakespeare, demonstrates “vigor . . . of the assimilative 
and . . . modifying faculties,” and can therefore transform perceptions into poetry 
as an organism transforms its food (Collected 7.2: 26).   
In Aids to Reflection (1825), Coleridge echoes his famous distinction 
between mechanical and aesthetic form, but on the level of the source domain, by 
differentiating a machine from a living organ:  
. . . herein consists the essential difference . . . of an Organ from a Machine; 
that not only the characteristic Shape is evolved from the invisible central 
power, but the material mass itself is acquired by assimilation.  The 
germinal power of the Plant transmutes the fixed air and the elementary 
Base of Water into Grass or Leaves; and on these the Organific Principle in 
the Ox or the Elephant exercises an Alchemy still more stupendous.  
(Collected 9: 397) 
Vitality, the “invisible central power” that lets the organ live, realizes itself in 
material form through digestive assimilation, which transforms nutrients into 
living beings.  Not limited to animals, this stupendous “Alchemy” also 
characterizes plants, which “transmute” water and air into their living leaves.  
Although they have none of the digestive organs of the ox or the elephant—or, 
for that matter, of the human—plants nonetheless partake of the “Organific 
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Principle.”  For Coleridge, assimilation unifies the great chain of being, not only 
through the food chain, in which one species eats the next, but also in the sense 
that the same vital power is realized through the nutritive growth of all organic 
forms.   
Likewise, in the Theory of Life (1816), Coleridge’s attempt to define “the 
universal LAW of Life” (Collected 11.1: 520), assimilation unifies mechanical 
structure and organic vitality.  Ultimately, Coleridge arrives at two definitions of 
life, both of which tellingly resemble his definition of beauty:13 “the principle of 
unity in multeity, as far as the former, the unity to wit, is produced ab intra,” and 
“the principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given all into a whole 
that is presupposed by its parts” (Coleridge’s italics, Collected 11.1: 510).  The 
latter definition includes mechanical and organic powers alike: 
. . . from its utmost latency, in which life is one with the elementary powers 
of mechanism, that is, with the powers of mechanism considered as 
qualitative and actually synthetic, to its highest manifestation, (in which 
the vis vitae vivida, or life as life, it subordinates and modifies these 
powers, becoming contradistinguished from mechanism, ab extra, under 
                                                 
13 In Principles of Genial Criticism (1814), Coleridge writes, “The BEAUTIFUL, contemplated in its 
essentials, that is, in kind and not degree, is that in which the many, still seen as many, becomes one. 
. . . . The most general definition of Beauty, therefore, is . . . Multëity in Unity” (Coleridge’s 
emphasis, Collected 11.1: 371-372).  
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the form of organization,) there is an ascending series of intermediate 
classes.  (Coleridge’s italics, Collected 11.1: 511) 
Coleridge then gives a detailed overview of his version of the great chain of 
being, in which the lowest forms of life, such as crystals—rocks are alive for 
Coleridge—are exclusively mechanical.  Higher forms increasingly subordinate 
the mechanical to the organic all the way up to the most complex and organically 
individuated being: man.  At various intermediate levels are plants and creatures 
exhibiting a curious mix of mechanical and organic characteristics.  Mollusks, for 
instance, are “[o]n the one side, a gelatinous semi-fluid; on the other side, an 
entirely inorganic, though often a most exquisitely mechanized, calcareous 
excretion!” (Collected 11.1: 541), and insects are likewise covered in “polished and 
moveable plates of defensive armour” (Collected 11.1: 544).  Because life, for 
Coleridge, is infused with mechanism from the bottom up, mechanical processes 
furnish the very basis of the organic.   
Digestion bridges the distinction between the two: “The lower powers are 
assimilated, not merely employed, and assimilation presupposes the homogeneous 
nature of the thing assimilated” (Coleridge’s italics, Collected 11.1: 511).  On the 
basis of the two systems’ fundamental sameness, assimilation elevates 
mechanism by incorporating it in organicism.  But this is not to suggest that 
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Coleridge equates assimilation with vitality.  He rejects out of hand any 
definition of life that is based on “some one particular function of Life common 
to all living objects—nutrition, for instance; or, to adopts the phrase most in 
vogue at present, assimilation” (Collected 11.1: 490).14  Rather assimilation is a 
hallmark of vitality because it signals organic unification at work in material 
substances. 
When this notion of life serves as the source domain for metaphors for the 
mind, assimilation likewise performs a unifying role.  The imagination, as 
described in Biographia Literaria, “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-
create . . . it struggles to idealize and to unify” (Collected 7.1: 304).  Whereas 
“dissolves” and “dissipates” signal a figurative mental digestion at work, 
“idealize” and “unify” signal the joining work of assimilation.15  A few pages 
later, Coleridge directly compares the imagination to digestion by suggesting 
that the following lines, in which Sir John Davies characterizes the soul, “may 
                                                 
14 As Coleridge’s editors note, “C had adopted a description of life as consisting in assimilation—
though he did not use the term himself—in the 1809-10 Friend, . . . but removed it when he 
revised the Friend for publication.” In an 1816 note to Hugh J. Rose, “C pointed out that 
assimilation was an effect rather than a definition of life” (Collected 11.1: 490 n. 2). 
15 Similarly, although I think less convincingly, Budge reads Coleridge’s description of blending 
and combing powers of genius in digestive terms, arguing that “genius can be equated to a 
superior power of mental digestion” and that in Biographia Literaria, “Wordsworth is the 
exemplar of the superior digestive powers of genius” (81-82). 
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with slight alteration be applied, and even more appropriately, to the poetic 
Imagination”: 
Doubtless this could not be, but that she turns 
Bodies to spirit by sublimation strange, 
As fire converts to fire the things it burns, 
As we our food into our nature change. 
 
From their gross matter she abstracts their forms, 
And draws a kind of quintessence from things; 
Which to her proper nature she transforms 
To bear them light on her celestial wings. 
(Nosce Teipsum, quoted Collected 7.2: 17)   
Coleridge invokes Davies’s language of elevation and “sublimation” to express 
the imagination’s ability to take up the “gross matter” of mechanism—to 
assimilate it into the higher condition of organic unity.   
Davies’s extended metaphor is based on the human body, but many of 
Coleridge’s digestive metaphors are based on vegetation.  Given that, for 
Coleridge, digestive powers unite all of creation from the bottom up, the source 
domain for THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY includes the plant kingdom.  As 
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Abrams explains, the plant is one of Coleridge’s “favorite” metaphors for the 
mind (Mirror 68) because it exhibits five principle characteristics: primacy of the 
whole over the parts, growth, an internal source of energy, organic structural 
unity, and assimilation (Mirror 171-174).  Although a surprising number of 
Abrams’s examples involve digestive metaphors, he seems unaware that each of 
the first four characteristics operates through and depends upon the fifth.  For 
example, in the quintessentially organic metaphor from “Treatise on Method” 
(1818), in which Coleridge compares the mind to a germinating seed, 
assimilation implements all of these characteristics:16  
Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external 
world, are like light, and air, and moisture, to the seed of the mind, which 
would else rot and perish.  In all processes of mental evolution the objects 
of the senses must stimulate the mind; and the mind must in turn 
assimilate and digest the food which it thus receives from without. (emphasis 
added, Collected 11.1: 634) 
As the seedling’s survival and development depend upon nutritive assimilation, 
the mind’s growth requires active commerce with the world through all of the 
                                                 
16 Although the syntax of this quotation renders “the seed of the mind” ambiguous, indicating 
either the mind as a seed or that mind contains a seed, Coleridge’s metaphor of the seed-as-idea 
on the previous page suggests that he intends the latter: “From the first, or intuitive idea, as from 
a seed, successive ideas germinate” (Collected 11.1: 633).  
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senses.  Moreover, as the “machinery of the external world” is transmuted into 
“food,” the mind assimilates mechanical stimuli into its organic structure.  
Similarly, in the Statesman’s Manual (1816), Coleridge offers an allegory of 
a digesting plant as an organic “symbol of that higher life of reason”:  
Lo! - with the rising sun it [a tree or flower] commences its outward life 
and enters into open communion with all the elements, at once 
assimilating them to itself and to each other.  At the same moment it 
strikes its roots and unfolds its leaves, absorbs and respires, streams forth 
its cooling vapour and finer fragrance, and breathes a repairing spirit, at 
once the food and tone of the atmosphere, into the atmosphere that feeds 
it.  Lo!—at the touch of light how it returns an air akin to light, and yet 
with the same pulse effectuates its own secret growth, still contracting to 
fix what expanding it had refined.  Lo!—how upholding the ceaseless 
plastic motion of the parts in the profoundest rest of the whole it becomes 
the visible organismus of the whole silent or elementary life of nature and, 
therefore, in incorporating the one extreme becomes the symbol of the 
other; the natural symbol of that higher life of reason . . ." (Coleridge’s 
italics, Collected 6: 72) 
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Assimilating, incorporating, communing, refining, absorbing, growing, and 
feeding—the plant’s nutritive process, its ability to combine air, water, and other 
“elements,” figures the reason’s power to coordinate and harmonize the mental 
faculties.  Dependent upon “the ceaseless plastic motion of its parts” and porous 
from root to leaf, the reason-as-plant is a dynamic, organizing and fixing center, a 
site of continual change and exchange with the environment.  Its ability to feed 
the air as well as be fed by it represents the reason’s ability to unite the mind 
with the rest of Creation; the organism functions as an organ within a larger 
whole.  
A few pages later, Coleridge reframes the reason’s unifying function in 
terms of an analogy with human digestion: “For never can I look and meditate 
on the vegetable creation without a feeling similar to that with which we gaze at 
a beautiful infant that has fed itself asleep at its mother's bosom, and smiles in its 
strange dream of obscure yet happy sensations.”  Nestled in its nutritive source 
as the plant is nestled in the soil, the child peacefully digests its meal.  And like 
the respiring plant, the child, “all permeable to a holier power!,” represents the 
reason as a continual site of change and exchange between the individual and the 
universal (Coleridge’s italics, Collected 6: 71).   
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Although Coleridge does not mention digestion in his famous definition 
of organic form, a metaphorical mental assimilation operates tacitly even there, 
as the organic form “shapes, as it developes itself from within.”  If the form in 
question is a poem, which takes shape within the poet’s mind, then this 
assimilating activity signals the suffusion of the poem with the reason’s organic 
vitality; the act of composition extends mental digestion into poetic form.  As a 
result, Coleridge’s definition obscures the poet’s agency, locating the mind’s 
synthesizing work within the emerging poem itself, which, by virtue of this 
synthesizing work, is continuous with the mind.  But the transfer of vital power 
from mind to poem depends upon the poet’s powers of mental assimilation.  If, 
in the source domain of life, assimilation is a hallmark of vital power—the 
evidence of its operation in the material world—in the target domain of poetic 
form, it is the means through which the mind of genius vitalizes its creations. 
 
Literature as Mental Food 
Through THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, Coleridge conceptualizes the 
structure and function of the mind through analogy with human and vegetable 
digestion.  Healthy digestion metaphorically represents the organizing 
operations of the reason as it unifies the mechanical and organic faculties within 
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a larger whole.  But in typical organic fashion, that whole constitutes but a part 
of a much larger network of interconnected wholes in which it is embedded.  
Within this system, the Coleridgean mind shapes itself through dynamic 
interaction with the rest of the world, which is often figured as nutritional 
exchange.  Just as a plant or an infant needs proper nutrition to sustain healthy 
growth, the mind requires a proper metaphorical diet.  Its unity depends upon 
the individual’s access to nature, education, political and social climate, and a 
host of other factors, but Coleridge’s anxieties about this environmental 
contingency emerge most clearly in his metaphors of literature as mental food.  
Unlike the wholesome produce of the imagination, which promotes mental 
digestion by strengthening the reason’s assimilating powers, the unwholesome 
cookery of the mechanical faculties results in mental constipation, bloating, 
diarrhea or other forms of figurative indigestion.   
As in the diatribe against Bertram, where the poisoning of public taste 
promotes a “shocking spirit of jacobinism,” Coleridge’s metaphors of mental 
indigestion frequently allude to the violence of the French Revolution as the 
worst-case outcome of the mind-turned-machine.  In The Statesman’s Manual, he 
blames the degeneration of the French national mind on the “boastful wisdom,” 
of mechanistic rationalism, which “gradually tampered with the taste and 
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literature of the most civilized nations in Christendom, seducing the 
understanding from its natural allegiance” (emphasis added, Collected 6: 73-74).  
Coming under the unwholesome influence of the likes of Voltaire and 
D’Alembert, the understanding was “tempted to throw off all show of reverence 
to the spiritual and even to the moral powers and impulses of the soul; and 
usurping the name of reason openly joined the banners of the Antichrist” 
(Collected 6: 75).  This seduction of the understanding precipitates “the fearful 
chastisement of France”: 
We have learned to trace [the causes of the Revolution] back to . . . the 
extreme over-rating of the knowledge and power given by the 
improvements of the arts and sciences, especially those of astronomy, 
mechanics, and a wonder-working chemistry; to . . . the general conceit that 
states and governments might be and ought to be constructed as machines, 
every movement of which might be foreseen and taken into previous 
calculation; to the consequent multitude of plans and constitutions, of 
planners and constitution-makers, and the remorseless arrogance with 
which the authors and proselytes of every new proposal were ready to 
realize it, be the cost what it might in the established rights, or even in the 
lives, of men. . . (emphasis added, Collected 6: 33-34) 
91 
 
Organic unity everywhere breaks down in this nightmarish vision of mechanism 
run amok.  When an individual allows the understanding to usurp the function 
of reason, he or she forfeits free will, radical creativity, and spirituality, confining 
the mind to an empirical rationalism that reduces all abstract systems to its own 
laws.  Without the unifying powers of reason, the individual can no longer 
function as a vital organ within the larger whole and in consequence, mechanism 
spreads upward from the individual to society.   
If mechanistic literature reduces its consumers to automata by stripping 
them of reason, Coleridge often characterizes this result in terms of the digestive 
side effects of opium: an incessant appetite for more and an irregularity of the 
bowels.  As an opium eater himself and as a friend of the physician, Thomas 
Beddoes, who described the drug’s digestive effects in his medical guide, Hygeia, 
Coleridge would have been intimately acquainted with these symptoms 
(Youngquist, “Romantic Dietetics” 242).  The numerous and detailed accounts of 
his constipation, flatulence, and other intestinal disturbances in Dorothy 
Wordsworth’s journals and in Coleridge’s own notebooks suggest, in short, that 
“[h]is digestion was a mess” (Youngquist, “Romantic Dietetics” 242).   
Like opium, mechanistic literature momentarily gratifies an appetite for 
stimulation, but it offers no mental nourishment and ends only in addiction, as 
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when Bertram leaves its audience “callous to all the mild appeals, and craving 
alone for the grossest and most outrageous stimulants.”  Budge reads Coleridge’s 
diatribe in the context of the nineteenth-century practice of using alcohol and 
opium as therapeutic stimulants, based on John Brown’s theory that disease 
resulted from an over- or under-stimulation of the nerves.  As Coleridge 
describes it, Bertram resembles “a botched Brunonian therapy” that ends in a 
“self-reinforcing spiral of addiction” (Budge 80-81).  Stripping individuals of 
agency, Maturin’s play reduces its audience to automatons who, capable of 
perceiving only overstimulation or the lack thereof, cannot distinguish right from 
wrong.   
Even when mechanistic literature is figured explicitly as food, rather than 
a drug, it produces the opium-like effect of disabling free will and blunting 
judgment.  For instance, Coleridge decries consumers of popular philosophy, 
that vast company . . . whose heads and hearts are dieted at the two public 
ordinaries17 of Literature, the circulating libraries and the periodical press.  
But what is the result?  Does the inward man thrive on this regimen?  
Alas! if the average health of the consumers may be judged of by the 
articles of largest consumption; if the secretions may be conjectured from 
                                                 
17 R. J White notes, “An ‘ordinary’ was the old fashioned term for the table d’hôte, or the ordinary 
meal, served for the farmers at hostelries in market-towns” (Collected 6: 38 n. 3). 
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the ingredients of the dishes that are found best suited to their palates; 
from all that I have seen, either of the banquet or the guests, I shall utter 
my Profaccia18 with a desponding sigh.  From a popular philosophy and a 
philosophic populace, Good Sense deliver us!”  (Coleridge’s italics, 
Collected 6: 38) 
Such mental fare offers little nutrition for “the inward man,” that is, for the mind 
as an organic whole.  “This alas! is an irremediable disease,” Coleridge laments, 
“for it brings with it, not so much an indisposition to any particular system, but 
an utter loss of taste and faculty for all system and for all philosophy” (Collected 
7.1: 292).  The inability to select appropriate mental food perpetuates the cycle of 
degeneration. 
In addition to this endless craving, mechanistic literature also causes the 
opium-like side effect of mental constipation.  The mechanical mind, such as that 
of the consumer of popular philosophy, often yields “secretions” of dubious 
value.  Citing Schiller’s Die Räuber as a paradigmatic example, Coleridge 
criticizes popular German drama both as the excremental product of deranged 
mental digestion and as an unsavory dish that will upset its audience’s mental 
digestion in turn.  As a mixture of the “bloated style” of Hervey’s Meditations 
                                                 
18 According to White, a profaccia, or “proface” is a statement of “[g]ood wishes before a meal, or 
a toast before drinking” (Collected 6: 38 n. 4). 
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among the Tombs, the “strained thoughts” of Young’s Night Thoughts, and the 
“self-involution” of Richardson’s Clarissa, Die Räuber is both constipated and 
constipating:  
as the compound of these ingredients duly mixed, you will recognize the 
so called German Drama.  The Olla Podrida thus cooked up, was 
denounced, by the best critics in Germany, as the mere cramps of 
weakness, and orgasms of a sickly imagination on the part of the author, 
and the lowest provocation of torpid feeling on that of the readers.  
(Coleridge’s italics, Collected 7.2: 211) 
If Coleridge’s vocabulary “suggests fairly graphically a case of indigestion and 
constipation” (Budge 80), this fecal imagery mixes uncomfortably with the 
vocabulary of cooking and eating.  The WRITING IS COOKING metaphor (Table 1, 
mapping (g)), identifies Die Räuber as the produce of a mechanized mind.  An 
Olla Podrida, or “rotten pot” in Spanish, is a heavily spiced stew, oft dreaded by 
visitors to Spain and Portugal, consisting of a hodge-podge of meats, legumes, 
and vegetables.19  Insofar as it represents German drama as a hasty concoction of 
                                                 
19 “It is not known why olla podrida was so called in Spanish; perhaps from the resemblance of the 
bubbling and swelling appearance of the slow-cooking stew to festering putrefaction (compare 
Spanish podrido (colloquial) fed up, podrida (colloquial) brawl, rumpus).” (OED, “olla podrida, 
n.”) 
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stale devices, warmed over but largely unimproved, the cooking metaphor 
reveals the workings of fancy, which “must receive all its materials ready made.” 
The metaphor of MENTAL MALFUNCTION IS INDIGESTION (Table 1, Mapping 
(s)), characterizes mechanism as illness.  As the product of the “cramps of 
weakness, and orgasms of a sickly imagination,” the German drama is 
paradoxically both an intestinal blockage and a loose stool.  In effect, the 
playwright’s mind lacks agency; it struggles to produce the text and cannot 
control anything it does manage to produce.  To surmise what sickened Schiller’s 
imagination, we need look no further than the list of what he has consumed.  
Hence, Hervey, Young, and Richardson come in for critique, in turn—and 
Coleridge’s description implicates each in the same mental indigestion he serves 
up.  Of course, the German playwright’s excremental dish will sicken its 
consumers in turn, resulting in the “lowest provocation of torpid feeling,” where 
“lowest” signals both an intellectual and an anatomical baseness. 
By short-circuiting the digesting mind, turning its metaphorical excrement 
into food, Coleridge characterizes German drama as not only as extremely 
distasteful, but also symptomatic of a contagious mental degeneration.  This 
effect depends upon a complex metaphorical blend of four input spaces, cooking, 
writing, eating, and play-going, as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Schiller's Audience 
 
The first three of these input spaces interact within a blended space such that the 
composition of Die Räuber is figured simultaneously as cooking an Olla Podrida 
and fitfully producing digestive waste.  In this first blended space, Schiller cooks 
up an unsavory and unwholesome mental dish.  Then, in a second blended 
space, this putrid pottage is fed back into the familiar logic of literary 
consumption as ingestion.  When we run the blend, the resulting image violates 
taboo. 
Fortunately, if literature-as-food can transmit mechanism from one mind 
to another, it can also transmit organicism.  Coleridge insists that literature 
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produced by the imagination, “is at all times the proper food for the 
understanding; but in an age of corrupt eloquence, it is both food and antidote” 
(Coleridge’s italics, Collected 7.2: 143).  Whereas mechanistic work “poison[s] the 
taste,” its organic counterpart works as an “antidote” that “will suffice to form a 
correct and even a sensitive taste” (Collected 7.2: 142).  Because it is organically 
structured and therefore readily assimilable, imaginative literature helps to 
restore the mind’s organic structure.  As an example, Coleridge describes the 
healing effect of his first reading of Wordsworth:  
It was not . . . the freedom from false taste, . . . which made so unusual an 
impression on my feelings immediately, and subsequently on my 
judgment.  It was the union of deep feeling with profound thought; the 
fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in 
modifying, the objects observed; and above all the original gift of 
spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the 
ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the 
common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the 
sparkle and the dew drops.  (Coleridge’s italics, Collected 7.1: 80) 
In language reminiscent of the reason as a plant that “breathes a repairing spirit, 
at once the food and tone of the atmosphere, into the atmosphere that feeds it,” 
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Coleridge suggests that imaginative literature can heal, “awaken[ing] in the 
minds of others . . . that freshness of sensation which is the constant 
accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, convalescence” (Collected 7.1: 
83).  Of course, the organic mind remains perpetually vulnerable to 
disorganizing influences; even full exposure to the greatest works of literary 
genius “will not perfectly secure us against the contagious familiarity with the 
far more numerous offspring of tastelessness or of a perverted taste” (Collected 
7.2: 142).  The present day, with its constant barrage of mechanistic literature 
provides an unfavorable environment for the organic growth of the mind.   
Hence, Coleridge’s metaphors of the digesting mind suggest an enduring 
anxiety about the fragility of organic unity as an environmentally contingent 
process.  As a result, they reveal an altogether more materially and empirically 
inflected side of Coleridgean organicism than critics have so far recognized.  In 
figuring organic process as a down-to-earth dynamic, contingent upon the 
material specifics of a particular time and place, these metaphors characterize the 
organic mind as an open system, which, although it shapes itself from within 
according to the universal telos that informs it, does so within the constraints of 
its particular environment.   
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As the product of such a mind, the literary text likewise develops within 
the constraints of a particular environment.  And by virtue of the nested 
interconnection among organic wholes, the text itself constitutes both an organic 
whole unto itself and an organ of a yet-larger whole.  For instance, once more 
echoing Schlegel,20 Coleridge writes, “at each new [literary] birth, at each rare 
avatar, for the human Race winning itself a new body by assimilating to itself the 
different materials [of] nourishment out of the then circumstances, & new organs 
of power & action appropriate to the new sphere of its motion & activity” 
(Collected 5.1: 465-66).  By comparing the individual text to a body, a “new birth,” 
which operates as a whole unto itself and as a “new [organ] of power” within the 
larger whole of “the human Race,” this metaphor represents the collective 
literary output of a generation as a living organism that shapes itself in response 
to its time and place.  Organic aesthetics extends beyond the boundaries of the 
individual text in order to position the text as a part within a larger whole.  Here, 
as elsewhere, assimilation figures the unifying work of organic vitality as it 
incorporates the text to the larger literary body.  Furthermore, assimilation also 
                                                 
20 In Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, Schlegel’s formulation follows shortly after the 
distinction between organic and mechanical form famously adapted by Coleridge. It reads, “the 
spirit of poetry, which, though imperishable, migrates, as it were, through different bodies, must, 
so often as it is newly born in the human race, mould to itself, out of the nutrimental substance of 
an altered age, a body of a different conformation” (241).  
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figures the interaction between the text and its context, and implicitly, between 
the writer’s mind and the world around him.  In this way, digestion comes to 
figure for Coleridge, as for many subsequent digestive organicists, literature’s 
origin in a contextually embedded mind and the contribution of that mind to the 
context in which subsequent minds are imbedded in turn.   
As writer and a poet, Coleridge would have his own work contribute to 
this organic conception of literary history as nutritional exchange.  But he 
worries that his efforts might be wasted on a public whose minds are too far 
gone.  In one of the more humorous moments of Biographia Literaria, a 
disgruntled Coleridge lambasts a nobleman who refused to pay for his 
subscription to the Friend, “[s]eventeen or eighteen numbers of which, however, 
his Lordship was pleased to retain, probably for the culinary or post-culinary 
conveniences of his servants” (Collected 7.1: 176).  For Coleridge, who would have 
his work “retained” for a different purpose—within his readers’ minds, its use in 
the scullery—or worse—the toilet, for the “post-culinary” purpose of wiping his 
Lordship’s butler’s backside, represents the ultimate debasement: the waste of 
his genius.  In subjecting himself to what Leah Price has termed, “the wastepaper 
trope,” Coleridge envisions his work valued not for the mental nourishment of 
its content, but for the material utility of its paper (253).  Hypothetically 
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transformed from a nobleman’s periodical into his servants’ toilet paper, 
Coleridge’s work undergoes simultaneous debasements on the levels of 
monetary value, social class, and intellectual worth.  But Coleridge’s digestive 
imagery implies a further set of debasements from figurative to literal and from 
mental to corporeal.  By skipping the mental digestive tract—and sending the 
Friend straight to the far end of its literal analog—“his Lordship” refuses to let 
Coleridge organically nourish his mind and instead forces him mechanically to 
clean his butler’s body.  While the Friend goes to waste, the gothic olla podrida is 
eagerly gobbled up by the public at large. 
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3. Feeding on Infinity: The Prelude as an Allegory of the Digesting Mind 
 
The Prelude, Wordsworth’s “poem on the growth of my own mind,” 
culminates in an expression of the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A DIGESTING 
BODY (Letters 1: 518).  Looking down from the summit of Mount Snowdon, the 
poet discovers, in the misty atmosphere below his feet, a paradigmatic image of 
the romantic mind, “The soul, the imagination of the whole”: 
. . . a blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour, 
A deep and gloomy breathing place, through which 
Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams 
Innumerable, roaring with one voice.   (Prelude XIII, 56-65)1 
Onto this mouth-like rift, Wordsworth projects an image of a poetic mind, such 
as Milton’s or his own, at the peak of its powers:  
. . . it appeared to me 
The perfect image of a mighty mind, 
Of one that feeds upon infinity, 
That is exalted by an under-presence, 
                                                 
1 All quotations come from the 1805 edition of the Prelude unless otherwise noted. 
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The sense of God, or, whatsoe’er is dim 
Or vast in its own being . . .   (Prelude XIII, 69-73) 
One of few critics who notice alimentary themes in the Prelude,2 Denise Gigante 
reads the feeding mind as a “prime emblem of Wordsworthian egotistical 
sublimity” and “a consciousness assimilating everything into itself” (Taste 69).3  
As an image of Hegelian subject formation, she argues, the feeding mind 
represents the “Wordsworthian Subject of Taste,” which achieves sublimity by 
abjecting the vulgar consumerist appetites of railway tourists, figured by the 
vaguely excremental “under-presence” (Taste 81).  But aesthetic taste is only one 
subset of the Prelude’s digesting mind imagery, much of which has gone 
unremarked either because of its conventionality or because of its subtlety.  
When interrelated through the conceptual framework of THE MIND IS A DIGESTING 
BODY, Wordsworth’s many images of mental ingestion and digestion reveal a 
                                                 
2 Richard J. Onorato perceives another subset of the Prelude’s mental-digestive imagery insofar as 
he reads Wordsworth’s many references to maternal nature as evidence of the poet’s longing to 
return to the primal scene of nursing (119-20). But like Gigante, he overlooks the myriad ways in 
which this theme interacts with other metaphors of mental digestion.  
3 Similarly, in A Mind that Feeds Upon Infinity (1991), Jean Hall uses Wordsworth’s image of 
“feeding” to explain the perpetual self-transcendence and imperialistic aggression against the 
external world through which the romantic self attains depth (14-15). But in reproducing rather 
than critically examining Wordsworth’s digestive metaphors, Hall’s discussion of “feeding” 
clings to the surface of the image. In Feeding on Infinity, Joshua Wilner adopts Wordsworth’s 
feeding mind as an example of psychoanalytic internalization in romantic literature. Comparing 
the feeding mind to the nursing babe of Book II, Wilner insightfully claims that “feeding” in the 
Prelude repeatedly figures a structure of reflection and transfer at “a peculiar interface that is also 
a point of discontinuity within a movement toward integration” (11). But beyond this remark, he 
has little to say about the function of feeding or other alimentary processes in the Prelude.  
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more nuanced and less aggressive stance toward the object world at Snowdon.  
In order to feed upon infinity, the Wordsworthian mind must abstain from its 
egotistical desires, allowing itself passively to be “exalted” by its surroundings 
and by its own memories.  Moreover, Wordsworth learns this passively active 
mode of mental feeding only through a lengthy process of trial and error that 
extends from infancy to adulthood.  In effect, the Snowdon scene marks the 
climax of an elaborate allegory of mental growth as dietary self-regulation.  
If, as several scholars have recognized, the Prelude traces Wordsworth’s 
subjective maturation through a process of sensuous interaction with the 
material world,4 his reliance on alimentary metaphors to characterize particular 
interactions reveals his struggle to balance the active and passive functions of his 
mind.  Expressions of DESIRE IS HUNGER, PERCEPTION IS INGESTION, INFLUENCE IS 
ASSIMILATION, and other familiar mappings of the digesting mind make the 
health of the young poet’s mental digestion an index of his changing 
relationships with nature, literature, and human affection, his principal sources 
                                                 
4This view of the Wordsworthian self as interactive process is informed by the work of Robert 
Langbaum and Meena Alexander. Langbaum credits the poet with establishing the “model of the 
modern self-creating, self-regarding identity, which draws its vital force from organic connection 
with nature,” bridging subject and object world through iterative exchange (46-47). Similarly, 
Alexander explains that the Wordsworthian self develops through a “bodily dialogue with 
nature” (87). In her phenomenological reading of the Prelude, Wordsworth constructs a 
continuous consciousness “by achieving in the radical recovery of time past . . . a subjective 
exploration of the bounds of the lived body, of the realm of interrelation between inner time and 
the outer world” (76). 
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of mental nourishment.  Before identifying the four stages of the Prelude’s 
alimentary arc, it will help to compare Wordsworth’s concept of the digesting 
mind to that of Coleridge, as outlined in the preceding chapter.  
For both poets, the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY 
foregrounds the contingency of a dynamic and processual subjectivity modeled 
on the body’s exchange of nutrients with the environment.  For example, both 
writers use the vocabulary of health and illness to characterize the effects of 
various types of literature on readers’ minds.  The 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads 
anticipates Coleridge’s more elaborate diatribes against the mechanized mental 
appetite of the reading public in Biographia Literaria.  Wordsworth blames the rise 
of a “degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation,” on the mechanical 
repetitiveness of modern urban life, which “produc[es] a craving for 
extraordinary incident which the rapid communication of intelligence hourly 
gratifies.”  In consequence, the great works of literary genius “are driven into 
neglect by . . . sickly and stupid German Tragedies” (emphasis added, Lyrical 
294).  For Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, the metaphor of aesthetic taste spills 
over into a rhetoric of addiction and illness to characterize the minds of the 
reading public in terms of appetitive and digestive dysfunction. 
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The Preface likewise anticipates the Biographia’s imagery of healthy mental 
digestion as a sign of an organically unified mind.  The poet, Wordsworth claims, 
can nourish readers’ minds—if he can first nourish his own: 
[O]ur continued influxes of feeling are modified . . . by our thoughts, 
which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and . . . by 
repetition and continuance of this act feelings connected with important 
subjects will be nourished, till at length, if we be originally possessed of 
much organic sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced that by 
obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits we shall 
describe objects and utter sentiments of such a nature . . . that the 
understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, if he be in a 
healthful state of association, must necessarily be enlightened, his taste 
exalted, and his affections ameliorated.   (emphasis added, Lyrical 291-92) 
In keeping with the dual sense of “organic,” which signifies the part and the 
whole as well as their interdependence, Wordsworth’s “organic sensibility” 
simultaneously connotes an acuteness of the sensory organs5 and the mind’s 
ability associatively to join discrete sensations into patterns that give rise to 
                                                 
5 Because Wordsworth’s “organic sensibility” predates Coleridge’s introduction of the idealist 
sense of “organic,” meaning transcendental unity, it invokes instead the sensory organs and “a 
mind shaped by and realized in bodily organs” (Richardson, British 71). 
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healthy mental habits.  That the poet should “mechanically” obey the habitual 
impulses arising organically from his sensory experience reveals that for 
Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, the organic mind involves mechanistic processes.   
Furthermore, the reader’s “healthful state of association” suggests that 
Wordsworth’s conception of the mind, like Coleridge’s, reflects the 
contemporary materialist discourses of medicine and psychology.  Over the last 
two decades, as scholars have begun to uncover the fleshier dimensions of 
Wordsworth’s thought, evidence increasingly points to Erasmus Darwin’s 1796 
medical treatise, Zoonomia, as an important source for his ideas about the mind 
and body.  Although we have no proof that Wordsworth read Hartley’s 
Observations on Man, we know that he read at least some of Zoonomia in 1798.6  
And although the depth of his reading and the duration of its influence remain 
open to debate,7 it seems likely that the book helped to familiarize him with 
                                                 
6 In 1798, Wordsworth requested that Cottle send him Zoonomia “by the first carrier” (Letters 1: 
199). The next month, his sister wrote that the two volumes had “already completely answered 
the purpose for which William wrote for them” (Letters 1: 214-15). 
7 Mary Moorman identifies an anecdote from Zoonomia as the source for “Goody Blake and Harry 
Gill” (I, 284). Paul D. Sheats (220) and Mary Jacobus (Tradition 234-36; 137-39) argue for Darwin’s 
broader influence, as does James H. Averill, who considers Darwin a source for several of the 
1798 poems dealing with abnormal psychology, but suggests that Wordsworth only briefly 
“dipped into” Zoonomia (240). Likewise, Desmond King-Hele finds echoes of Darwin throughout 
the early poetry but insists that his influence quickly waned (79). 
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Hartley’s associationist psychology.8  Paul Youngquist and Gavin Budge have 
further demonstrated that Darwin would have exposed Wordsworth to the 
medical theory of the Scottish physician John Brown, who considered disease the 
result of an excess or insufficiency of nervous stimulation.9  And based on 
Wordsworth’s ubiquitous inner-body imagery, Richard Matlak compellingly 
argues that Zoonomia profoundly influenced the poet’s “biological understanding 
of life,” offering him “a unified perspective inter-relating available medical 
information and physiology and psychology” (“Wordsworth’s Reading” 76, 
80).10 
If, as Matlak argues, Wordsworth’s “interior body consciousness” draws 
heavily on Darwinian biology (“Wordsworth’s Reading” 78), then Zoonomia 
probably influenced his metaphors of the digesting mind—especially his image 
                                                 
8 In 1960 Arthur Beatty argued that Wordsworth adapted Hartley’s three stages in the growth of 
the individual’s subjectivity (113, 127), but John O. Hayden countered that we have no proof that 
Wordsworth ever read Hartley (94). More recent critics tend to maintain that Wordsworth would 
have been exposed to associationism through the works of Darwin (Richardson, British 67-68, 73; 
Budge 52), Coleridge (Richardson, British 68), and Samuel Rogers (J. Wordsworth, 
“Introduction”). 
9 For Youngquist, Wordsworth’s early poetry “practices a physiological aesthetics” aimed at 
healing the reader’s mind and body by regulating levels of nervous excitement (“Lyrical Bodies” 
152). For Budge, the Prelude is Wordsworth’s Brunonian “epic of self-regulation,” which draws 
heavily on Darwin’s somatic associationism, but ultimately equilibrates the poet’s stimulation 
level through immaterial intuition (67). 
10 Matlak further develops this argument in Poetry of Relationship (110-119). 
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of the mind’s “chief feeder.”  In the 1800 Preface, Wordsworth hypothesizes that 
meter yields pleasure through the perception of similarity and difference:  
This principle is the great spring of the activity of our minds and their chief 
feeder.  From this principle the direction of the sexual appetite, and all the 
passions connected with it take their origin . . . and upon the accuracy 
with which similitude in dissimilitude, and dissimilitude in similitude are 
perceived, depend our taste and our moral feelings.   (emphasis added, 
Lyrical 306-07) 
Although Gigante reads the mind’s “chief feeder” as “the faculty of aesthetic 
discernment” (Taste 68), Wordsworth indicates that it refers to a deeper mental 
process, of which taste is but one dependent faculty.  Rather, as Stuart Sperry 
demonstrates, the “chief feeder” designates consciousness itself—a rhythmic 
pulse aligned with heartbeat that constitutes the “primal quality of awareness” 
through which self-consciousness organically emerges (66).  Based on 
Richardson’s comparison of this passage to Darwin’s theory of meter as 
pleasurable repetition, we might further identify the chief feeder as the rhythm 
of the association of ideas (British 79-80).  It represents the mechanical process of 
comparison and contrast through which the organic mind develops from within 
by interacting with its environment. 
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If the target domain of the mind’s chief feeder is the association of ideas, 
its source domain is a blended image of the circulatory system as a stream of 
nutrition that irrigates the mind.  Although Gigante oversimplifies the function 
of the chief feeder, she astutely recognizes its operation in Wordsworth’s many 
images of waterways that suffuse the land as veins and arteries suffuse the body 
(Taste 77-82).  Given Wordsworth’s penchant for portraying consciousness as a 
waterway11—“The river of my mind” (Prelude 1799 II, 249)—the “chief feeder,” as 
“the great spring of the activity of our minds,” invokes a river’s unseen, 
mysterious source.12  But the words “appetite” and “taste” amplify the 
alimentary sense of feeding.  Like many of the physiological thinkers of his day, 
including Darwin and Hartley, Wordsworth considers the circulatory system an 
integral part of the alimentary system because it absorbs nutrients and 
distributes them throughout the body for assimilation.  In effect, he expands the 
source domain of the digesting mind to include the vascular system.  For 
example, in ‘Tintern Abbey,’ where “digestion is one of the constitutive 
metaphors” (Youngquist, “Romantic Dietetics” 249), alimentation happens in the 
                                                 
11 As Alexander notes, “the river . . . both thematically and structurally provides consciousness 
with an image of continuity” (80). On Wordsworth’s stream-like consciousness, see also J. 
Wordsworth (Borders 331-34). 
12 Gigante notes that Wordsworth refers to a river’s source as a “feeder of the perpetual current” 
in the first of his Essays upon Epitaphs (Taste 77). 
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vascular system: “sensations sweet” are “Felt in the blood, and felt along the 
heart,” nourishing the mind with “tranquil restoration” (Lyrical 157).13  That this 
circulatory digestion takes place on the “banks of the Wye,” that “wanderer 
through the woods,” implicitly compares the circulatory system and the 
waterway as fluid distribution channels (Lyrical 156, 158).   
If, according to the bloodstream metaphor, Wordsworth maps a river onto 
an artery, he maps that river’s source—that which continually renews its flow—
onto the heart.  The flow itself becomes the pulse, as in “Lines Written near 
Richmond, upon the Thames, at Evening,” where the placid river becomes “an 
image of a poet’s heart, / How bright, solemn, how serene!” (Lyrical 147).  
Throughout the Prelude, we find the chief feeder at work in the poet’s “beating 
mind” or “inner pulse / Of contemplation” (II, 18; III, 347-48).  Within the context 
of the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, the chief feeder, 
represents the associative process of consciousness as a vascular system: that 
rhythmic power that suffuses the mind with the nourishment that it assimilates.  
As the pulse nourishes the body in the source domain, association nourishes the 
mind in the target domain.   
                                                 
13 Matlak identifies these lines as evidence of Darwin’s influence on Wordsworth’s inner-body 
imagery (“Wordsworth’s Reading” 78). 
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But if the “great spring of the activity of our minds” suggests organic 
nutrition, it also invokes a clockwork coil.  Once set in motion, the associative 
rhythm continues automatically and unconsciously, like a pendulum.  
Mechanism further creeps into the chief feeder metaphor through the source 
domain of the heart, which since the circulation of blood was discovered in 1628, 
physiologists increasingly conceived of as a mechanical pump (Alberti 23).  
However active and creative, the Wordsworthian mind remains passive in the 
sense that its mechanistic inertia cannot be controlled.  The “chief feeder” as a 
“spring” reveals that on the most fundamental level, the mind operates 
organically and mechanically—or, more precisely, mechanically organically.  
Hence, according to the Preface, the poet must “blindly and mechanically” obey 
the impulses of his “organic sensibility.” 
Less anxious than Coleridge about the mechanistic quality of association, 
Wordsworth endorses a thoroughly mechanical organic mind.  If dieted on 
nature, human affection, and wholesome books, the Wordsworthian mind can 
digest even the most mechanical shocks because it works automatically and 
unconsciously on the level of the figurative gut.  In “Expostulation and Reply,” 
Wordsworth names this mode of mental feeding: 
“Nor less I deem that there are powers, 
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“Which of themselves our mind impress, 
“That we can feed this mind of ours,  
“In a wise passiveness.   (emphasis added, Lyrical 148) 
In “wise passiveness,” the mind automatically feeds on nature through the 
senses.  “The eye it cannot chuse but see,” the poet explains, “We cannot bid the 
ear be still; / ‘Our bodies feel, where’er they be, / ‘Against, or with our will” 
(Lyrical 148).  As a network of orifices through which the mind ingests 
nourishment, the body resembles Coleridge’s reason-as-plant, everywhere 
permeable to its environment.  But whereas Coleridge worries that such 
openness entails vulnerability, Wordsworth’s defense of idleness affirms the 
automaticity of the organic mind as long as one chooses to let it feed itself.  In 
this sense, wise passiveness is active, a deliberate yielding up of willful agency. 
This mechanically organic mode of mental feeding represents the end 
state of the Prelude as an allegory of mental digestion.  As he matures, 
Wordsworth’s mind passes through four overlapping and loosely defined stages 
of mental feeding.14  In the first, which I call “passive activity,” to distinguish it 
                                                 
14 Perhaps coincidentally, these stages parallel Hartley’s account of appetitive development. As 
infants, he claims, we instinctively desire an optimal quantity of healthy food, but in youth, we 
succumb to immoderate cravings for unwholesome food and drink. Ultimately, as adults, we 
learn to preserve our health by carefully moderating our diets (2: 218-27). If Wordsworth did read 
the Observations, he might have read this passage as confirmation of his personal experience. 
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from the “wise passiveness” of “Expostulation and Reply,” the infant poet’s first 
sensory and affective experiences are figured as mental nursing—an innate 
receptivity to the mental nutrients on offer in his surroundings.  His mind grows 
automatically through the association of ideas figured, through the metaphor of 
the mind’s chief feeder, as digestive assimilation.  In early childhood, the poet 
continues to imbibe nature but expands his mental diet to include stories and 
poems.  But as the youth’s will emerges, it draws him into the second stage, 
which I call “unwise striving,” to designate its inversion of wise passiveness.  
With the emergence of aesthetic taste, he begins to seek sensuous gratification, 
whether from nature or other enjoyments such as immoderate food and drink.  
Turning away from his former nurse, he deprives his mind of nourishment, 
rendering it vulnerable to the unwholesome temptations of urban life.  The peak 
of unwise striving occurs when, thus malnourished, Wordsworth cannot 
associatively assimilate his experience of the French Revolution, the violent 
shock of which precipitates the third stage, in which mental crisis is figured as 
mental indigestion.  Desperately craving moral certainty, the poet turns to 
philosophy and to Godwinian rationalism in particular.  But this new mental diet 
only compounds his mental sickness by leading him to abstain from literature 
out of a distrust of its emotional effects.  To restore the balance of his mind, 
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Wordsworth must learn to feed upon his associative memory, represented as a 
metaphorical blood stream laden with nutrients.  He must also re-learn to 
consume literature and nature passively, and to allow his mind automatically 
and organically to associate ideas and emotions, as it did in infancy.  Only in this 
fourth stage of wise passiveness, when he achieves a self-consciously controlled 
version of his original relation to the external world, can his mind reach the 
maximum creative power represented by the feeding mind at Snowdon. 
If digestive self-regulation seems too distasteful a theme for the epic form, 
it is not without precedent.  Paradise Lost, arguably the Prelude’s most important 
precursor, itself constitutes an epic of digestion.  After all, “paradise was lost 
(and society made) because Eve, and then Adam, ate” (Gigante, Taste 24).  But in 
the Prelude, Wordsworth denies a personal fall, crediting Milton’s wholesome 
influence with empowering his mind to overcome the consequences of its dietary 
indiscretions.  Having assimilated Milton’s concept of “right reason,” which 
combines intellection and emotion within a single moral compass, Wordsworth’s 
mind can purge what, however unfairly, he characterizes as Godwin’s 
emotionless rationalism.  Unlike Adam and Eve, Wordsworth redeems himself 
because Milton flows in his metaphorical veins. 
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Passive Activity: Feeding the Mind in Infancy and Early Childhood 
In a passage that seems a likely source for Coleridge’s 1816 image of the 
organic mind as a suckling babe, “all permeable to a holier power,” the Prelude 
locates the poet’s first experience of the external world in the scene of nursing: 
. . . blest the babe 
Nursed in his mother’s arms, the babe who sleeps 
Upon his mother’s breast, who, when his soul 
Claims manifest kindred with an earthly soul, 
Doth gather passion from his mother’s eye. 
Such feelings pass into his torpid life 
Like an awakening breeze . . .  (Prelude II, 239-45) 
As the child’s first representative of the external world, the mother becomes the 
face of nature, an association that persists throughout Wordsworth’s oeuvre, as 
when nature appears as the “homely Nurse,” who nurtures man “with 
something of a Mother’s Mind” (Major Works 299).15  But as the child’s “first 
                                                 
15 Many critics psychologize Wordsworth’s nature as a reflection on the poet’s relationship with 
his mother, who died when he was eight years old. Moorman suggests that Wordsworth 
transferred to nature his idealized love for his mother (2-3). Richard J. Onorato claims that 
Wordsworth remains “fixated to a trauma, obsessed by a vital relationship with Nature which 
has come to stand unconsciously for the lost mother” (64).Similarly, G. Kim Blank argues that 
nature fills the emotional needs that Wordsworth’s mother left unsatisfied (54-55). And according 
to J. Wordsworth, “Nature who ‘never did betray / The heart that loved her’ is a substitute for the 
mother who had done just that” (Borders 79). 
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human love,” the mother also becomes the face of mankind, her affection 
bonding him to a community (Prelude VIII, 178).  Their intimacy imparts “a 
sympathetic relation of mind to universe,” an interaction of subject and object 
through which the child’s consciousness gradually develops (Langbaum 33).  
 Citing the earlier version of this passage in the 1799 Prelude as evidence of 
Wordsworth’s attunement to “the new biological psychology of his time,” 
Richardson notices its attempt to “balance the empiricist stress on sensation with 
the infant’s active participation in shaping the objects of that sensation.”  Valuing 
primarily the latter, he concludes that the vignette marks “a remarkable 
departure from the more passive, mechanistic accounts of Locke, Hartley, and 
Condillac” (British 67).  True—Wordsworth emphasizes the child’s mental 
activity: his soul “Doth gather passion” and his mind, “in the first trial of its 
powers” is  
 . . . eager to combine 
In one appearance all the elements 
And parts of the same object, else detached 
And loath to coalesce . . . .   (Prelude II, 247-50) 
But this activity takes the form of an automatic linking that suggests Hartleyan 
association, an unwilled and therefore passive accretion of memory that 
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strengthens the “recipient faculties” (Prelude II, 252).  The mind’s organic 
unifying power arises through the passive activity of its associative mechanism. 
If it is a “hard task to analyse a soul” in which each thought proves so 
thoroughly entwined that it “Hath no beginning,” Wordsworth’s nursing 
vignette attempts to recreate the lost sensory origins of the self (Prelude II, 232; 
236).  In this respect, it reveals a debt to Hartley, whether from the Observations 
or through Zoonomia.  Because, as Hartley explains, “the automatic state . . . is not 
to be found pure, except in the motions of the new-born infant,” all three writers 
recreate the Lockean tabula rasa by imagining the multi-sensory experience of the 
infant’s first meal (1: 110).  According to Darwin, the child’s consciousness 
gradually deepens through sensuous engagement with the breast, that 
“archetype . . . for pleasure and esthetic form” (Richardson, British 72): 
When the babe, soon after it is born into this cold world, is applied to its 
mother's bosom; its sense of perceiving warmth is first agreeably affected; 
next its sense of smell is delighted with the odour of her milk; then its 
taste is gratified by the flavour of it; afterwards the appetites of hunger 
and of thirst afford pleasure by the possession of their objects, and by the 
subsequent digestion of the aliment; and, lastly, the sense of touch is 
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delighted by the softness and smoothness of the milky fountain, the 
source of such variety of happiness.   (1: 145) 
For Darwin, association seamlessly mediates mind and body, joining sensory 
impressions into the complex idea of the mother as an object of desire.  
Evidently, this scene derives from a similar, if less sentimental, passage in the 
Observations:  
[A]n idea, or nascent perception, of the sweetness of the nurse's milk will 
rise up in that part of the child's brain which corresponds to the nerves of 
taste, upon his hearing her name.  And hence the whole idea belonging to 
the word nurse now begins to be complex, as consisting of a visible idea, 
and an idea of taste.  And these two ideas will be associated together, not 
only because the word raises them both, but also because the original 
sensations are.  (1: 272) 
In Hartley, even more explicitly than in Darwin, association transforms 
sensations to ideas, beginning with the touch upon the lips and proceeding 
“mechanically or automatically” to more complex ideas (1: 169).  Even “our 
passions or affections can be no more than aggregates of simple ideas united by 
association” (Hartley 1: 368).   
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For all three writers the first meal is an early instance of the association of 
ideas.  But for Wordsworth alone, the subsequent process of nutritional 
absorption becomes a metaphor for the way in which the associative mechanism 
continues to operate, even after a sensory experience has ended.16  Once the 
infant mind has swallowed its metaphorical meal, its figurative nutrients are 
taken up and distributed by the mind’s chief feeder: “Along his infant veins are 
interfused / The gravitation and the filial bond / Of Nature that connect him with 
the world” (Prelude II, 262-64).  The body’s assimilation of nutrients conceptually 
models the mind’s association of ideas.  In effect, whereas Coleridge treats 
association as a mechanism that must be assimilated by the organic mind, 
Wordsworth treats association as the mind’s mechanism of organic assimilation. 
The infant’s passive activity prefigures the mature poet’s inspired 
imagination.  Like Coleridge’s “Eolian Harp,” set humming by the rush of fluids 
                                                 
16 Although Hartley and Darwin understand the vascular system as an important part of the 
digestive process, they do not extend the source domain of the digesting mind into the vascular 
system as Wordsworth does. Their mental digestion takes place more conventionally in the 
alimentary canal, as when Hartley explains that, by linking words in an oft repeated sequence, 
poetry enables a “more perfect digestion by the mind” (1: 236) or when Darwin compares a 
failure of memory to constipation: “It is thus likewise observable in some inflammations of the 
bowels, the too strong efforts made by the muscles to carry forwards the offending material fixes 
it more firmly in its place, and prevents the cure. So in endeavouring to recal [sic] to our memory 
some particular word of a sentence, if we exert ourselves too strongly about it, we are less likely 
to regain it” (1: 189).  
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through its frame, he gathers force from the influx of air, food, and affect, 
becoming responsive to the world:17 
From Nature largely he receives, nor so 
Is satisfied, but largely gives again; 
For feeling has to him imparted strength, 
And—powerful in all sentiments of grief, 
Of exultation, fear and joy—his mind, 
Even as an agent of the one great mind,  
Creates, creator and receiver both, 
Working but in alliance with the works 
Which it beholds.  . . .  (Prelude II, 263-75) 
Like the speaker of ‘Tintern Abbey,’ the infant half perceives and half creates his 
vision of the world (Onorato 63).  And his creative power depends upon his 
receptivity. 
The digestive and venous imagery of the blessed babe vignette 
complicates the received view of romantic inspiration as a nearly disembodied, 
influx of metaphysical afflatus, exposing the material exchange latent within the 
                                                 
17 J. Wordsworth argues that like the blessed babe, many of Wordsworth’s child characters are 
border figures who, “in their extreme passivity . . . approach, or seem to approach, a boundary 
that is the entrance to another world” (Borders 4). As symbols of the adult poet’s potential, they 
are “a guarantee for the imagination of the possibility that truth may be attained” (Borders 10).  
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conventional metaphor of poetic inspiration, a breathing-in of a divine afflatus.  
For Wordsworth, as for many scientific thinkers of his day, the digestive and 
respiratory systems converge in the bloodstream, which absorbs materials from 
both the stomach and the lungs.18  Hence, the airy “awakening breeze” of 
maternal passion merges with the metaphorical nutrients of his first mental meal.  
If throughout the Prelude, as Abrams claims, “the wind serves unobtrusively as a 
thematic emblem of the relation of life, mind, and imagination to nature,” this 
passage reveals that the airy affair of inspiration simultaneously plays out on the 
fleshier levels of touch, taste, and material exchange (“Correspondent” 116).  
Wordsworth doesn’t just breathe nature; he swallows it. 
In early childhood, Wordsworth continues metaphorically to consume 
nature through the passive activity of association:  
A child, I held unconscious intercourse 
With the eternal beauty, drinking in 
                                                 
18 The bloodstream’s role in distributing nutrients has been acknowledged since classical 
antiquity (Boylan 116), but its role in exchanging oxygen is a more recent discovery. For Hartley, 
respiration ventilates the blood and replenishes it with electricity (1: 94-95). But following the 
discovery of oxygen in the 1770s, usually attributed to Priestley but sometimes to Lavoisier or 
Scheele, scientists refined theories of material exchange between the blood and atmosphere. In 
1790, Lavoisier and Seguin argued that the blood absorbs oxygen and expends it in a combustion-
like reaction (J. Poirier 301-305). Citing Priestley and Lavoisier, Darwin treats the blood as 
responsible for the exchange of oxygen and nutrients as well as an “ethereal fluid” that “is too 
fine to be long contained in animal vessels, and therefore requires perpetual renovation; and 
without which life cannot continue” (1: 471). 
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A pure organic pleasure from the lines 
Of curling mist, or from the level plain 
Of waters coloured by the steady clouds.   (Prelude I, 590-91) 
The phrase “pure organic pleasure” undoubtedly refers to sensory delight, as 
noted by the Prelude’s editors (60 n. 6); the eye enjoys the shapes, motions, and 
colors of the landscape.  But it also suggests a pleasurable feeling within the 
digestive and other bodily organs.  According to Darwin, “the natural growth of 
the various parts of the body” through nutrition results in “are a pleasurable 
sensation . . . as in youth, and perhaps in those, who are in the progress of 
becoming fat” (1: 466-67).  Throughout the Prelude, Wordsworth likewise links 
physical growth with a pleasure felt in the organs.  But “organic pleasure” 
further signifies the mind’s synthetic, associative activity.  As “A stranger, 
linking with the spectacle / No conscious memory of a kindred sight,” 
Wordsworth writes, 
. . . mine eye has moved o’er three long leagues 
Of shining water, gathering, as it seemed, 
Through every hair-breadth of that field of light 
New pleasure, like a bee among the flowers   (Prelude I, 601-08) 
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At first glance, this passage seems to deny Hartleyan association by insisting that 
the child’s pleasures are unconnected to any “kindred sight” in his memory.  But 
Wordsworth holds “unconscious intercourse” with nature and specifies that he 
links “no conscious memory” with his present pleasure.  The double emphasis 
on the subliminal reveals passive activity at work—and the image of the poet 
“drinking in” nature recalls the nursing infant.  Though it feels altogether new, 
the pleasure of the landscape, comes in part from its unconscious association 
with the primal experience of the first meal.   
As in the blessed babe vignette, vascular circulation figures the process of 
association that follows the metaphorical ingestion of nature: “a giddy bliss / 
Which like a tempest works along the blood / And is forgotten” (Prelude I, 611-
13).  As nutrients leave the bloodstream for assimilation by the body, so too, this 
image suggests, memories leave the conscious memory to be fully associated by 
the mind.  The eventual forgetting of early sensuous experience, then, marks not 
its loss, but its complete internalization—the moment when the memory 
becomes so fully absorbed by the mind that, like the primary experience of 
nursing, its associations need no longer involve the poet’s conscious thoughts in 
order to affect his perceptions.  Now an organic part of his subjectivity, the 
memory can shape and direct it from within.  In one of his most Hartleyan 
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statements, Wordsworth explains that these sensuous pleasures “did at length / 
Become habitually dear, and all their hues and forms were by invisible links / 
Allied to the affections” (Prelude I, 637-40).   
This mechanically organic association explains the growth of the poet’s 
visionary powers, for it yields glimmerings of his adult power: “even then I felt / 
Gleams like the flashing of a shield” (Prelude I, 613-14).  Repeatedly, Wordsworth 
traces his mature vision to his steady childhood diet of nature: “Thence did I 
drink the visionary power,” and “O Nature.  Thou hast fed / My lofty 
speculations” (emphasis added, Prelude II, 330, 463-64).  But that he identifies the 
“giddy bliss” of these feedings as the source of those “obscure feelings 
representative / Of joys that were forgotten,” suggests that other obscure 
feelings—those absent presences and dim, diffuse broodings that famously 
signal the climactic moments of his greatest poetry—may likewise indicate the 
mechanism of association (Prelude I, 634-35).  For example, as the poet recollects 
crossing the Alps, his imagination usurps his attention, revealing that 
 . . . in such visitings 
Of awful promise, when the light of sense 
Goes out in flashes that have shewn to us 
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,   (Prelude VI, 533-36) 
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These dark flashes of imagination that illuminate the invisible recall the early 
gleams that depend upon the felt but forgotten experiences of eating nature.  The 
effects—and affects—of associated ideas are felt even if their original sensations 
are no longer recollected.  In this way, Wordsworth’s metaphor of association as 
digestive assimilation helps to explain the paradoxical sensation of the extinction 
of sensation in many of his visionary moments.   
 But before Wordsworth can claim his full poetic power, he must feed his 
growing mind with wholesome literature.  And like Coleridge, Wordsworth 
frequently expresses the mapping, READING IS EATING, in highly conventional 
images.  Although he learns to love “the delicious world of poesy” at age thirteen 
(Prelude V, 605), his cravings for it begin much earlier.  Young children, he 
claims, innately crave literature: “Dumb yearnings, hidden appetite, are ours / 
And they must have their food” (Prelude V, 530-31).  Hence ballad tunes furnish 
“[f]ood for the hungry ears of little ones” even before they can read (Prelude V, 
212).   
Often, Wordsworth characterizes his early literary consumption, roughly 
from pre-literate childhood through grammar school, through a less 
conventional metaphor comparing his former self to a ruminant that grazes on 
whatever roughage is nearest to mouth.  Of himself and the classmates “[w]ith 
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whom I herded,” he remarks that “easily, indeed, / We might have fed upon a 
fatter soil / Of Arts and Letters” (Prelude V, 433-35).  But thankfully, he insists, he 
was not confined to the books served up in school.  In a passage worth quoting at 
length for its rich alimentary imagery, Wordsworth celebrates his and 
Coleridge’s early freedom to read indiscriminately:  
Where had we been we two, belovèd friend, 
If we, in lieu of wandering as we did 
Through heights and hollows and bye-spots of tales 
Rich with indigenous produce, open ground 
Of fancy, happy pastures ranged at will, 
Had been attended, followed, watched, and noosed, 
Each in his several melancholy walk, 
Stringed like a poor man’s heifer at its feed, 
Led through the lanes in forlorn servitude; 
Or rather like a stallèd ox shut out 
From touch of growing grass, that may not taste 
A flower till it have yielded up its sweets 
A prelibation to the mower’s scythe.   (Prelude V, 233-45) 
128 
 
Comparing people to animals, Wordsworth works downward in the GREAT 
CHAIN OF BEING metaphor system, replacing rationality with instinct in order to 
emphasize the organic automaticity of this mode of mental feeding.  Grazing 
becomes a metaphor for reading in passive activity.  The youths read “at will,” as 
yet unburdened with a utilitarian task.  Not yet “yoke-fellows / To custom,” they 
eat for the pleasure of it (Prelude V, 544-45).  To make this experience available 
for all of England’s youth, Wordsworth imagines an ideal educational setting: a 
“virgin grove,” sequestered from the workaday world, “[a] habitation sober and 
demure / For ruminating creatures” (Prelude III, 442; 449-50).  The proper 
digestion of books requires natural space and ample time to chew the cud. 
Throughout the Prelude, Wordsworth couples books and nature as the 
mind’s twin “feeding pleasures” (Prelude IV, 280).  If these two nutrients, freely 
accessible and in diverse supply, jointly nourish the mind, Wordsworth’s 
portraits of Coleridge and the “Infant Prodigy” suggest that a deficiency of either 
stunts its growth.  Not permitted to graze for long, Coleridge was pent up in the 
city during his formative years.  Addressing him directly, Wordsworth laments 
that his mind was starved of natural objects: 
Thy subtle speculations, toils abstruse 
Among the schoolmen, and Platonic forms 
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Of wild ideal pageantry, shaped out 
From things well-matched, or ill, and words for things— 
The self-created sustenance of a mind 
Debarred from Nature’s living images, 
Compelled to be a life unto itself, 
And unrelentingly possessed by thirst 
Of greatness, love, and beauty. . . .   (emphasis added, Prelude VI, 305-16) 
Craving nature but finding it not, Coleridge’s mind turns inward, in self-
consumption, manufacturing ersatz experiences, that “well-matched, or ill,” 
become associated for lack of anything else to digest.  By comparing Coleridge to 
a mad scientist who vainly labors to recreate nature in the dank laboratory of his 
mind, Wordsworth’s vaguely alchemical language attributes his friend’s 
fascination with the supernatural to an unsatisfied appetite for nature.  Although 
he likely agreed with it, Coleridge might have smarted from this portrait, which 
attributes to him not a robust poetic imagination, such as Wordsworth’s own, but 
a grotesque “airy wretchedness / That battened,” or fattened itself, on his 
youthful potential (Prelude VI, 325-26).   
 But at least Coleridge benefits from some imaginative literature; 
Wordsworth’s Infant Prodigy lacks even that.  A hyperbolic portrait of a child 
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victimized by educational theorists, the Prodigy is debarred from the open 
pastures of literary and natural delights: 
 Nay, if a thought of purer birth should rise 
To carry him towards a better clime, 
Some busy helper still is on the watch 
To drive him back, and pound him like a stray 
With the pinfold of his own conceit, 
Which is his home . . .   (Prelude V, 358-63) 
A foil to Wordsworth himself (Potkay 160), the Prodigy cannot graze on the 
legends that delighted the young poet.  As a result, his character suffers 
deformity.  “Oh, give us once again the wishing cap / Of Fortunatus, and the 
invisible coat / Of Jack the Giant-killer . . .,” Wordsworth laments, “The child 
whose love is here, at least doth reap / One precious gain—that he forgets 
himself” (Prelude V, 364-69).  Like the “stallèd ox shut out” from fresh grass and 
confined to a ration of hay, this child becomes complacent, a self-centered 
creature of vanity.  By contrast, these lines imply, Wordsworth’s literary grazing 
expands his mind, carrying him beyond himself.   
Overall, the portrait of the Prodigy suggests that contemporary education 
starves the mind by replacing the mechanical organicism of passive activity with 
131 
 
an impoverished and purely passive mechanism.  Of the Prodigy’s teachers 
Wordsworth wonders, “when will they be taught / That in the unreasoning 
progress of the world / A wiser spirit is at work for us” (Prelude V, 383-85).  Like 
Matthew of “Expostulation and Reply,” who overlooks the mental manna of his 
natural surroundings, they discount wise passiveness.  Conspiring with the 
utilitarian forces of industrialization, they yoke the Prodigy to a purpose, 
rendering him “the monster birth / Engendered by these too industrious times” 
(Prelude V, 292-293).  “[T]o the very road / Which they have fashioned,” these 
teachers, “would confine us down / Like engines” (Prelude V, 381-83).  If, as the 
Prelude’s editors note, “engines” suggests restraints or instruments of torture (172 
n. 5), the ruminant metaphor makes them whips and harnesses that lead the ox 
“through the lanes in forlorn servitude.” 
Alternatively, if the phrase “like engines” modifies “us,” then the 
educators transform their pupils into machines by confining them as if they are 
engines.  In February of 1804—likely only a few days before Wordsworth penned 
the Infant Prodigy passage19—the world’s first steam locomotive on rails made 
headlines by hauling 10 tons of iron almost 10 miles through South Wales 
                                                 
19 First appearing in Manuscripts W and WW, the Infant Prodigy passage was like composed Feb-
Mar 1804 (Reed 641-43).  
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(Klooster 78).  In light of this event, the image of pupils restricted like engines to 
a prefabricated road invokes not just any machine, but the steam locomotive.   
In effect, the ambiguous referent of “like engines” sets up a blended 
mental space in which the teachers’ treatment of the child as a beast of burden 
facilitates his transformation into a locomotive.  Moving the child downward 
two levels in the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor system, from human past 
animal to complex object, the image extends the consequences of the industrial 
revolution to the child’s mind.  All the more disturbingly, this mental 
mechanization results in a kind of death when the child-ox, sent prematurely to 
slaughter, becomes a consumable product of the industrial system: “tender as a 
nun. / Yet deem him not for this a naked dish / Of goodness merely—he is 
garnished out” (Prelude V, 304-06).  If “tender” means meek, as Adam Potkay 
points out, it also means “easy to chew”; the Prodigy is “a meal that (like the 
Irish babies of Swift's Proposal) is . . . prepared specifically to be consumed by 
others with fashionably corrupted tastes” (157).   
For Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, the kind and quantity of literature 
consumed, as well as the mode of consumption, can mechanize the mind.  But 
whereas Coleridge would carefully regulate the literary diet, Wordsworth warns 
against over-regimentation, especially in childhood.  Mental grazing develops 
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the emerging will by grounding literary taste in natural instinct.  The mind’s 
chief feeder, the associative pulse of similarity and difference, lets it recognize 
elements of nature in certain books.  The child with whom “living Nature hath 
been intimate,” is “stirred to ecstasy, as others are, / By glittering verse,” but he 
alone receives joy “From the great Nature that exists in works / Of mighty poets” 
(Prelude V, 612-20).  
 
The Appetites of Youth 
Having internalized nature as a criterion of literary excellence, 
Wordsworth begins to read more selectively.  By the time he enters the 
university, “many books were read in process of this time—devoured, / Tasted or 
skimmed, or studiously perused— / Yet with no settled plan” (Prelude VI, 26-29).  
Although his reading remains free of any academic purpose, he no longer grazes 
indiscriminately but exercises taste, deciding what to gobble up and what to set 
aside.  At this point, Wordsworth’s expressions of the digesting mind become 
more appetitive, reflecting his increasingly complicated relationship to the 
world.  The tabula rasa of infancy now overwritten with associations and desires, 
passive activity gives way to a new mode of mental feeding: the unwise striving 
of youth and young-adulthood.  Various pleasures, such as unwholesome or 
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immoderate foods, youthful companionship, and rambunctious sport, begin to 
seduce him from his wholesome diet of books and nature—and when he strays, 
he suffers guilt and a diminution of poetic powers. 
For example, in “Nutting,” which, although published in the 1800 Lyrical 
Ballads was originally written for the Prelude (Fenwick 62), the poet recounts a 
childhood adventure in which he sets out to gather nuts in the woods.  Coming 
upon a hazel bower, “Tall and erect, with milk-white clusters hung, / A virgin 
scene!,” the youth “luxuriates” awhile in his find (241; 19-20, 40). 
. . . Then up I rose, 
And dragg’d to earth both branch and bough, with crash 
And merciless ravage; and the shady nook 
Of hazels, and the green and mossy bower 
Deform’d and sullied, patiently gave up 
Their quiet being . . .   (241-42; 42-47) 
Patiently giving up its being to critics who ransack it for clues about 
Wordsworth’s psychosexual development,20 this erotically charged poem has 
                                                 
20 Since the 1970s, psychoanalytic readings of the poem’s gender dynamics have tended to treat 
the destruction of the bower as an Oedipal drama or as a narrative of ego formation. Among the 
most influential of these are Brisman (298-300), Cooke (137-45, 150-1), Homans (53-54), Schapiro 
(106-107), Ross, Arac (34-49), Crawford, Fay (63-67), Rowe, Jones, and Peritz. Others have taken a 
psychological, though not explicitly psychoanalytic approach, focusing on the boy’s displacement 
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prompted some to confess their own acts of critical rapine.21  But concentrating 
on the sexual dimension of the poem’s imagery, scholars have largely overlooked 
its alimentary dimension.  Indeed, as Bloom notes, the boy’s attitude toward 
nature departs from the ideal of wise passiveness (Romanticism 129).  But as a 
mode of mental feeding, his gluttony constitutes its very antithesis.   
The poem’s alimentary language invites such a contrast.  Before his 
rampage, he writes, “I stood, / . . . and with wise restraint / Voluptuous, fearless 
of a rival, eyed / The banquet” (241; 20-24).  Recalling the memorable phrase 
“wise passiveness” from the preceding volume of Lyrical Ballads, “wise restraint” 
invokes a self-serving inaction, an autoerotic “restraint of desire calculated to 
increase the slightly deferred satisfaction” (Jones 225).  The “wallet,” like a 
prosthetic stomach, lets the boy carry off whatever portion of the “banquet” he 
cannot consume on the spot (240; 5).  Or perhaps it lets him further exercise 
“wise restraint” by saving his pleasure for later.  Either way, it enables a rags-to-
riches fantasy in which his desire is more than amply satisfied.  Dressed for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
of his guilt onto his companion or his suppression of her voice. See for example Bloom (Visionary 
128-31), Ross, and Jacobus (Romanticism 254-66). 
21 For instance, Robert Burns Neveldine writes that the poem “interpellates the reader as a 
violator, interpolating him or her into the poem, which itself had for some time existed as an 
undiscovered bower” (669). Similarly, in Arnd Bohm’s treatment of “Nutting” as an allegory of 
Wordsworth’s intellectual encounter with Ovid’s “Nux,” the metaphor of reading as gathering 
suggests that “every act of reading disrupts the tranquil coherence of the text” (46). 
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scrape with nature at the outset, he fancies himself a mendicant: “a Figure 
quaint, / Trick’d out in proud disguise of Beggar’s weeds / . . . / More ragged 
than need was” (241; 7-13).  His wallet adds the finishing touch to the costume: a 
beggar’s purse.22  When empty, it figures desire as destitution.  But after the raid, 
when, “rich beyond the wealth of kings,” the wallet is doubly full, as if by magic 
(242; 50).  The coin-like nuts, in this context of transgressive greed, associate 
monetary abundance, lust, immoderate appetite, and the violation of nature—a 
complex of temptations that returns in the Prelude to signal the young poet’s fall 
from passive activity to unwise striving.  And although “Nutting” recounts a 
solitary adventure, these associations signal social influences that corrupt the 
mental appetites with desire for wealth and power. 
In the 1805 Prelude, the “milk-white clusters” alone remain, gesturing 
toward the excised lyrical ballad (I, 511).  The milk imagery linking the two 
poems marks a shift in the youth’s relationship to nature; instead of nursing in 
passive activity, now he takes his milk by force.  The desire to gratify his 
appetites leads him incestuously to violate maternal nature.  But like many of 
Wordsworth’s poems, “Nutting” is narrated retrospectively, by a more mature 
and self-critical voice.  After recollecting his rampage, the poet turns toward a 
                                                 
22 The word “wallet” was used as early as the sixteenth century to refer to a bag used by a beggar 
to carry donations of money and provisions (OED, “wallet, n.,” 1.d). 
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heretofore unacknowledged interlocutor23 with a moral lesson: “Then, dearest 
Maiden! move along these shades / In gentleness of heart with gentle hand / 
Touch, —for there is a Spirit in the woods” (242; 53-55).  The imperative “touch” 
advocates a gentle agency, a form of “wise restraint” that replaces the boy’s 
autoerotic delay with an attitude closer to wise passiveness. 
In the Prelude, the youth learns from several other instances of unwise 
striving.  For example, while attending grammar school at Hawkshead, 
Wordsworth and his brother boarded with Ann Tyson—the “frugal Dame” of 
“Nutting”—who provides them a modest but wholesome diet (240; 10): 
No delicate viands sapped our bodily strength: 
More than we wished we knew the blessing then 
Of vigorous hunger, for our daily meals 
Were frugal, Sabine fare—and then, exclude 
A little weekly stipend, and we lived 
Through three divisions of the quartered year 
In pennyless poverty.  . . .  (Prelude II, 79-85). 
The adult poet retrospectively extolls his spare diet and scant pocket money—the 
very conditions hyperbolized as destitution at the beginning of “Nutting.”  His 
                                                 
23 In a longer, unpublished version of the poem, the maiden is addressed as “Lucy” (Jones 213), 
but most read her as the poet’s sister Dorothy (Crawford 197). 
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hunger signals not deprivation, but an ideal nutritional balance, such as that 
prescribed by Hartley and Darwin,24 to perpetuate the appetite rather than to 
quench it.  Moreover, the rustic simplicity of the “Sabine fare” signals its 
closeness to nature.  A daintier diet would have depleted their strength as 
Wordsworth’s prosody suggests: contrast the attenuated rhythm of the 
frenchified, hypermetrical, “Nó délĭcăte víănds sápped oŭr bódĭlў stréngth,” 
with the hearty pentameter of “Wĕre frúgăl, Sábĭne fáre—ănd thén, ĕxclúde.”   
But when the brothers return from summer break, “with purses more 
profusely filled,” they splurge on dainties, “To gratify the palate with repasts / 
More costly than the dame of whom I spake, / . . . supplied” (Prelude II, 87; 89-91).  
As in “Nutting,” dietary decadence yields transgressive pleasure, which 
Wordsworth elicits by combining it with another reckless adventure.  Renting 
horses from the local innkeeper under false pretenses, Wordsworth and his 
companions throw caution to the wind, riding hard all the way to Furness 
Abbey—just for the pleasure of it.  Pushing the limits of their mounts, they test 
their agency, effectively pitting their wills against nature.  Whether for horses or 
hors d’oeuvres, the poet has developed a taste for the luxuries contingent upon 
                                                 
24 Hartley recommends that food portions “ought scarce ever to be so much as our appetites 
prompt us to, but, in general, to fall a little short of this” (2: 224). Darwin claims, “the art of 
preserving long health and life . . . must consist in using no greater stimulus. . . of the quantity or 
kind of our food and drink . . . than is sufficient to preserve us in vigour” (1: 468). 
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disposable income.  To the temptations of decadent food and physical pleasure, 
this episode adds social diversion. 
Wordsworth further departs from passive activity by pursuing nature’s 
pleasures: “Nature . . . now at length was sought / For her own sake” (Prelude II, 
207-09).  The metaphor of the mind’s chief feeder reappears as the visual delights 
of the landscape pervade his vascular system: “from excess / Of happiness my 
blood appeared to flow / With its own pleasure, and I breathed with joy” (Prelude 
II, 191-93).  But this self-induced pleasure is illusory at best; it only “appear[s]” to 
permeate the body, which suggests that it cannot be fully assimilated to the 
digesting mind.  The mature poet’s critique of his former drug-like self-
stimulation emerges as this passage leads directly into the blessed babe vignette 
with its idyllic mental feeding.  Whereas the active voice gives agency to youth, 
whose “blood appeared to flow / With its own pleasure,” the passive voice 
withholds agency from the babe, along whose “infant veins are interfused / The 
gravitation and the filial bond.”  In this way, the contrast between the youth’s 
unwise striving and the infant’s passive activity plays out grammatically.   
When Wordsworth leaves the metaphorical grazing pasture of his rural 
childhood home for the bustle of St. John’s College in Cambridge, his mind faces 
a dilemma that still plagues freshmen today: what to eat. 
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 . . . a swarm 
Of heady thoughts jostling each other, gawds 
And feast and dance and public revelry 
. . . did now 
Seduce me from the firm habitual quest 
Of feeding pleasures, from that eager zeal, 
Those yearnings which had every day been mine, 
A wild unworldly-minded youth, given up 
To Nature and to books . . .   (Prelude IV, 272-82), 
Once more, the trifecta of money, fine foods, and gay society displaces his 
respect for nature.  Gawds and feasts replace his steady mental diet of books and 
nature even as they replace the frugal Dame’s rustic board. 
As usual, the mature poet disapproves: “This vague heartless chace [sic] / 
Of trivial pleasures was a poor exchange / For books and Nature” (Prelude IV, 
304-06).  That this “chace,” which invokes the sport of hunting in a pursuit of 
pleasure, is a “poor” substitute for books and nature stresses its nutritional 
poverty for the mind.  That it is “heartless” suggests not only a lack of 
enthusiasm, but an attenuation of physical and mental strength, “an inner falling 
off” of the mind’s chief feeder (Prelude IV, 270).  Repeatedly, Wordsworth 
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characterizes the effect of his altered mental diet as a circulatory lethargy.  For 
example, his new lifestyle, he claims, “appeared to prey upon my strength, and 
stopped the course / And quiet stream of self-forgetfulness” (Prelude IV, 292-94).  
And elsewhere, “the heart / Reposed in noontide rest, the inner pulse / of 
contemplation almost failed to beat” (Prelude III, 336-38).   
These metaphors may be informed by Darwin’s theory that the heart and 
digestive system are linked through “sympathy, or association of motions,” such 
that, in a variety disorders ranging from minor indigestion to gout and cholera, a 
torpor of digestive torpor induces a corresponding “torpor of the heart,” which 
weakens and slows the pulse (1: 283).  The fermentation of undigested food in 
the stomach, he claims, may cause the heart to beat intermittently or temporarily 
to stop altogether.25  Evidently, Wordsworth folds Darwin’s linkage between 
digestion and circulation into his conceptual metaphor of the digesting mind.  
The young poet’s impoverished mental diet slows the associative rhythm of 
consciousness even as the feasts and gawds sap his bodily strength.  And just as 
Darwin claims that stimulants, like spices, wine, and opium, can accelerate the 
pulse by stimulating digestion (1: 282), so Wordsworth attempts to medicate 
himself with feasts, wine, dances, and the “blind zeal / Of senseless 
                                                 
25 For these unfortunate patients, Darwin recommends the simple cure of burping to release the 
gaseous byproducts of fermentation (1: 283). 
142 
 
horsemanship” (Prelude III, 255-56).  Much of this unwise striving might well be 
described as the kind of “degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation” he 
decries in the 1800 Preface. 
 After graduating in 1791, Wordsworth spends four months in London, 
where the spectacle of urban life multiplies the opportunities for unwholesome 
stimulation.  Unwise striving and its consequences become increasingly 
associated with “cities, where the human heart is sick, / And the eye feeds it not, 
and cannot feed” (Prelude XII, 202-03).  Using the chaotic bustle of St. 
Bartholomew’s Fair as a synecdoche for London as a whole, Wordsworth 
characterizes the city as “a hell / For eyes and ears” (Prelude VII, 659).  Like 
Dante, reporting the punishments on his tour of Hell, Wordsworth catalogs street 
performers like “[t]he stone-eater” and “the man that swallows fire,” who seem 
condemned to an inferno of mental indigestion (Prelude VII, 682).  Among them, 
“The horse of knowledge, and the learned pig” (Prelude VII, 683) preview the 
Infant Prodigy’s ultimate fate as they perform amid posters displaying “Dumb 
proclamations of the prodigies” (Prelude VII, 667).  If in life the prodigy was a 
barn sour beast, complicit in his own enclosure, Wordsworth condemns him ever 
after to stomp out mimic responses to earn his dole of hay.  And as these figures 
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relive their alimentary sins they furnish as an endless spectacle for onlookers 
thirsting after outrageous stimulation. 
London itself resembles a vast digestive tract that blends the mechanical 
dehumanization of an industrial mill with the fetidness of a sewer.  It is a “vast 
receptacle” containing a “perpetual flow / Of trivial objects, melted and reduced / 
To one identity by differences” (Prelude VII 735, 702-04).  This roiling melting pot 
suggests both a churning stomach and an industrial smelter.  And the perpetual 
current of obliterated matter equally suggests an intestinal canal, an industrial 
pipe, and a sewer. 
. . . Tents and booths 
Meanwhile—as if the whole were one vast mill— 
Are vomiting, receiving, on all sides, 
Men, women, three-years’ children, babes in arms.   (Prelude VII, 692-95) 
Among the “trivial objects” digested by the city are human beings, vomited up 
only to be reabsorbed into “the wide waste” (Prelude VII, 76).  This viscerally 
unsettling confluence of industrial mechanism, indigestion, and sewage depicts 
London as a metaphorical digestive tract that dysfunctionally consumes its 
inhabitants and feeds on its own waste. 
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Despite his embroilment in this digestive chaos, the poet does, in young 
adulthood, occasionally experience restorative intervals of wise passiveness, 
during which he allows his mind to feed on the world in passive activity, as it 
did in infancy.  For instance, just before Wordsworth’s famous encounter with 
the discharged soldier, he ambles down the road in a state of relaxation 
reminiscent of the suckling babe: “My body from the stillness drinking in / A 
restoration like the calm of sleep, / But sweeter far” (Prelude IV, 386-88).  As in 
many other passages in the Prelude, the choice of drinking rather than eating as 
the source domain for perception recalls the infant’s receptivity to the influx of 
nature through the maternal breast.  That the young man’s “body” performs this 
metaphorical drinking rather than his mind further quells any sense of conscious 
agency.  No longer chasing his desires, he enjoys “such near objects as from time 
to time / Perforce intruded on the listless sense” (Prelude IV, 378-79).   
This wise passiveness enables the return of the “pure organic pleasure” 
that Wordsworth enjoyed in childhood: 
O happy state! what beauteous pictures now 
Rose in harmonious imagery; they rose 
As from some distant region of my soul 
And came along like dreams—yet such as left 
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A consciousness of animal delight, 
A self-possession felt in every pause 
And every gentle movement of my frame.  (Prelude IV, 392-99) 
Mental pleasure gives way to corporeal as new sensory perceptions recall 
associated ideas of former pleasures, which draw the poet’s attention inward to 
his own kinesis.  Charles Rzepka reads such dream-like moments of “visionary 
solipsism,” as instances when the romantic self, “[f]reed from its sense of 
embodiment,” becomes a “magisterially isolated mind” (24-25).  But these 
withdrawals into the mind remain deeply embodied in the sense that they focus 
the poet’s attention on minute internal sensations by retrieving associations of 
prior corporeal experiences.  Not transcended, the senses are turned inward, as 
in the “blessed mood” of ‘Tintern Abbey.’  When “we are laid asleep / In body 
and become a living soul,” wise passiveness stills the outward-direction of the 
senses only to amplify their most subtle stimuli, taken in from nature, 
assimilated, and returned from within the body.  When Wordsworth writes, “I 
looked not round, nor did the solitude / Speak to my eye, but it was heard and 
felt,” his synesthetic paradox captures the effect of sensuous pleasure that, taken 
up and internalized through the mental digestion of nature, now comes more 
directly from within the body and mind than from without (Prelude IV, 390-91).  
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 This mysterious, sleeplike sensory trance, which paradoxically awakens 
the imagination, resembles Darwin’s account of what today we would call a food 
coma.  In several respects, Darwin conceives of this blissful repose through 
analogy with nursing.  He sees the human body as a microcosm in which each 
gland, muscle fiber, and blood vessel is a digesting creature that ingests its food 
from ambient fluids and excretes a product that feeds other body parts in turn.  
For example, the lacteals “probably consist of a mouth to select, a belly to digest, 
and an excretory aperture to emit their appropriated fluids” (1: 251).  These 
glands, which reside in the walls of the stomach and intestines, link the digestive 
and vascular systems by ingesting chyle from the alimentary canal and excreting 
it into the bloodstream.  Their name, from the Latin root for milk (OED, “lacteal, 
adj. and n.”), comes from their food because, as Darwin notes, “the chyle of 
animals . . . is very similar to their milk,” both in color and in nutritive content (1: 
463).  Like Hartley’s nursing infant, the lacteals are rewarded with milk for 
obeying the mechanical stimulus to suck: their “mouths . . . are irritated into 
action by the stimulus of the fluid, which surrounds them; and by animal 
selection, or appetency, they absorb such part of the fluid as is agreeable to their 
palate” (1: 463).  The Darwinian digestive system is lined with tiny nursing 
bodies. 
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 The feeding pleasure of the lacteals extends to the body as a whole and, 
like the Coleridgean infant who has nursed himself to sleep, Darwin’s well-fed 
adult drifts off to a healthful slumber: 
When the stomach and intestines are thus filled with their proper food, 
not only the motions of the gastric glands, the pancreas, liver, and lacteal 
vessels, are excited into action; but at the same time the whole tribe of 
irritative motions are exerted with greater energy, a greater degree of 
warmth, colour, plumpness, and moisture, is given to the skin from the 
increased action of those glands called capillary vessels; pleasurable 
sensation is excited, the voluntary motions are less easily exerted, and at 
length suspended; and sleep succeeds . . . . At this time also, as the blood-
vessels become replete with chyle, . . . the pulse becomes fuller, and softer, 
and in general quicker.   (1: 274-75) 
Conscious bodily control yields to the automatic processes of digestion and 
circulation and the blood, fattened on chyle, strengthens and quickens the pulse.   
Wordsworth likely would have read Darwin’s portrait of the sleeper as an 
account of the physiology of wise passiveness: a state of voluntarily passive 
activity in which the mind’s chief feeder operates at full strength.  Matlak 
suggests that wise passiveness corresponds to a different state that Darwin calls 
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reverie (Wordsworth’s Reading 78-79; Poetry 117).  Although “reverie or 
studium” involves a sensuous withdrawal and some of the characteristics of 
sleep, it differs from wise passiveness in two respects (Darwin 1: 220).  First, 
reverie is sustained by intense concentration; Darwin’s examples include the 
amusing case of “a very ingenious and elegant young lady,” who, after vomiting 
and hiccoughing, was given over to “paroxysms” of reciting “whole pages from 
the English poets” (1: 220-22 ).  But Wise passiveness requires the absence of any 
such exertion.  Secondly, the sensations accompanying wise passiveness more 
closely resemble those of the food coma.  Darwin’s “irritative motions,” or 
muscular movements stimulated by pressure or distension of an organ, may or 
may not produce conscious sensation.  For example, the irritative contractions of 
the heart or of the stomach and bowels may be felt only in some instances 
(Darwin 1: 37).  During Darwinian reverie, the individual feels no such sensation.  
But in wise passiveness as in the food coma, these otherwise unnoticed 
movements become a source of felt pleasure. 
Wordsworth’s moments of restorative wise passiveness portray a mind 
that, having fed on nature, now digests its meal in a waking slumber of a sort.  
Hence, in the discharged soldier passage, the images sent forth by the 
imagination are “like dreams” in that they arise without conscious control, but 
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from the activity of the mind itself, “As from some distant region of my soul.”  In 
these moments, Wordsworth momentarily regains the imaginative powers first 
awakened in infancy. 
 
Epic Indigestion: The French Revolution and the Moral Crisis  
But such reawakenings remain as yet intermittent.  And Wordsworth’s 
greatest challenge lies ahead in his moral crisis of 1796, which results from the 
disappointment of his hopes for the French Revolution, which is compounded by 
his disgust with moral philosophy.  Finding himself deeply conflicted after the 
French Revolution turns violent, the young poet turns to moral philosophy in 
general, and William Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) in 
particular, in search of a system that might reground his values on the bedrock of 
certainty.  But this strategy leads only to further confusion, and ultimately, to 
despair, bringing Wordsworth to the moral nadir of the Prelude, metaphorically 
represented as a case of mental indigestion.  This crisis marks the ultimate 
obstacle to Wordsworth’s attainment of his full poetic powers through wise 
passiveness. 
Wordsworth characterizes revolutionary violence as an epidemic 
derangement of appetite that magnifies the gluttonous violence of “Nutting” and 
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the digestive inferno of London to international proportions.  The Reign of Terror 
is a destructive hunger of biblical proportions that renders France “a plain / 
Devoured by locusts” (Prelude IX, 178-79).  And although Robespierre and his 
henchmen freely indulge their “heinous appetites” for heads, they remain “ever 
thirsty” for more and “[d]omestic carnage . . . fill[s] all the year / With feast-days” 
(Prelude X, 339; 337; 329-30).  Human flesh becomes the metaphorical plat du 
jour.26  The taste for blood spreads abroad as the English government’s 
reactionary measures only replicate Robespierre’s cravings: “Our shepherds . . . 
at that time / Thirsted to make the guardian crook of the law / A tool of murder” 
(Prelude X, 645-47).27  Pitt’s government, it seems, would make a meal of the 
revolution’s sympathizers—including Wordsworth and Coleridge.  
Wordsworth even admits that he experienced this cannibalistic hunger on 
a personal scale.  In 1793, the young poet, recently returned from France and still 
hopeful that the revolution might succeed, watches in dismay as the English 
navy prepares to sail against the French.  He recalls sitting in church among his 
countrymen, who earnestly pray for England’s victory while “I only, like an 
uninvited guest / . . . sate silent—shall I add, / Fed on the day of vengeance yet to 
                                                 
26 Wordsworth was not alone in comparing French revolutionary violence to cannibalism; Eli 
Sagan notes a “liberal use of cannibal rhetoric to express primeval rage” throughout the Reign of 
Terror (349). 
27 See Roe’s reading of Wordsworth’s Pitt as an inferior imitator Robespierre (202-04). 
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come!” (Prelude X, 272-74).  Although not literally demanding anyone’s head on a 
platter, Wordsworth, like Robespierre, thirsts for the blood of his own 
countrymen.  
The shock of suddenly finding himself rooting against his own country, 
which he dearly loves, amounts to nothing less than a personal revolution, “[A] 
stride at once / Into another region,” where his most deeply held moral values 
suddenly clash (Prelude X, 240-41).28  The declaration of war suddenly “Soured 
and corrupted upwards to the source, / My sentiments” (Prelude X, 761-62).  If the 
words “soured” and “corrupted” invoke a turned stomach, their connotations of 
rotting and decay may recall Darwin’s claim that fermentation of the stomach 
contents immediately follows any interruption of digestion (1: 283).  Just as 
Darwin warns that such disruptions may impede the pulse, Wordsworth’s 
mental indigestion interferes with the association of ideas, once more 
represented as the mind’s chief feeder, a river-like pulse: 
. . . . my likings and my loves 
Ran in new channels, leaving old ones dry; 
And thus a blow, which in maturer age 
Would have but Touched the judgement, struck more deep 
                                                 
28 On the “implosion” of Wordsworth’s confidence, both in the revolution and in himself and his 
“personal, inner turmoil” following the declaration of war, see Roe (118). 
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Into sensations near the heart. . . .   (Prelude X, 769-73) 
The declaration of war wrenches Wordsworth’s stream of associations out of its 
habitual patterns, severing his heart, a metonym for the affections, from his 
former enjoyments.  Now morally confused, the poet becomes “enflamed / With 
thirst of a secure intelligence, and sick of other passion,” as he rejects his former 
mental nourishment of literature and nature in order to pursue a system of moral 
philosophy that will satisfy his thirst (Prelude X, 832-34).   
Enter Godwin, whose necessitarian faith in rational benevolence and the 
perfectibility of man seem to offer a stabilizing moral center.  The extent and 
duration of Wordsworth’s exploration of Godwin remains open to debate, and 
Alan Grob wisely cautions against reducing his engagement with moral 
philosophy and ethical theory during this period to Godwin alone.29  But others 
have demonstrated that Godwin’s ideas significantly contributed to 
Wordsworth’s moral crisis.30   
In Political Justice, Godwin argues that political and social melioration can 
be brought about not by political schemes and upheavals, such the revolution, 
                                                 
29 Based on evidence that Wordsworth was influenced by several other strands of thought, Grob 
argues that his eventual disenchantment with moral philosophy is not a rejection of Godwinian 
theory in particular, but, of any “false methodology” that would use abstract principles to guide 
the ethical conduct of real life (117). 
30 See Roe’s chapters 5 and 6 in Wordsworth and Coleridge: The Radical Years and J. Wordsworth’s 
Chapter 8 in Borders of Vision. 
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but by the gradual improvement of man, both individually and collectively, 
through reason.  Godwin’s digestive metaphors for this gradual and automatic 
process reveal the Hartleyan basis of his theory.  For instance, he asks, “Who 
does not perceive that [moral principles] are regularly generated in the mind by a 
series of impressions, and digested and arranged by association and reflexion?” 
(1: 14).  Political and social improvement, he claims, come about through 
cooperative discussion, or “mature and digested discourse,” in which the group 
arrives at truth by collectively reasoning through their individual empirical 
experience (2: 847).  The exchange of ideas through conversation is Godwin’s 
collective equivalent of the association of ideas within the individual mind and 
political change can only succeed insofar as it arises from this process: “If the 
government of Great Britain were dissolved to-morrow, unless that dissolution 
were the result of consistent and digested views of political justice . . . it would be 
very far from leading to the abolition of violence” (emphasis added, 2: 734).  The 
revolution demonstrates the consequences of insufficient collective association: 
So bold a revolution cannot take place in human affairs, till the general 
mind has been highly cultivated. . . . Hasty and undigested tumults may 
take place under the idea of an equalisation of property; but it is only a 
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calm and clear conviction of justice, . . . that can introduce an invariable 
system of this sort.   (2: 820) 
If political upheaval amounts to dyspepsia of the “general mind,” Godwin offers 
Political Justice as a tonic that will promote reasoned conversation, figured as 
healthy mental digestion.   
Given Wordsworth’s, deranged mental appetites, no wonder Godwin 
appealed to him.  In the Prelude, the clear-cut rationalism of Political Justice at first 
looks like a tall drink of water:  
This was a time, when, all things tending fast 
To depravation, the philosophy  
That promised to abstract the hopes of man 
Out of his feelings, to be fixed thenceforth 
For ever in a purer element, 
Found ready welcome.  Tempting region that 
For zeal to enter and refresh herself, 
Where passions had the privilege to work, 
And never hear the sound of their own names—   (Prelude X, 805-13) 
The abstraction of mankind’s hopes from emotions, however unfairly to Godwin, 
alludes to the replacement of the affective basis of morality with rational 
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thought: one of the central tenets of Political Justice (Ulmer 182).  But just as 
Wordsworth’s earlier experiences of unwise striving yield only illusory 
satisfaction, Godwin’s proffered refreshment proves a mere mirage.  That the 
passions continue to work unrecognized proves this moral oasis a delusion, or, 
as J. Wordsworth aptly calls it, “a paradise of self-deception” (Borders 266). 
Under the influence of Godwinian rationalism, Wordsworth comes to 
resemble the Infant Prodigy, who “sifts, . . .weighs, / Takes nothing upon trust” 
and under whose eye “All things are put to question” (Prelude V, 337-38; 341).  
Like the Prodigy, who mechanistically subjects the world to his “deep 
experiments” (Prelude V, 340), Wordsworth dissects society, with a scalpel of 
skepticism: 
. . . I took the knife in hand, 
And stopping not at parts less sensitive, 
Endeavored with my best of skill to probe 
The living body of society 
Even to the heart.  I pushed without remorse 
My speculations forward, yea, set foot 
On Nature’s holiest places.   (Prelude X, 872-78) 
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If, in Political Justice, Godwin asserted that “nothing is too sacred to be brought to 
the touchstone of examination,” Wordsworth claims to have taken him at his 
word (1: 21).  Remembering his former “meddling intellect,” the mature poet has 
since learned, like the speaker of “Expostulation and Reply,” that “We murder to 
dissect” (Lyrical 149; 28).  
These deep Godwinian experiments further implicate Wordsworth in 
revolutionary violence, as he replicates the “unjust tribunals” of the Terror on a 
personal level (Prelude X, 377), acting as “prosecutor, judge, and defendant, 
divided against himself over the ‘bar’ of self-inquisition” (Roe 219):31   
. . . . Thus I fared, 
Dragging all passions, notions, shapes of faith, 
Like culprits to the bar, suspiciously 
. . .  
. . . –till, demanding proof, 
And seeking it in every thing, I lost 
All feeling of conviction, and, in fine, 
Sick, wearied out with contrarieties, 
                                                 
31 Reading Wordsworth’s Godwinian scalpel as a guillotine (220), Roe argues that the Prelude 
“associates Robespierre’s politics with Godwin’s philosophy, [and] Wordsworth’s confused 
Godwinian self with the author of the Terror” (221). J. Wordsworth also claims that “Godwinian 
reason [takes] in this psychomachy the part of Robespierre’s tribunals” (Borders 268). 
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Yielded up moral questions in despair,   (Prelude X, 888-900)   
If Godwinian rationalism transforms Wordsworth simultaneously into 
Robespierre and into one of his candidates for the guillotine, it also leaves him 
“sick” in the sense of mental indigestion, more deeply conflicted than ever.   
Under Godwin’s influence, the young man eschews poetry and history on 
the grounds that they are “not free from taint” of affect, “something false and 
weak, which could not stand / the open eye of reason” (Prelude XI, 65-67).  Falling 
“[b]eneath the dominion of a taste / Less elevated” (Prelude XI, 117-18), he 
hungers for sensuous gratification in nature: 
. . . my delights,  
Such as they were, were sought insatiably, 
Though ‘twas a transport of the outward sense, 
Not of the mind—vivid but not profound— 
Yet was I often greedy in the chace, 
And roamed from hill to hill, from rock to rock, 
Still craving combinations of new forms, 
New pleasure, wider empire for the sight, 
Proud of its own endowments, and rejoiced 
To lay the inner faculties asleep.  (emphasis added, Prelude XI, 185-94) 
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Whereas wise passiveness stills the senses to amplify their most subtle stimuli 
from within the body, this unwise striving drowns out the “inner faculties” with 
sensory stimulation ab extra.  In terms of the digesting mind metaphor, unwise 
striving replaces the deep postprandial repose of wise passiveness with a 
superficial but insatiable hunger.  The moral crisis leaves Wordsworth a veritable 
sensuous Napoleon, striving after an ever “wider empire for the sight.” 
 
Self-Regulation and Wise Passiveness 
Wordsworth recovers from the moral crisis by regulating his mental diet.  
The sobering influence of Paradise Lost enables him to purge the temporarily 
intoxicating effects Godwinian rationalism by replacing it with a Hartleyan 
adaptation of Milton’s “right reason,” a more humane moral center.  Through 
this displacement, Wordsworth enacts an organic and digestive model of literary 
influence.  He further recovers by learning to feed his mind in wise passiveness.  
Reintroducing poetry, nature, and human affection to his diet, and drawing 
sustenance from his richly associated childhood memories, he balances his will 
with the choice to feed in passive activity.  This wise passiveness repeats mental 
nursing, but with a difference; it is a highly self-conscious and voluntary 
submission to an instinctual mode of mental feeding that allows the poet to claim 
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his creative power by associating his former and current selves.  The feeding 
mind at Snowdon, as a reprise of the blessed babe vignette, performs this kind of 
work, becoming a creative power akin to Milton and to the God of Paradise Lost, 
who digests Creation into being.  In effect, Wordsworth answers Milton’s epic of 
digestive Creation with the Prelude as an epic of digestive self-creation. 
After Wordsworth’s moral crisis, the effects of Godwinian rationalism 
quickly fade because, unlike the deeply affective books upon which the child fed, 
moral philosophy cannot be assimilated to the mind.  In the fragment entitled, 
“Essay on Morals,” probably written near the end of 1798, Wordsworth singles 
out Godwin by name, explaining that moral philosophy stimulates too little 
emotion for mental digestion: “Now, I know no book or system of moral 
philosophy written with sufficient power to melt into our affections [? s], to 
incorporate itself with the blood & vital juices of our minds, & thence to have any 
influence worth our notice in forming those habits of which I am speaking” 
(Prose Works 1: 103).  In what appears to be a novel mapping in THE MIND IS A 
DIGESTING BODY, emotion works like a gastric fluid that dissolves the text-as-food 
in preparation for its association-as-assimilation.  Lacking emotional stimulus, 
moral philosophy can have no lasting effect because it cannot be assimilated. 
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Together with the 1800 Preface, this extended metaphor sets up moral 
philosophy as poetry’s indigestible antitype.  According to the Preface, as we 
have seen, a reader’s mind can be “nourished” by poetry “if he be in a healthful 
state of association,” because “his affections [will be] ameliorated.”  Unlike moral 
philosophy, poetry can be mentally assimilated because it stimulates affect.  In 
characteristic Wordsworthian fashion, this association-as-assimilation happens in 
the vascular system of the mind-as-body: poetic “truth . . . [is] carried alive into 
heart by passion” (Lyrical 301).  In addition to the veins, which transport 
nutrients to the heart, this metaphor of the mind’s chief feeder invokes the 
heart’s metonymic connotations of affect, depth, and centrality, which, when 
recruited into the reader’s blended space, give poetic affect a penetrating power 
to be assimilated into the mind’s very core.   
These contrasting metaphors for literary influence help to explain why, in 
the Prelude, Godwin cannot permanently undo the salutary effects of 
Wordsworth’s childhood: 
. . . this degradation . . . 
. . .  –was transient.  I had felt 
Too forcibly, too early in life, 
Visitings of imaginative power: I shook the habit off 
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Entirely and for ever . . .  (Prelude XI, 242-54) 
Compared to the deep feelings of power under the early influence of books and 
nature, it seems, moral philosophy’s power of rational judgment is a superficial 
affair, capable of being dropped like a bad habit. 
Wordsworth’s dawning friendship with Coleridge aids his recovery by 
providing a fresh influx of feeling that helps him to overcome his mistrust of 
affect on a philosophical level.  As several critics have demonstrated, Coleridge’s 
critique of Godwin lets Wordsworth embrace a Hartleyan version of association 
that values emotion as the basis of benevolence, and therefore, as a source of 
moral certainty that unites mankind.32  Coleridge objected to Godwin on the 
grounds that he “invested man with the just omniscience of the God in whom he 
no longer believed” (Trott 215).  In his 1795 Conciones ad Populum and Lectures on 
Revealed Religion, he rejects Godwin’s theory of rational benevolence in favor of 
his own Hartelyan version, in which God is the benevolent mover of the whole 
associationist system.  Whereas emotional ties impede the progress of 
                                                 
32 According to Roe, Coleridge helped Wordsworth “to reformulate his revolutionary and 
Godwinian solicitude for man as a corollary of his own visionary fondness for nature” (229). 
Trott argues that Wordsworth’s 1798 work toward the Recluse reflects Coleridge’s Hartleyan and 
Unitarian rejection of Godwin’s atheism (212). And Ulmer claims that although Wordsworth 
became disenchanted with Godwin by 1795, Coleridge let him “reclaim his necessitarianism by 
introducing him to an alternate version of the doctrine indebted to Hartleyan associationism and 
freed from its objectionable Godwinian features” (168). 
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benevolence in Godwin’s system, in Coleridge’s and in Hartley’s, they promote 
and sustain it.33  “The searcher after Truth must love and be beloved,” writes 
Coleridge, for “ . . . general Benevolence is begotten and rendered permanent by 
social and domestic affections” (Collected 1: 46).  In 1797, at the tail end of his 
moral crisis, Wordsworth was just such a “searcher after truth.”  And as Ulmer 
explains, Coleridge’s critique of Godwin “helped Wordsworth to his own vision 
of a necessitated moral psychology that began with local attachments and then 
ramified through . . . the collective redemption of humanity” (193).   
In the Prelude, Coleridge helps restore Wordsworth’s mental-digestive 
health by purging Godwin’s influence with nourishing affect.  In a 
characteristically circulatory image, his affection penetrates the mind-as-
digesting-body: “Thy gentle spirit to my heart of hearts / Did also find its way” 
(Prelude XIII, 252-53).  Coleridge’s affirmation that mankind is united by love 
grounded in divine benevolence displaces Godwinian rationalism with a new “. . 
. reason which indeed / Is duty, and pathetic truth” (Prelude XIII, 264-65).  In 
effect, Wordsworth writes, “thou, most precious friend, . . . / . . . didst lend a 
living help / To regulate my soul” (Prelude X, 905-07).  In another digestive 
                                                 
33 Hartley and Godwin agree that virtue originates in self-interest and it is gradually built up 
through association. But whereas Godwin believes that benevolence remains directly motivated 
by self-interest (1: 342), Hartley believes that self-interest can be converted into disinterested love 
through repetition and habit (3: 655-58). 
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double entendre, “regulate” means to render normal, both in the sense of 
bringing the poet back in line with his fellow men and in the sense of restoring 
the digestive rhythm of his mind.34  If Godwinism causes mental blockage, 
Coleridge helps to purge it.  But the word “regulate” also signals Coleridge’s role 
in reintroducing poetry to Wordsworth’s mental diet.  Once more able to trust 
affect, he recalls with fondness when, “in delicious words,” Coleridge read him 
“The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere,” as the two wandered through nature, 
reenacting their youthful grazing (Prelude XIII, 395).   
Once more trusting poetry, Wordsworth turns to Milton’s “right reason” 
as an alternative moral center.  Praising nature for aiding his recovery, 
Wordsworth calls her the “very quality and shape / And image of right reason” 
(Prelude XII, 25-26).  For Milton, as Richard Arnold explains, “right reason” 
signifies “the highest faculty in the human being” (ix): an intuitive conscience 
that, by uniting rational thought with spiritual intuition, enables the 
“simultaneous act of right knowing and right doing” (2).  In Arnold’s persuasive 
reading of Paradise Lost, the fall results from a lapse in right reason; Adam’s 
insatiable “thirst . . . of knowledge” about the universe (Paradise Lost VII, 8), 
initiates the fall well before Satan tempts Eve because when Adam and Eve 
                                                 
34 According to the OED, the adjective “regular” has been used since the 1600s to characterize 
bowel movements “occurring at uniform intervals” or at “the expected time” (4.c-d). 
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rationalize eating the fruit, they forego intuitive conscience (Arnold 80; xi-xii).  
For Milton, then, “right reason” connotes an appetitive self-control found lacking 
in our original parents.  After the fall, Michael explains to them, 
Since thy original lapse, true liberty 
Is lost, which always with right reason dwells 
Twinned, and from her hath no dividual being. 
Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed, 
Immediately inordinate desires 
And upstart passions catch the government 
From reason, and to servitude reduce 
Man, till then free. . . . (Paradise Lost XII, 83-90) 
As the source of man’s innate power and dignity, right reason keeps—or rather 
ought to keep—his appetites in check.  In forfeiting it in order to gratify their 
“inordinate desires,” Adam and Eve enslave mankind to appetite. 
In the Prelude, Wordsworth attributes to nature, as an “image of right 
reason,” a similar function of appetitive control.  She  
Holds up before the mind, intoxicate 
With present objects and the busy dance 
Of things that pass away, a temperate shew  
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Of objects that endure—and by this course 
Disposes her, when over-fondly set  
On leaving her incumbrances [sic] behind, 
To seek in man . . . 
. . . what there is  
Desirable, affecting, good or fair, 
Of kindred permanence . . .   (Prelude XII, 25-42) 
By invoking Milton, this passage aligns nature and poetry as enduring and 
sobering influences that counteract various mental distractions.35  That the 
mind’s foolish desire to leave its “incumbrances behind” recalls the way in which 
Godwin had formerly tempted Wordsworth to “abstract the hopes of man / Out 
of his feelings,” suggests that Political Justice is one such distraction.  In this 
respect, the intoxication metaphor reinforces Wordsworth’s distinction, in the 
“Essay on Morals” and the 1800 Preface, between the lasting influence of 
assimilable poetry and the fleeting effects of indigestible moral philosophy.  If 
                                                 
35 Earlier in the Prelude, Wordsworth similarly contrasts the effects of Milton to wine. He recalls 
when, during his university days, he visited a friend’s room, which was reputed to have housed 
Milton himself. Intemperately toasting the “temperate bard,” Wordsworth becomes inebriated 
and makes himself late for chapel (Prelude III, 299). In repenting “the weakness of that hour,” the 
mature poet juxtaposes his enduring respect for Milton with the fleeting effects of his private 
bacchanal (Prelude III, 326). 
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Godwin urges the mind to purge itself of affect, this passage suggests, the 
recollection of Milton intervenes to retain affect while purging Political Justice.   
As the return of right reason demonstrates, Wordsworth begins to draw 
upon his own richly associated memory, aiding his recuperation in two ways: by 
recalling the pleasures of passive mental feeding and by reminding him of the 
power of his own imagination through the famous “spots of time.”  In both 
ways, the poet’s memory acts not unlike Hartley’s account of the circulatory 
system: “by storing our blood, and the solids thence formed with active 
properties, we lay up matter for future pains, both bodily and mental, whenever 
either body or mind become disordered, at the same time that a high diet has . . . 
an evident tendency to disorder both” (2: 220).  If Wordsworth’s mind is 
disordered by a “high diet” of rationalism, his memory provides just such a 
circulating source of restoration that maintains continuity with the healthier 
mental diet of an earlier self. 
Because it explicitly figures the memory as a bloodstream, ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
elucidates the more subtle workings of the venous memory in the Prelude.  When 
Wordsworth returns to the banks of the Wye after five years’ absence, his 
surroundings prompt an extended reflection on memory.  The landscape 
reminds him of how, “[O]ft, in my rooms, and mid the din / Of town and cities,” 
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remembering the scene had produced “sensations sweet, / Felt in the blood and 
felt along the heart, / And passing even into my purer mind / With tranquil 
restoration” (Lyrical 157; 26-31).  Like the blessed babe, along whose “infant veins 
are interfused” sensations of nature, the adult experiences the association of 
ideas as a metaphorical venous pleasure.  But whereas the infant passively 
imbibes new sensations, the adult voluntarily draws sustenance from memories, 
stored like the nutrients in Hartley’s bloodstream.  As a result, he achieves 
another state of wise passiveness analogous to a Darwinian food coma:  
. . . that serene and blessed mood,  
In which the affections gently lead us on, 
Until the breath of this corporeal frame, 
And even the motion of our human blood  
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep 
In body, and become a living soul: 
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy, 
We see into the life of things.  (Lyrical 157; 42-50) 
Like Darwin’s well-fed sleeper whose pulse becomes “fuller and softer” when 
“replete with chyle,” Wordsworth’s pulse softens as his mind plumps its 
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metaphorical veins with memories.  But “almost” underscores the continuation 
of the pulse even as it describes its attenuation.  As in the discharged soldier 
passage, when minute bodily sensations become perceptible, he feels his pulse 
because his outward “eye [is] made quiet.”  “[L]aid asleep in body,” he can “see 
into the life of things,” such as the inner workings of his body and mind.   
Eventually, this second visit to the Wye will, like the “unripe fruit” at the 
poem’s outset, yield further nourishment, for “in this moment there is life and 
food / For future years” (Lyrical 156, 12; 158, 65-66).  In effect, ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
portrays remembering as a self-nourishing association of associations, which 
overlays various timeframes to create a gratifying feeling of temporal continuity.  
For example, the deictic “this moment” links the poem’s present to the past as 
the poet draws upon his memories, including memories of former memories.  
Associating the fresh influx of nature during the second visit with his 
recollections of the first and of those later times when they sustained him, 
generates pleasure, gratitude, continuity, and security.  And these emotions 
render the present experience of remembering, in turn, a memory for future 
consumption.   
This feeling of temporal continuity extends to the poem’s audience; 
Dorothy and the reader will likewise be nourished by “this moment.”  In taking 
169 
 
in the landscape with her brother, Dorothy ingests raw experience of nature.  But 
at some later point, she also ingests the poem, which aids her digestion of nature 
by conveying her brother’s pre-digested experiences and by illustrating the 
mind’s absorption and storage of nourishing memories.  For us, “this moment” 
signifies the poem’s vanished diegetic present, but is also deictically points to our 
own moment of reading, tacitly invoking the familiar mappings of THE TEXT IS 
FOOD and READING IS EATING.  Our consumption of the poem, including 
Wordsworth’s pre-digested experiences, prompts an affective response that lets 
us associate the poem with our own memories.  In effect, the poem becomes, like 
nature, the mental food we store up for future use.  If poetry can have a lasting 
effect by virtue of its mental digestibility, Wordsworth would “feed” and 
“inform” our minds as nature has nourished his own (Lyrical 160, 126-32). 
Although the memory is less explicitly venous in the Prelude, there too it 
provides temporal continuity figured as restorative nourishment.  Several of the 
poet’s memories recall former mental-digestive pleasures.  For example, his wife-
to-be, Mary Hutchinson, reminds him of the healthy appetite for nature he 
enjoyed in childhood.  She delights in birds and flowers, plagued by none of the 
poet’s desperate desire for stimulation: “ . . . From appetites like these / She . . . / 
Was wholly free. . . .”  Instead of riddling her mind with “intermeddling 
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subtleties,” as he did, “She welcomed what was given and craved no more” 
(emphasis added, Prelude XI, 200-206).  Hutchinson’s robust but moderate 
appetite for nature, passive receptivity, and freedom from systematic education 
recall the poet to his former self, when he too had been “filled and satisfied” with 
nature’s simple pleasures (Prelude XI, 239).   
Wordsworth’s sister likewise provides “a saving intercourse / With [his] 
true self” (Prelude X, 914-15).  Dorothy’s steadfast affection takes the form of a 
metaphorical brook that, like Lucy Gray, runs blithely over rough or smooth.  
From her “springs of tender thought,” Wordsworth has continuously “imbibed” 
a “sweet influence” (XIII, 214-18).  Given his frequent comparisons of waterways 
to blood vessels, this image portrays Dorothy as a surrogate chief feeder: the one 
associative vein that never dried up when Wordsworth endeavored to “cut off 
[his] heart.”  She represents the temporal continuity of the associative memory 
figured as a bloodstream—that perpetual influx of nourishing affect that links his 
former and current selves.36 
Even Wordsworth’s more ominous and troubled recollections provide 
restorative nourishment.  The famous “spots of time,” those early memories of 
                                                 
36 Similarly, J. Wordsworth reads Dorothy as a surrogate “river of the imagination,” which 
sustains Wordsworth during the moral crisis, but he does not connect this image with 
Wordsworth’s venous imagery (Borders 270). 
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his imagination revealing its power, are “spectacles and sounds to which / I often 
would repair, and thence would drink / As at a fountain” (Prelude XI, 257, 382-
84).  These memories “. . . retain / A renovating virtue, whence, . . . / . . . our 
minds are nourished and invisibly repaired” (Prelude XI,  257-64).  As in ‘Tintern 
Abbey’ and “Nutting,” the poet acknowledges, in the spots of time, a 
discontinuity between his former and current selves while affirming their 
associative continuity thorough memory.   
The discontinuity resides in the temporal distance that enables the mature 
self’s deeper understanding of the experience: “the child does not know that 
what he sees and hears is an effect of the power of his own imagination. . . . For 
the retrospective poet, however the power that belonged to the external world is 
now seen to have belonged to the mind” (Hartman 215).  For example, 
Wordsworth remembers a childhood episode when, finding himself separated 
from his guardian, he spies a girl struggling against the wind.  Suddenly, the 
world seems overcome with “visionary dreariness” (Prelude XI, 310).  The adult 
knows that “. . . It was, in truth, / An ordinary sight” colored by a fearful and 
lonely imagination (Prelude XI, 307-08).  But to the child, the whole world turns 
bleak and even hostile on its own.  From a safe temporal remove, the adult’s 
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recognition of the imagination yields “The spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden 
gleam”: 
And think ye not with radiance more divine 
From these remembrances, and from the power 
They left behind?  So feeling comes in aid 
Of feeling, and diversity of strength 
Attends us, if but once we have been strong   (Prelude XI, 322-27) 
The repetition of “feeling” syntactically enacts the association of ideas as the 
phrase “diversity of strength” joins his former and current strengths: the 
youthful intensity of the imagination and the adult recognition of its operations. 
 Although the child’s imaginative power is perhaps more intense, the 
greater overall mental strength belongs to the adult, whose self-conscious 
feeding on memory yields a “diversity of strength” and a “radiance more 
divine.”  J. Wordsworth grants the superior power to the child: “[i]t is finally the 
vision of the child that we are left with, because the child as borderer [on the 
supernatural] is the guarantee of his creator’s adult strength” (Borders 41).  
True—the power of the spots of time depends upon the youth’s imagination, 
which furnishes their subject matter.  But the Prelude was not written by the six-
year-old.  Only the adult with his mature self-consciousness can experience that 
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“deepest feeling that the mind / Is lord and master, and that outward sense / Is 
but the obedient servant of her will” (Prelude XI, 270-72).   
According to the Preface, Wordsworth’s poetics depends upon precisely 
this temporal parallax of retrospection:  
Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin 
from emotion recollected in tranquility: the emotion is contemplated till 
by a species of reaction the tranquility gradually disappears, and an 
emotion, similar to that which was before the subject of contemplation, is 
gradually produced . . . (Lyrical 307)   
By metaphorically feeding on the spots of time, Wordsworth dramatizes this 
process of deliberately generating affect through recollection.  By associating 
former emotions with current ones, the poet creates new feelings that are 
“similar” but not identical to their predecessors.  In effect, the spots of time help 
the poet claim his maximum power by establishing a differential continuity with 
his former self. 
With a renewed trust in affect, and recognizing that “From Nature doth 
emotion come,” Wordsworth once again feeds his mind on nature in passive 
activity (Prelude XII, 1).  In pointedly metabolic terms, he explains that nature’s 
“sister horns,” or twin cornucopias, offer his poetic genius a doubly nutritious 
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harvest of excitation and calmness, the alternation of which enables wise 
passiveness (Prelude XII, 4): 
. . . genius, which exists by interchange 
Of peace and excitation, finds in [nature]  
His best and purest friend—from her receives 
That energy by which he seeks the truth, 
Is roused, aspires, grasps, struggles, wishes, craves, 
From her that happy stillness of the mind 
Which fits him to receive it when unsought.    
(emphasis added, Prelude XII, 8-14) 
The succession of moods alternates action and inaction, stress and relaxation, as 
the mind’s chief feeder metaphorically synchronizes the poet’s physical, 
emotional, rational, and metrical rhythms.37  Although the mind is active in that 
it continually shifts between activity and passivity—it nonetheless depends upon 
a deeper condition of passivity, “that happy stillness” in which it allows itself to 
be nourished by seeking nourishment not at all. 
                                                 
37 On Wordsworth’s possible debt to Darwin for similar conjunctions of circulatory, mental, and 
metrical rhythms, see Sperry, who treats these rhythms as synchronized in a more literal sense, 
and Matlak (“Wordsworth’s Reading” 77-78). 
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The feeding mind at Snowdon enacts this kind of wise passiveness as a 
voluntary return to the passive activity of the nursing infant.  In 1805, when he 
writes the climactic scene, Wordsworth reimagines the 1791 excursion during 
which he saw the “deep and gloomy breathing place” in the misty rift below his 
feet.  Then, like the speaker of ‘Tintern Abbey,’ he recollects remembering the 
sight “when the scene / Had passed away,” later “that night” (Prelude XIII, 66-68).  
He recalls having projected onto the memory of the rift an image of a poetic 
imagination at the peak of its poetic powers, “. . . a mighty mind” that “feeds 
upon infinity,” 
That is exalted by an under-presence, 
The sense of God, or, whatsoe’er is dim 
Or vast in its own being . . .    
While actively consuming infinity, the mind allows itself to be exalted by powers 
arising automatically from within its own being.  The poet has sought out nature 
by climbing the mountain for the view, but now he allows the meditation to arise 
seemingly by itself from some deep “under-presence” within his mind.  He puts 
wise passiveness into practice. 
But Wordsworth cannot recognize the scene as a projection of his own 
feeding mind until 1805.  Although he claims to have experienced his vision of 
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the feeding mind in 1791, on the night he visited Snowdon, its absence from 
earlier renderings of the scene suggests that the epiphany of self-recognition may 
have originated as late as 1804, with the introduction of the mouth-like “blue 
chasm” in the five-book Prelude (V, 56).38  Given the dual temporality upon which 
Wordsworth founds his poetics, it seems likely that he experienced some sort of 
imaginative vision that night in 1791, but lacked the perspective fully to 
understand it until 1805.  He had yet to undergo the crisis of 1796 and the 
subsequent recovery, which would enable him to recognize the wise passiveness 
with which the mighty mind feeds.  Indeed, his many reworkings of the scene 
suggest a mind returning to some as yet dimly comprehended, but nevertheless 
profound experience.  Between 1791 and 1805 and even into his later revisions 
for 1850 Prelude, Wordsworth becomes the feeding mind, returning to the 
memory of Snowdon like a nourishing spot of time, and amplifying the passage’s 
digestive imagery with each revision.  By the 1850 Prelude, the mind not only 
“feeds upon infinity,” it also “craves” and “broods”39 and is “sustained” by 
                                                 
38 On the poet’s early attempts to render the Snowdon scene in Descriptive Sketches (1792), “A 
Night-Piece” (1798), and the five-book Prelude (1804), see J. Wordsworth (Borders 310-18). I have 
argued elsewhere that Johnny Foy’s speech in “The Idiot Boy” (1798) may represent another early 
version of the Snowdon scene (Guendel 67). For accounts of Wordsworth’s revisions of this scene 
between 1805 and 1850, see Gigante (Taste 70-88) and J. Wordsworth (Borders 328-31). 
39 Because “Brooding is an anglicized version of the Latinate term rumination,” this word invokes 
not only God’s brooding over Creation in Paradise Lost (Gigante, Taste 71), but also Wordsworth’s 
childhood grazing on books and nature. 
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awareness of its power (XIV, 68-74).  When read as an example of digestive 
association that leverages the dual temporality of recollection, the Snowdon 
passage locates Wordsworth’s maximum poetic powers not in 1791, but at least 
fourteen years later, when he composes and revises the Prelude’s climax. 
Building on J. Wordsworth’s reading of the Snowdon scene as a response 
to the divine Creation in Paradise Lost (Borders 324-26), Gigante astutely points 
out that Milton’s Creation resembles a divine evacuation: 
. . . on the watery calm 
His brooding wings the spirit of God outspread 
. . . but downward purged 
The black tartareous cold infernal dregs 
Adverse to life . . .  (Paradise Lost VII, 235-39) 
God’s expulsion of his own dregs renders prelapsarian Creation “a symbolic 
world of clean, waste-free circulation” in which all things ascend toward God by 
eating and digesting the materials of a monist universe (Gigante, Taste 31-33).  
Just as God abjects his infernal dregs, Gigante claims, Wordsworth creates his 
sublime subjectivity at Snowdon by purging his abject components, such as the 
vulgar taste of a railway tourist and the appetite for nature, which she finds in 
the dim “under-presence” that exalts the feeding mind.  As a result, “the feeding 
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mind naturally exists in a state of precarious tension with its own abjected 
matter” (Taste 72).  But what Gigante reads as excretion, when considered in 
terms of Wordsworth’s digestive allegory, more closely resembles the workings 
of the mind’s chief feeder: the circulatory pulse that metaphorically represents 
the rhythm of association.  Any mental purgation takes place before the 
Snowdon passage, in the moments when, as we have seen, Coleridge, Dorothy, 
Milton, and nature help flush out Godwin’s influence. 
 As “The sense of God, or, whatsoe’er is dim / Or vast in its own being,” 
the “under-presence” seems too spiritually beneficent and sublimely mysterious 
to figure the excrementitious, vulgar taste of the masses.  Rather, the emphasis on 
that which pervades the poet’s being on the deepest level recalls other images of 
the chief feeder at work, such as the poet’s “inner pulse / Of contemplation” in 
the Prelude, or the “blessed mood” of ‘Tintern Abbey,’ when “sensations sweet” 
are “Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart.”  Plus, the vaguely circulatory 
imagery of the feeding mind likewise invokes the chief feeder.  Gathering the 
sounds of the streams and torrents below and transmitting them as a single 
voice, the rift in the mist figures the source of Wordsworth’s many descriptions 
of his imagination as a river (J. Wordsworth, Borders 331).  In recalling “the great 
spring of the activity of our minds,” the source of the streamy imagination also 
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recalls Wordsworth’s many bloodstream metaphors (Lyrical 307).  The feeding 
mind, then, is more likely exalted by the rhythm of association as a metaphorical 
digestion.  Not abject, but foregrounded in the moment of Wordsworth’s greatest 
strength, the chief feeder as under-presence sustains the mind. 
The passage emphasizes not what the feeding mind purges but what it 
retains.  Wordsworth alludes to Godwinian reason only negatively, by affirming 
the Miltonic alternative that has replaced it.  The minds of poetic geniuses, he 
writes, are “truly from the Deity” because they are optimally suited for “religion, 
faith, / And endless occupation for the soul, / Whether discursive or intuitive” 
(Prelude XIII, 106; 111-13).  As Wordsworth’s editors note, the phrase “discursive 
or intuitive” invokes Milton’s distinction between human and angelic reason 
(Paradise Lost V, 487-90).  According to the angel Raphael, the two faculties differ 
in degree, not in kind, as both are nourished by the divine food chain that unites 
all of Creation: “whatever was created needs / To be sustained and fed; of 
elements / The grosser feeds the purer” (Paradise Lost V, 414-16).  That 
Wordsworth grants both types of reason to poetic minds underscores their 
higher digestive powers.  Like angels, they can “concoct, digest, assimilate, / And 
corporeal to incorporeal turn” (Paradise Lost V, 412-13).  In a veiled reference to 
the Godwinian reason he has rejected, Wordsworth explains that this 
180 
 
combination of discursive and intuitive reason yields “truth in moral judgments” 
and empowers the poetic mind with “sovereignty within and peace at will, / 
Emotion which best foresight need not fear, / Most worthy then of trust when 
most intense” (Prelude XIII, 118; 114-16).  Recollecting the rationalism he has 
purged lets Wordsworth value the Miltonic reason he retains.   
Thanks to Milton and to the other wholesome influences on his mind, 
Wordsworth denies, at the climax of the Prelude, having undergone a fall 
analogous Adam and Eve’s dietary indiscretion.  He calls upon nature to 
Witness—whatever falls my better mind, 
Revolving with the incidents of life, 
May have sustained—that, howsoe’er misled, 
I never in the quest of right and wrong 
Did tamper with myself from private aims; 
Nor was in any of my hopes the dupe 
Of selfish passions; nor did willfully 
Yield ever to mean cares and low pursuits; 
But rather did with jealousy shrink back 
From every combination that might aid 
The tendency, too potent in itself, 
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Of habit to enslave the mind—I mean 
Oppress it by the laws of vulgar sense, 
And substitute a universe of death, 
The falsest of all worlds, in place of that 
Which is divine and true . . . (Prelude XIII, 128-43) 
Replete with Miltonic allusions, such as the mental servitude to the senses, the 
“universe of death,” and “falls” that signal engagement with Paradise Lost, this 
passage insists that no personal fall has occurred.   
Frustrated by this denial, J. Wordsworth reads it as evidence of a failed 
attempt to imitate the Miltonic pattern of temptation, fall, and redemption.  In 
the moral crisis of 1796, he claims, Wordsworth comes close to a fall in losing his 
poetic vision, but “[o]ne is left wondering why after trying so hard to 
manufacture a Fall . . . . Wordsworth should have made so little of it . . . . Is the 
answer perhaps that . . . his imagination never had been seriously impaired?” 
(Borders 276).  Yes.  This answer emerges from Wordsworth’s metaphors of the 
digesting mind, which J. Wordsworth reproduces without examination, as when 
he claims that the poet’s imagination is “nourished in childhood, sustained in 
adolescence,” and “impaired for a while by the poet’s entry into adult life” 
(emphasis added, Borders 236).  In the context of the Prelude’s allegory of mental 
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digestion, the denial constitutes neither “dithering” nor “shilly-shallying” with 
Miltonic structure, but a cogent response to it (Borders 275; 272).  Granted, 
Wordsworth’s claims to appetitive innocence feel somewhat disingenuous—if 
the greedy rapine of “Nutting” does not constitute a “selfish passion,” I wonder, 
what does?  But, as an affirmation of Wordsworth’s associative version of “right 
reason,” the denial credits Milton with a wholesome and organic influence that, 
fully assimilated to the poet’s mind, aids his recovery from the moral crisis.  
Unlike Adam and Eve, Wordsworth’s right reason finds sustenance in his early 
diet of Milton.  Even in the postlapsarian world, when most of mankind is 
enslaved to sensuous appetites, the Prelude suggests, right reason can persist if 
the mind is dieted on the right stuff. 
The Snowdon scene brings the Prelude’s digestive arc full circle.  If, as 
Wilner claims, the mouth-like rift at Snowdon “seems to have some disturbed 
relation to the mouth ‘of the babe, / Nursed in his mother’s arms” (11), it is 
because the feeding mind fully realizes the power foreshadowed by the blessed 
babe.40  The mighty mind no longer depends upon the mediating presence of the 
maternal breast; it feeds upon the world with direct access to “infinity.”  Gigante 
                                                 
40 Several have noticed connections between Snowdon’s feeding mind and the blessed babe. The 
editors of the Prelude note that both passages underscore the imagination’s God-like power as 
well as its simultaneously receptive and creative nature (462 n. 2). J. Wordsworth reads the blue 
chasm as a “complete reconciliation” of the mind’s creative and perceptive powers (Borders 321). 
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reads this change as evidence that Wordsworth has undergone a Kristevian ego 
formation, which entails “[r]ejecting the food of the mother, nurse, or feeder (in 
Wordsworth’s case, nature) . . . as a loathsome mess” (Taste 75).41  Although 
Wordsworth often figures nature as breast milk, as in the blessed babe passage or 
in ‘Tintern Abbey,’ where she becomes “the nurse . . . of my heart,” he never 
rejects it outright.  He sometimes strays from it, but ultimately, the maturity of 
the feeding mind is conditioned upon a return to a mental diet like that of his 
youth.  In the Snowdon scene, rather than abjecting the maternal breast, the poet 
identifies with it.  The feeding mind becomes a nourishing fountain: the outlet of 
the poetic voice, which is itself a source of nourishing inspiration.  In effect, the 
feeding mind resembles a self-nursing breast that, as both nourishing fount and 
consuming mouth, “Creates, creator and receiver both.” 
In the final pages, Wordsworth offers the Prelude to Coleridge as 
figurative breast milk.  As the mature poet, “whose soul hath risen / Up to the 
height of feeling intellect,” he assumes an explicitly maternal role: his heart shall 
“Be tender as a nursing mother’s heart” (Prelude XIII, 204-07).  And the Prelude 
becomes an “offering of my love,” like the affection imbibed through the infant’s 
dialogue with his mother’s heart” (Prelude XIII, 426-27).  Just as ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
                                                 
41 In Gigante’s reading, the same abject under-presence that signifies vulgar taste also invokes 
nature figured as rejected breast milk. 
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takes on for its audience the role of maternal Nature, who feeds the mind, so too 
does the Prelude.  In arriving at the familiar and even commonplace mappings of 
THE TEXT IS FOOD and READING IS EATING, we find ourselves, like Coleridge, folded 
into Wordsworth’s organic economy of literary influence.   
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4. Whitman and Emerson: The Digesting Mind on American Soil 
 
 Whereas in ‘Tintern Abbey,’ Wordsworth turns to nature for spiritual 
renewal figured as nutritional sustenance, in “This Compost,”1 Walt Whitman 
refuses this romantic gesture, instead recoiling from nature in fear:  
SOMETHING startles me where I thought I was safest, 
I withdraw from the still woods I loved, 
I will not strip the clothes from my body to meet my lover the sea, 
I will not touch my flesh to the earth as to other flesh to renew me.   
(Poetry and Prose 495)  
What scares him is neither nature’s violence nor her indifference to man—
Tennyson’s “Nature, red in tooth and claw,”—but the horrific materials she 
consumes, the “distemper’d corpses,” “foul liquid and meat” that she swallows 
(Poetry and Prose 495).  Fearing a contamination that would amount to death—the 
dissolution of his subjectivity and the swallowing of his own corpse by the 
earth—Whitman spurns nature in the psychological self-defense of Kristevan 
                                                 
1 This poem first appeared in the 1856 second edition of Leaves of Grass under the title “Poem of 
Wonder at the Resurrection of the Wheat.” Although untitled in the 1860 third edition, it was 
renamed “This Compost!” in the 1867 edition. In 1871, Whitman changed the exclamation mark 
in the title to a period and retained this title, “This Compost.,” in subsequent editions. 
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abjection.  For Kristeva, that which is abject confronts the subject with its own 
inevitable dissolution: 
A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, 
does not signify death.  In the presence of signified death—a flat 
encephalograph, for instance—I would understand, react, or accept.  No, 
as in true theater, without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me 
what I permanently thrust aside in order to live.  These body fluids, this 
defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, 
on the part of death.  There, I am at the border of my condition as a living 
being.   (Kristeva’s italics, 3) 
Just as the Kristevan subject, confronted with its limits, thrusts the abject aside in 
order to reinforce its boundaries, so too Whitman repulses nature.  
By the end of the poem, however, the poet overcomes his revulsion so 
completely that he not only touches nature, “reclin[ing] on the grass,” but 
eagerly takes her into his body as food and drink: “the cool drink from the well 
tastes so good, / The blackberries are so flavorous and juicy” (Poetry and Prose 
496).  This surprising about-face hinges on Whitman’s conception of the soil as 
“Nature’s stomach”: a sublimely powerful agent that transforms detritus into 
food for new life (Poetry and Prose 973).  Here and elsewhere, Whitman 
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conceptualizes composting, the chemical decomposition of organic matter in the 
soil, to a natural form of digestion that folds individual alimentary systems into 
an all-inclusive cycle of nutritional exchange.  By swallowing and digesting life’s 
remains, the earth renders their materials safe for consumption in the form of 
fruit and water.  Meanwhile, Whitman’s digesting mind enacts an analogous 
transformation: as the soil sanitizes its abject horrors, he thinks himself out of 
disgust and into a robust hunger for nature.   
“This Compost” exemplifies a distinctly American version of the digesting 
mind.  Like his English predecessors, Whitman uses digestion as a source 
domain to conceptualize abstract mental processes in a way that confronts and 
grapples with the aporetic interactions of part and whole, self and world.  But 
Whitman expands the metaphor’s scope.  His source domain, the soil as 
“Nature’s stomach,” extends digestion beyond limitations of a single body in 
order to convey the complex temporality of a future-oriented imagination that 
enacts a continuous transformation of the remains of the past.  By reading “This 
Compost” in the context of an Emersonian aesthetic that values the remains of 
the past as a source of nutrition for present minds, which alone have power to 
create nourishment for future minds, this chapter follows the conceptual 
metaphor, THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, across the Atlantic, where it enacts the 
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American sense of temporality, identity, and organic relation that, later, will 
come to underpin the pragmatic and modernist aesthetics of William Carlos 
Williams. 
Whitman’s intellectual relationship to Emerson is anything but 
straightforward.  Early in his career, in a letter appended to the second edition of 
Leaves (1856), Whitman heaped panegyric at Emerson’s feet, addressing him as 
“dear Master” (Poetry and Prose 1360).  And in 1860, as his friend Trowbridge 
recalls, Whitman admitted that he had consumed a steady diet of Emerson at the 
outset of his career.  While working as a carpenter and composing the first 
edition of Leaves in 1854, he carried his dinner pail to work every day: “[a]long 
with his pail he usually carried a book, between which and his solitary meal he 
would divide his nooning.  Once the book chanced to be a volume of Emerson; 
and from that time he took with him no other writer” (Trowbridge 165).  The 
Good Gray Poet seasoned his daily bread with a dash of Concord Sage: “in one 
hand the sandwich put up for him by his good mother, his other hand holding 
open the volume that revealed to him his greatness and his destiny.”  The 
discovery of Emerson marked a turning point, Whitman told Trowbridge: “I was 
simmering, simmering, simmering; Emerson brought me to a boil” (Trowbridge 
166).  In this expressions of PREPARING IDEAS IS COOKING (Table 1, mapping (g)), 
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Whitman figures his former self as a raw soup of sorts, under which Emerson 
turns up the heat, speeding his ability to nourish others minds. 
But Whitman’s admiration cooled as he came to consider Emerson’s work 
“[c]old and bloodless” (Poetry and Prose 1077).  By 1880 he compared reading his 
former daily bread to “eating nothing but sugar and butter”—pleasurable but 
“too concentrated” (Poetry and Prose 1076) and lacking in nutritional substance: 
“Suppose these books becoming absorb’d, the permanent chyle of American 
general and particular character—what a well-wash’d and grammatical, but 
bloodless and helpless, race we should turn out!” (Poetry and Prose 1077-78).  In 
the same essay, he admits to having had, “like most youngsters, . . . a touch . . . of 
Emerson-on-the-brain” (Poetry and Prose 1079).  But this remark reduces 
Emerson’s influence to a passing phase that as, Sean Ross Meehan notices, 
“sounds something like an intestinal ailment” (98).  Although Whitman claims to 
have outgrown his early enthusiasm for his idol, he continued intermittently to 
praise him.  And to the end, he remained willing to count Emerson among the 
few Americans who merit a place beside Milton, Wordsworth, and Coleridge 
(Poetry and Prose 1294-95).  To complicate matters, a lifelong series of personal 
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and professional frictions between the two men likely colored many of 
Whitman’s remarks about Emerson.2   
Some scholars have productively downplayed Whitman’s intellectual debt 
to Emerson in order to emphasize differences in their views stemming from their 
disparate social classes and political leanings.3  But whatever their personal or 
intellectual differences, Whitman’s ambivalence toward Emerson bespeaks a 
Bloomian anxiety of influence.4  Plus, his various endorsements of Emerson 
combined with his lifelong engagement with his ideas, as described below, 
                                                 
2 Although their personal interaction has been variously interpreted to demonstrate, interrogate, 
or downplay Whitman’s debt to Emerson, most accounts include some or all of three episodes of 
friction. In the first, Whitman published without permission Emerson’s personal letter praising 
the first edition of Leaves. Emerson thought this decision a “strange rude thing” (Letters of Emerson 
8: 458), but was gracious enough to make Whitman’s acquaintance soon after (Loving 96). When 
Whitman re-published the letter in the 1856 second edition, even printing one of its lines on the 
cover, making Emerson “ipso facto the blurb writer for a book of poems he had never examined,” 
Emerson was annoyed (Loving 96). For select accounts of this episode, see Folsom 
(“Transcendental” 273-74), Loving (95-102), Grossman (95-101), Callow (230-34), Reynolds (341-
43), and Kaplan (205-06). The second episode occurred on the Boston Common in 1860, when 
Whitman was piqued by Emerson’s recommendation to remove the sexually explicit “Enfans 
d’Adam” from his third edition. For accounts of this episode see Folsom (“Transcendental” 275-
76), Loving (105-08), Callow (271), Grossman (75-82), Reynolds (194), and Kaplan (247-49, 353). 
The third episode is Emerson’s omission of Whitman from his 1874 anthology, Parnassus, which 
included all of his favorite poetic “gems of pure lustre” (Parnassus iii). Whitman could not 
understand the omission (Traubel 6: 222) and some critics have considered it a snub. Grossman 
(94) and Monteiro (7) in particular, view it as evidence that Emerson did not consider Leaves 
poetry at all. For alternative accounts, see Loving (xi), Folsom (“Transcendental” 277), Reynolds 
(517), Kaplan (354), and Meehan (117). 
3 See, for example, Betsy Erkkila’s Whitman the Political Poet (1989) and Jay Grossman’s 
Reconstituting the American Renaissance (2003), both of which distance Whitman from Emerson on 
the basis of social class and political views. 
4 In Poetry and Repression, Bloom Identifies Emerson as Whitman’s most influential precursor and 
finds in “Song of Myself” evidence of each of the revisionary ratios that characterize the anxiety 
of influence (235-66). 
191 
 
establish Emerson as an important context for Whitman.  After all, he has long 
been recognized as a likely source for Whitman’s Coleridgean organic aesthetics.5  
And because Whitman so frequently discusses Emerson’s influence in nutritional 
terms, it also seems likely that, as Meehan claims, “Whitman assimilates 
Emerson’s . . . teachings on the digestive, ‘assimilating power’ of the poet” (116).  
However, Meehan perhaps oversimplifies the influences in play.  He bases 
his claim largely on Emerson’s 1875 remark in “Poetry and Imagination,” that 
“every man would be a poet, if his intellectual digestion were perfect” (Collected 
Works 8: 18).  But by 1875, several others including Wordsworth, Coleridge, and 
even Whitman himself, have already associated poetic genius with a superior 
power of mental digestion.6  And some of Whitman’s digestive metaphors echo 
other writers more distinctly, as in “Democratic Vistas,” when he complains 
about the public’s “sensational appetite for stimulus,” and women’s tendency to 
give themselves over to “what is called taste . . . . webs of silliniess, millinery, and 
                                                 
5 For example, in 1941, F. O. Matthiessen identified Emerson as a possible source for Whitman’s 
Coleridgean organicism (593). For more recent accounts of this influence, see LeMaster and 
Kummings (490) and York (59-62). 
6 Although Emerson’s remarks about “intellectual digestion” come from the 1875 essay, “Poetry 
and Imagination,” Meehan speculates that Whitman may have heard these ideas earlier at 
Emerson’s 1872 lecture of the same title at the Peabody Institute, which he attended (100-01). But 
even so, the lecture postdates much of Whitman’s digestive imagery in Leaves, including his claim 
in the 1855 Preface that the “greatest poet” is characterized by “large alimentiveness” and his 
attribution of this quality to his own “fluid and swallowing soul” in the poem that he later titles 
“Song of Myself” (Poetry and Prose 20, 63). 
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every kind of dyspeptic depletion” (emphasis added, Poetry and Prose 998, 964).  
These remarks sound less like Emerson than they do like Coleridge and 
Wordsworth.   
Emerson’s particular influence is more readily apparent when Whitman 
echoes his departures from their English predecessors, especially Emerson’s 
claim that the American poet can digestively re-form stale European literature 
into fresh food for future minds.  Like Emerson, Whitman folds the digesting 
mind into an organic model of literary history as nutritional exchange, the source 
domain of which includes composting and plant growth in addition to corporeal 
digestion.  In keeping with the cyclical temporality of this metaphor, Whitman, 
like Emerson values waste, fragments, and decaying things, such as America’s 
European literary heritage, as a source of raw nutrients for the poet of today.  
 
Emerson’s Digestive Transition  
In “The American Scholar,” Emerson calls upon American intellectuals to 
cultivate their own domestic sources of mental nourishment: “The millions, that 
around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the sere remains of 
foreign harvests” (Essays & Poems 53).  European texts, here figured as scant 
leavings, offer some nutritional value: “as the human body can be nourished on 
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any food, though it were boiled grass and the broth of shoes, so the human mind 
can be fed by any knowledge.”  But, Emerson insists, “it needs a strong head to 
bear that diet,” and “we crave a better and more abundant food” (Essays & Poems 
59, 67).  This superior produce can be cultivated here and now, in the form of 
American literature figured as abundant and even Edenic fruit: “the apple which 
the ages have desired to pluck, now at last ripe, and inviting nations to harvest” 
(Essays & Poems 65).  And because “[the] perception of the worth of the vulgar is 
fruitful in discoveries,” American scholars can feed the world if they recognize 
the potential in their nation’s mundane stuff (Essays & Poems 69).  The body’s 
ability to consume, digest, and assimilate nourishment represents the individual 
mind’s power to transform the textual materials of the past and sensuous 
experiences of the present into the texts of the future.  But Emerson’s organic 
metaphor also operates on a collective level, through the agricultural image.  The 
American soil, which represents the nation’s collective mind, composts the 
literary past along with its own raw materials in order to yield a more abundant 
and fresher fruit.   
These two metaphors, the digesting mind and cultural composting, are 
compatible because they share the source domain of organic vitality.  Moreover, 
both composting and digestion perpetuate life by freeing nutrients from old 
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organisms for the growth of new ones.  Composting yields nutrients for plants, 
which feed man and other animals, which are eventually composted in the soil.  
Merging these source domains within the broader domain of organic nutritional 
exchange, Emerson represents American literary history as a process of 
nutritional exchange that takes place in individual bodies and within the soil 
upon which they live.  In effect, the metaphor of cultural composting allows the 
individual digesting mind to participate in culture figured as organic growth. 
In this passage and many others, Emerson participates in the American 
tradition that Robert Weisbuch calls “futurism,” which “consider[s] the present 
not as the result of a long past but as prologue to a glorious future” (154).  As one 
of several strategies through which America compensates for its perceived lack 
of cultural history, futurism contributes to the nation’s characteristic sense of 
“cultural earliness,” which re-inscribes the Old World’s heritage as an effete 
“cultural lateness,” in order to celebrate its own blank slate as untainted Adamic 
potential (Weisbuch 122, 111).  As Emerson puts it succinctly, “The divine resides 
in the new” (Essays &Poems 1041).  Often, as in Emerson’s Edenic fruit metaphor, 
cultural earliness secures its sense of possibility by exploiting a simultaneous 
advancement and regression; futurism requires a return to innocence (Weisbuch 
126). 
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Weisbuch treats this temporal paradox as an unavoidable result of “an 
opportunistic myth” that disregards logical consistency in favor of ideological 
utility (125).  But Emerson’s cultural composting demonstrates that organic 
metaphor allows Americans to have their Edenic fruit and eat it too—without 
defying the laws of time.  Insofar as it represents America as new life, “[c]ultural 
earliness is an organic metaphor” (Weisbuch 123).7  Its source domain can 
reconcile its perpetual advancements and returns through the cyclical 
temporality of biological processes, which advance by resetting themselves in 
perpetuity.  Emerson’s culture-as-agriculture transforms the remains of former 
harvests into America’s impending bumper crop. 
Moreover, Emerson’s organic metaphors reveal that, for all its insistent 
privileging of the future over the past, cultural earliness tends to situate power in 
the present, as the only moment when change happens.  In “Quotation and 
Originality,” Emerson writes, “We cannot overstate our debt to the Past, but the 
moment has the supreme claim.  The Past is for us; but the sole terms on which it 
can become ours are its subordination to the Present” (Essays & Poems 1042).  In 
                                                 
7 Although Weisbuch implies that the metaphor of cultural earliness is inherently organic, it 
would perhaps be more accurate to say that it is often organic. Many of Weisbuch’s examples 
compare America to biblical places or evens such as the “land of the apocalypse,” the “Old 
Eden,” or “the New Jerusalem” (124-25). These metaphors of cultural earliness seem to overcome 
their temporal contradictions through typological or other relations rather than the cyclical 
recursion of biological processes. 
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organic metaphors, as Emerson seems keenly aware, the power to effect change, 
to transform future potential into the facticity of the past, resides in the present 
workings of vital power: America’s intellectual fruit is “now at last ripe, and 
inviting nations to harvest.”  For Coleridge and Wordsworth, as we have seen, 
the cognitive utility of biological life, as a source domain for abstract targets, 
inheres in its dynamic temporality.  Life’s perpetual changes—its growth, decay, 
and exchanges—conceptually model identity in difference and continuity 
through change.  The same is true for Emerson.  But for him, vitality most 
importantly models the way in which power resides in the fleeting of the present 
moment as it bridges the past and the future. 
Vitality is but one instance of Emerson’s ideal of power in action, as it 
unfolds in time.  Although Emerson uses many names to conceptualize this 
power,8 I follow Jonathan Levin in referring to it as “transition,”9 which is 
Emerson’s term from “Self-Reliance,” where “Power ceases in the instant of 
                                                 
8 Some of Emerson’s other metaphors for this ideal power include “ecstasy,” which he calls “the 
law and cause of nature” (Essays & Poems 127); that “figure of figures,” the circle, which marks 
one horizon that gestures beyond itself to another (Levin 39); and visual transparency, a “seeing 
seen through” (Pease 225). 
9 Although Levin is first to adopt transition as an umbrella metaphor for Emerson’s ideal of 
power, several of his predecessors use the term in in compatible ways. Pease, for instance, claims 
that Emerson’s self-contradictions “underscore the transitional quality of all of his formulations: 
his capacity to restate yet unsay almost everything, to make all of his utterances seem tentative 
and provisional” (229). See also Bercovitch (313, 346) and R. Poirier (Poetry & Pragmatism 149, 
153). 
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repose; it resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state, in the 
shooting of the gulf, in the darting to an aim” (Essays & Poems 271).  Because 
every new shooting of a gulf supersedes the last, transition moves 
simultaneously forward and in circles, like an instantaneous version of the 
organic life cycle.  Every present transition is a repetition of transition itself, a 
particular instance—singular and unrepeatable—of a general dynamic that 
endlessly repeats.   
Often, Emerson invokes organic vitality to exemplify this transitional 
power,10 which operates through all of nature’s ceaseless changes, both organic 
and inorganic.  For example, he writes, “The method of nature: who could ever 
analyze it?  That rushing stream will not stop to be observed. . . . . Its smoothness 
is the smoothness of the pitch of the cataract.  Its permanence is perpetual 
                                                 
10 Although Levin attempts to distance transition from organicism, he does so evidently to 
disown a more narrowly defined organicism of the New Critical variety, which extolls the kind of 
objective formal unity that more authentic forms of organicism actively resist. For instance, in 
response to critics who condemn John Dewey’s aesthetics on the grounds that words such as 
“universal,” “wholeness,” and “organic,” betray a facile mystification at its core, Levin 
contextualizes this vocabulary within an Emersonian transitional idealism that unsettles such 
unities: “The unities about which Dewey writes are felt, aesthetic unities. They are not unified 
wholes embedded in the world . . . but human projections onto the world” (85-86). But when we 
recognize organic aesthetics as a conceptual metaphor, the point becomes moot; any unity that 
organic metaphor would bestow upon a work is necessarily a “human projection onto the 
world.” Moreover, if we understand organic unity as an aporetic interaction between part and 
whole, which continually undoes the unities it establishes, then organic unity itself exemplifies a 
transitional dynamic. When Levin claims that, for Emerson, “the health of the self depends on its 
feeling of interrelatedness to everything that exceeds and so in some sense ruins the self,” he 
intuits the organic aporia of transitional selfhood without recognizing it as such (35). 
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inchoation” (Essays & Poems 119).  Similarly, when Emerson writes, “In 
nature. . . . Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit,” vital 
power serves as a synecdoche for the more general dynamic, which includes 
inorganic forces such as gravity (Essays & Poems 413), and elsewhere, death 
functions as a synecdoche for cessation and stasis: “Transition, shooting the gulf, 
becoming somewhat else, is the whole game of nature: and death, the penalty of 
standing still” (Later Lectures 92). 
As “power in its purest form,” transition is an ideal (Levin 67).  But it is an 
imminent and “pragmatic” one, “a function of particular, imperfect, and 
immediately accessible actualities” (Levin 25).  For Emerson, metaphysical ideals 
such as unity and power exist, but they emerge only through human experience 
of the physical world.  Idealism, he explains in Nature, is useful as an 
“introductory hypothesis, serving to apprize us of the eternal distinction 
between the soul and the world.”  But Emerson goes beyond this distinction to 
theorize it as interactive relation: 
behind nature, throughout nature, spirit is present; one and not 
compound, it does not act upon us from without, that is, in space and 
time, but spiritually, or through ourselves: therefore that spirit, that is, the 
Supreme Being, does not build up nature around us, but puts it forth 
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through us, as the life of the tree puts forth new branches and leaves 
through the pores of the old.   (Essays & Poems 41) 
Transitional power describes the dynamic of the putting-through.  It does not 
reside in matter, but rather is realized in the perception of the perpetual changes 
of matter.   
Selfhood, the mental experience of subjectivity, is one such transitional 
process.  As Levin demonstrates, the Emersonian self realizes transitional power; 
it is no static essence, but “a figure for . . . possibility, a circle always expanding 
into broader circles by means of ceaseless crossings and transitions” (Levin 30).11  
Like the waterfall, the Emersonian self is paradoxically unified by its perpetual 
newness.  It continually breaks its boundaries in order to shape itself through 
interaction with nature.  As the self perpetually shoots the gulfs between past 
and future, mind and world, and ideas and things, cultural earliness plays out on 
the level of individual subjectivity.  Emerson’s penchant for using vitality as a 
synecdoche for transitional power frequently results in organic images of the self, 
as in the following simile from “Compensation:” 
                                                 
11 As Levin argues, the Emersonian self “is not . . . the liberal subject that so many of Emerson’s 
critics make it out to be” because “the most peculiar and distinctive feature” of self-reliance is 
that it posits “no self on which to rely in the first place” (202). Compatible accounts of 
Emersonian selfhood include those of Sacvan Bercovitch, in Rites of Assent (chapter 9); R. Poirier, 
in Poetry & Pragmatism (chapters 1-2) and The Renewal of Literature (86-87, 196-202); and Donald 
Pease, in Visionary Compacts (chapter 6). 
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Every soul is by this intrinsic necessity quitting its whole system of things, 
its friends, and home, and laws, and faith, as the shell-fish crawls out of its 
beautiful but stony case, because it no longer admits of its growth, and 
slowly forms a new house.  In proportion to the vigor of the individual, 
these revolutions are frequent, until in some happier mind they are 
incessant, and all worldly relations hang very loosely about him, 
becoming, as it were, a transparent fluid membrane through which the 
living form is seen . . .   (Essays & Poems 301) 
The shellfish simile maps organic vitality, “the vigor of the individual,” onto the 
self’s transitional dynamic.  Then Emerson fantasizes an ideal self, a “happier 
mind,” that continually exercises this vital transitional power.  Projecting this 
ideal self back onto the source domain of the shellfish, within a new blended 
mental space, Emerson conjures an image of a shell-free mollusk, whose 
minimally delimited body changes too rapidly to be housed by a rigid shell.   
This membranous self, as Levin points out (37), recalls the transcendental 
moment in Nature, when Emerson experiences the transitional power of an 
“original relation to the universe” (Essays & Poems 7).  “I become a transparent 
eye-ball;” he writes, “I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being 
circulate through me” (Essays & Poems 10).  If this “ecstatic experience in nature 
201 
 
renders the boundary between self and nature permeable,” it does so only 
momentarily (Levin 38).  In contrast, the shell-free mollusk represents an ideal 
self that realizes transitional power in perpetuity.  Both passages hinge on 
organic metaphor to represent transitional power as vitality.  But whereas the 
eyeball’s vitality comes ab extra, from the metaphysical “currents of the Universal 
Being” that unite it with nature, the mollusk’s vitality arises from its capacity for 
nutritional growth—its ability to shape its body by exchanging materials with 
the environment.  As an organism rather than an organ, the mollusk owns its 
transitional power in a way that the eyeball does not.  In effect, Emerson tacitly 
invokes the digesting mind in order to imagine a self that can experience power 
in perpetuity. 
More often, however, Emerson uses explicit metaphors of PERCEPTION IS 
INGESTION (Table 1, mapping (i)) to locate the self’s transitional power in its 
active, alert, and momentary engagements with the object world here and now.  
For instance, in the passage leading up to the transparent eyeball, he echoes 
Wordsworth’s “Ode, Intimations of Immortality” when he claims that “few adult 
persons can see nature. . . . The sun illumines only the eye of the man, but shines 
into the eye and heart of the child.”  But “the lover of nature,” such as Emerson, 
remains permeable to its influences: “intercourse with heaven and earth, 
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becomes part of his daily food” (Essays & Poems 10).  If Wordsworth’s child, that 
“best philosopher,” is destined to lose sight of “the visionary gleam” as he 
matures into his inheritance of English cultural lateness, Emerson implies that his 
American counterpart might sustain it through a steady mental diet of nature.  
The process of nutrition figures a dynamic interpenetration of self and world that 
perpetuates transitional power, as vitality, in the everyday experience of 
selfhood as it unfolds in time.   
Even in the later essay “Experience,” when Emerson has come, more 
pessimistically, to deny the possibility of immediate experience, transitional 
power still emerges through the interaction of subject and object, metaphorically 
figured as eating.  In the more famous visual metaphor for this process, Emerson 
writes, “We have learned that we do not see directly, and that we have no means 
of correcting these colored and distorting lenses which we are” (Essays & Poems 
487).  Transitional power nevertheless reveals itself “in flashes of light, in sudden 
discoveries of . . . profound beauty,” as the object world passes through the lens 
of subjectivity during everyday experience (Essays & Poems 484).  But unlike a 
lens, which cannot adjust its translucence, the self can increase or decrease its 
capacity for transitional power.   
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To critique those who willfully foreclose their transitional power, Emerson 
invokes the digesting mind: “Men live in their fancy, like drunkards whose 
hands are too soft and tremulous for successful labor” (Essays & Poems 479).  
Echoing Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s condemnation of deranged public taste, 
Emerson redirects the language of addiction and impotence against those who 
withdraw from the world into their minds.  “Do not craze yourself with 
thinking . . . . ,” he warns, “If a man should consider the nicety of the passage of a 
piece of bread down his throat, he would starve” (Essays & Poems 478).  Instead, 
Emerson recommends a robust appetite for everyday engagement with the object 
world: “The fine young people despise life, but in me, and in such as with me are 
free from dyspepsia, . . . a day is a sound and solid good. . . . I . . . should relish 
every hour and what it brought me, the pot-luck of the day as heartily as the 
oldest gossip in the bar-room” (emphasis added, Essays & Poems 479).  Whereas 
the dyspeptic youths forfeit vital power because they cannot stomach “life,” 
Emerson relishes the present as a hearty, if unpredictable, “pot-luck” of 
experience that sustains the self’s vital power through its transitional relations 
with the object world. 
As “the potential or ideal man,” whose “intellectual digestion [is] perfect,” 
the Emersonian poet exemplifies this model of selfhood (Collected Works 8: 13, 
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18).  In “Poetry and Imagination” and elsewhere, the “poet” refers not 
necessarily to one who composes verse, but to the ideal genius whose 
imagination enacts transitional power.  For Emerson, as for Coleridge, the 
imagination performs a unifying function.  But rather than making new wholes, 
it enacts an always fleeting metaphysical unity through its symbolizing 
perception.  Because “nature is a symbol, in the whole and every part,” 
everything, even the most abject or seemingly insignificant fragments and 
remains, holds value for the Emersonian poet, who, by using them as symbols, 
“purges their grossness” (Essays & Poems 452, 454).  For example, the Jewish 
practice of circumcision demonstrates “the power of poetry to raise the low and 
offensive.  Small mean things serve as well as great symbols” (Essays & Poems 
454).  Although severed from the body, the foreskin is not abject: “as it is 
dislocation and detachment from the life of God, that makes things ugly, the 
poet, who re-attaches things to nature and the Whole,—re-attaching even 
artificial things, and violations of nature, to nature, by a deeper insight,—
disposes very easily of the most disagreeable facts” (Essays & Poems 455).  The 
transitional leap of symbolizing perception performs the momentary unification. 
Hence, the Emersonian poet relishes the pot-luck of the day with 
omnivorous confidence in the sanitizing and elevating power of his intellectual 
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digestion.  He “must draw the elements into him for food, and, if they be granite 
and silex, will prefer them cooked by sun and rain, by time and art, to his hand.  
But, however received, these elements pass into the substance of his constitution, 
will be assimilated, and tend always to form, not a partisan, but a possessor of 
truth” (emphasis added, Essays & Poems 1041).  This image amplifies the subtle 
digestive connotations of the famous claim, in Nature that “In proportion to the 
energy of his thought and will, [man] takes up the world into himself” (Essays & 
Poems 16).  To take up the world into one’s self is mentally to ingest it, whatever 
it holds.  In “Poetry and Imagination,” when Emerson calls for “poetry which 
tastes the world and reports of it,” he advocates a poetics of engagement with the 
world that, as we will see in the next chapter, underpins Williams’s modernist 
poetics of contact (Collected Works 8: 36).   
Along with other parts of the object word, the Emersonian poet must 
digest the textual remnants of the literary past.  In the 1868 essay, “Quotation 
and Originality,” Emerson explains that “It is inevitable that you are indebted to 
the past.  You are fed and formed by it” (emphasis added, Essays & Poems 1040).  
Fittingly then, just as Coleridge praised Shakespeare’s vigorous “assimilative 
and . . . modifying faculties” (Collected 7.2: 26), Emerson praises Coleridge’s in 
turn: “Original power is usually accompanied with assimilating power, and we 
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value in Coleridge his excellent knowledge and quotations perhaps as much, 
possibly more, than his original suggestions” (Essays & Poems 1035).  As an 
Emersonian genius, Coleridge creates not ex nihilo, but digestively, by taking in 
and reworking the ideas of others, making them new.  And Emerson, in recycling 
Coleridge’s digestive metaphor, does the same. 
Whether it operates through symbol, metaphor, metonymy, or any other 
linking trope, Emerson treats the transitional dynamic of the poet’s imagination 
as a symbol of his ideal of transitional power.  In “Poetry and Imagination,” he 
illustrates this point by setting up an extended analogy between two stepwise 
systems of transformation: the series of material transitions that culminates in 
digestive assimilation and the mind’s processing of sensory data into thought. 
The atoms of the body were once nebula, then rock, then loam, then corn, 
then chyme, then chyle, then blood; and now the beholding and co-
energizing mind sees the same refining and ascent to the third, the 
seventh, or the tenth power of the daily accidents which the senses re-
port, and which make the raw material of knowledge.  It was sensation; 
when memory came, it was experience; when mind acted, it was 
knowledge; when mind acted on it as knowledge, it was thought.  This 
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metonomy [sic], or seeing the same sense in things so diverse, gives a pure 
pleasure.   (Collected Works 8: 12) 
The first chain, which effectively operates as a source domain for the second, 
follows a hypothetical particle moving upward through the great chain of being, 
from raw mineral to organic soil, then vegetable produce, and, after an implied 
ingestion, to digestive chyme and chyle, and finally blood.  The second chain 
details a parallel series of immaterial transformations, in which the mind 
processes sensation, “the raw material of knowledge,” into increasingly refined 
thought.  The analogy holds the two chains side by side for comparison, rather 
than substituting one for the other as a metaphor would do.  But conceptually, it 
functions like a metaphor or simile in that the concrete domain of the first chain 
illustrates the abstract domain of the second in a source and target relation.  In 
effect, the material transition of nature models the immaterial transition of the 
mind, much as it would in an expression of the digesting mind metaphor. 
 As he traces each transitional chain, Emerson’s mind moves 
metonymically, from one step to the next, according to the temporal adjacency of 
sequence in which one thing replaces another.  Insofar as this metonymic shifting 
implicitly parallels the two transitional chains that Emerson describes, it 
constitutes a third transitional dynamic—and the one that most interests 
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Emerson in this essay about the workings of the creative mind.  By tracing his 
metonymic thought process in outlining the other two chains, Emerson reveals 
that all three partake in the same transitional dynamic.  In this sense, Emerson’s 
metonymic thought symbolizes the larger transitional dynamic in which it 
participates.   
In order to support his claim that Emerson’s imagination operates 
primarily through metonymic rather than metaphorical relations, Meehan 
attempts to merge these three chains by treating them as contiguous parts of the 
same transformative process of metonymy.  Citing nineteenth-century medical 
texts that claim that “the process of assimilation culminates in thinking,” Meehan 
argues that for Emerson, metonymy “names a convertibility that is already in 
nature, one that the poet converts or materializes naturally into poetry” (105, 
103).  In other words, Emerson’s “intellectual digestion,” a process of metonymic 
transformation, literally continues the process of physical digestion.  But 
Emerson does not claim that nature transforms minerals into food through 
metonymy.  That would be absurd.  Nor does he claim that the mind converts 
sensation to memory, or memory to experience, through metonymy.  For him, 
metonymy resides only in the perception of relation; it is imposed by the 
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“beholding and co-energizing mind” in the act of “seeing the same sense in 
things so diverse.”  It does not operate in nature as a material force. 
Moreover, metonymy is but one of many compatible ways in which the 
Emersonian mind manipulates the object world through “intellectual digestion.”  
And in “Poetry and Imagination,” it does not mean the polar opposite of 
metaphor, as it does for Meehan, who follows Jakobson’s influential distinction 
(102).  In fact, by defining it as “seeing the same sense in things so diverse,” 
Emerson characterizes metonymy in terms of the relation of similitude that 
belongs more properly to analogy, simile, and metaphor.  “Metonymy,” it seems, 
stands synecdochically for any trope that enacts a unifying transition on the 
conceptual level of language.  The general thrust of the essay, after all, is neither 
to differentiate various rhetorical tropes nor to privilege one over the others, but 
to reveal the transitional dynamic that characterizes all figurative language as 
imaginative power.  Emerson puts it with characteristic eloquence: 
[I]ndeed Nature itself is a vast trope, and all particular natures are tropes.  
As the bird alights on the bough,—then plunges into the air again, so the 
thoughts of God pause but for a moment in any form.  All thinking is 
analogizing, and 't is the use of life to learn metonomy.  The endless 
passing of one element into new forms, the incessant metamorphosis, 
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explains the rank which the imagination holds in our catalogue of mental 
powers.  The imagination is the reader of these forms.  The poet accounts 
all productions and changes of Nature as the nouns of language, uses 
them representatively, too well pleased with their ulterior to value much 
their primary meaning.   (Collected Works 8: 7-8) 
Tropes, metonymies, representations, metaphors, and similes intermingle freely 
in this passage, as Emerson skillfully demonstrates the imaginative flux he 
extolls.  Rather than diametrically opposing metonymy and metaphor, Emerson 
deploys them together in a more complex figuration that epitomizes transitional 
dynamic of intellectual digestion more adequately than could metonymy or 
metaphor alone.   
Within this context, any particular metonymy, metaphor, or other trope 
symbolizes the transitional power of intellectual digestion.  “What is the term of 
the ever-flowing metamorphosis?,” Emerson asks, “I do not know what are the 
stoppages, but I see that a devouring unity changes all into that which changes 
not” (emphasis added, Collected Works 8: 9).  If the stoppages represent individual 
metonymic shifts and metaphorical comparisons, the devouring unity figures the 
imaginative transition that incorporates them all.  This figure of figuration might 
seem to epitomize organicism’s ideological dangers of freezing movement and 
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nullifying difference within a monolithic totality.  But by envisioning a 
paradoxical fixity through motion, the organic metaphor of figuration-as-
digestion preserves—even depends upon—the individual transitional tropes it 
comprises.  Ultimately, then, it is not metonymy that, for Emerson, “offers a 
paradox of identity through change,” but any kind of troping as transition (101).  
Like Coleridge and Wordsworth, then, Emerson conceptualizes poetic 
genius as a superior power of mental digestion: a transformative engagement 
with the world of objects and ideas.  But whereas for the English romantics, 
creative power resides in the mind’s dynamic ability to unify itself, whether in 
the sense of subordinating its mechanical parts to an organic whole or of 
reconciling the active will with a passive receptivity to nature, for Emerson 
creative power resides in the mind’s ability disruptively to re-new the self by 
engaging with the material world and using it as an endless source for the 
imagination’s tropes.  As a result, Emerson’s digesting mind is less selective than 
that of his English predecessors; it matters less what the mind eats than that it 
eats often, continually unsettling the self by interacting with the world. 
This omnivorousness extends beyond the digesting mind of the individual 
to collective processes such as literary history, which Emerson frequently 
conceptualizes as an all-devouring nutritional cycle.  The source domain for this 
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metaphor of cultural composting includes plant nutrition and organic 
decomposition in the soil in addition to human and animal digestion.  In 
“Quotation and Originality,” for example, he writes, 
You are fed and formed by [the past].  The old forest is decomposed for 
the composition of the new forest.  The old animals have given their 
bodies to the earth to furnish through chemistry the forming race, and 
every individual is only a momentary fixation of what was yesterday 
another’s, is to-day his, and will belong to a third to-morrow.  So it is in 
thought.  Our knowledge is the amassed thought and experience of 
innumerable minds: our language, our science, our religion, our opinions, 
our fancies, we inherited.   (Essays & Poems 1040)  
Emerson represents culture as a collective mental ecosystem, in which each mind 
transforms ideas as an organism transforms nutrients.  Our cultural memory 
works like the soil, to compost old ideas for new applications in present thought: 
“This vast memory is only raw material.  The divine gift is ever the instant life, 
which receives and uses and creates, and can well bury the old in the 
omnipotency with which Nature decomposes all her harvest for recomposition” 
(Essays & Poems 1042).  As a decentralized system of nutrient exchange, cultural 
composting figures literary history as a collective form of mental digestion that 
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takes place not in the individual body, but in the bowels of the earth, as it 
decomposes nature’s harvest.   
Likewise, in “Circles,” Emerson represents culture as composting: “The 
Greek letters . . . are already . . . tumbling into the inevitable pit which the 
creation of new thought opens for all that is old.  The new continents are built 
out of the ruins of an old planet; the new races fed out of the decomposition of 
the foregoing.  New arts destroy the old” (Essays & Poems 403).  By identifying 
the same transitional dynamic at work within the eons-long cycle of planetary 
formation and in the decomposition of a single human generation, Emerson 
effectively equates these vastly disparate time scales, reducing the past to a 
single “inevitable pit”—a whole into which everything falls: texts, continents, 
and human and heavenly bodies alike.  The present is its gaping mouth: “every 
moment is new; the past is always swallowed and forgotten” (Essays & Poems 
413).  As the “new thought” of today perpetually opens the past, literary history 
becomes a devouring maw, a continual apocalyptic swallowing by the present 
generation of all that has come before.   
In this complex image, Emerson modifies the familiar metaphor of the 
grave-as-mouth in order to link the processes of digestion, the decomposition of 
food in the stomach, and composting, the decomposition of remains in the soil, 
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as material instantiations of the same transitional dynamic.  Traditionally, the 
grave-mouth compares death to a swallowing by the earth, which then becomes 
a digesting body with a mouth (the grave opening) and bowels (the soil itself), in 
which remains are decomposed.  Emerson adapts this metaphor to literary 
history by figuring texts, “all that is old,” eventually tumbling into the earth, 
where they, like corpses, will be subject to “decomposition.”  But in the 
transitional cycle, decomposition leads neither to obliteration nor to a stagnant 
non-existence, but to another ingestion and subsequent digestion; composting 
frees nutrients, enabling them to feed subsequent generations in perpetuity.  
And, the metaphor implies, the next generation’s “intellectual digestion” will 
yield new texts that will, in turn, be swallowed by the past.   
Folding the alimentary imagery of the grave-mouth into a larger cycle of 
death and life as nutritive exchange in this way lets Emerson conceptualize the 
relationship between the individual mind and the collective literary culture by 
expanding the source domain of the digesting mind beyond the temporal and 
spatial limits of the individual body.  As the body is inevitably digested by the 
earth, the metaphor suggests, so too any writer will be assimilated and 
transformed in perpetuity by the literary history to which he contributes.  Hence, 
the process of literary history, as Emerson characterizes it, is a transitional cycle 
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of growth and decay that repeats the individual thinker’s textual consumption 
even as it subsumes it.   
 
Whitman: Nourishing America 
In the essay that dismisses Emerson’s work as mere sugar-and-butter 
confectionery, Whitman frames this disparagement as evidence of his 
indebtedness: “I will begin by scarifying him—thus proving that I am not 
insensible to his deepest lessons” (Poetry and Prose 1076).  “The best part of 
Emersonianism,” he explains, “is that it breeds the giant that destroys itself. . . . 
No teacher ever taught, that has so provided for his pupil’s setting up 
independently—no truer evolutionist” (Poetry and Prose 1079).  If these remarks 
demonstrate Emersonian self-reliance (Bloom, Poetry and Repression 251; Loving 
99), they also enact Emerson’s transitional conception of literary influence in 
“The Over-Soul” (1841): “The great poet makes us feel our own wealth, and then 
we think less of his compositions.  His best communication to our mind is to 
teach us to despise all he has done” (Essays & Poems 396).  By gesturing beyond 
Emerson, despising all he has done, Whitman affirms his precursor’s genius, 
perpetuating a fundamentally Emersonian model of literary history as a 
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transitional cycle—a reworking of the literature of the past to actualize that of the 
future. 
Like Emerson, Whitman uses the cyclical dynamic of nutrient exchange as 
a source domain through which to conceptualize American cultural earliness on 
the individual and collective levels.  But Whitman goes beyond Emerson in 
conceptually blending the domains of digestion and composting in order to 
conceptualize his own contribution to American letters.  Emerson, I have argued, 
uses the digesting mind to conceive of the individual’s relation to the world and 
the metaphor of cultural composting to join individuals within a collective 
economy of ideas.  In addition to using these metaphors, Whitman merges 
digestion and composting into a blended source domain, digestive composting, 
which he applies to individual and collective mental processes.   
Whitman likely considered digestion and composting chemically similar 
and mutually dependent processes.  As Meehan points out, he understands that 
“decomposition is fundamental to the organic composition of life” and that 
materials must be digestively destroyed in order be absorbed by the body; in this 
sense, Whitman treats assimilation as “the body’s own compost-poetics of 
decomposition” (112-13).  Curiously, however, Meehan overlooks the probability 
that Whitman would have found scientific support for his “poetics of digestion” 
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in Justus Liebig’s Chemistry in its Application to Agriculture and Physiology, which 
he reviewed in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle in 1847 (110). 
Whitman extols Liebig’s chemical theory, which treats nature as a 
continuous cycle of material change: “Chemistry! the elevating, beautiful 
study! . . . –that involves the essences of creation, and the changes, and the 
growths, and formations and decays, of so large a constituent part of the earth, 
and the things thereof!” (“Books”).  Liebig, it seems, achieves the sweeping and 
dynamic inclusiveness that Whitman will later claim for Leaves of Grass; if we 
substitute “Poetry!” for “Chemistry!” these remarks might be taken for one of 
Whitman’s self-reviews.  As Mark Noble explains, Liebig showed Whitman “that 
all bodies are moments in a process of transmutation,” which reveals “the pure 
democracy and thus broad possibility that are both inherent in and constitutive 
of nature” (253).12  Hence, Liebigian science lets us literalize some of Whitman’s 
most famous lines: “one can explicitly demonstrate . . . that ‘every atom 
                                                 
12 See also Reynolds, who explains that although many scientists viewed nature as cyclical, 
“Liebig gave the idea validity through the study of transferred compounds.” For Whitman 
Liebig’s work suggested that “[t]here seemed . . . to be an ongoing resurrection and a democratic 
exchange of substances inherent in nature” (240). 
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belonging to me as good belongs to you’—that grass may in fact ‘transpire from 
the breasts of young men’” (Noble 254).13 
Although Whitman confines his remarks to the general material flux of 
Liebigian nature, the chemist himself characterizes this movement as the result of 
many interdependent processes of nutritional exchange, such as absorption, 
assimilation, and putrefaction.  For instance, he explains that digestion 
counteracts decay: “during every moment in the life of an animal, part of its 
structure loses its vitality, and assumes the form of dead matter.  This, after 
suffering certain changes, is finally separated from the system by the organs of 
secretion, namely, the skin, lungs, and kidneys.  The daily loss thus experienced 
is restored by food” (Chemistry 50).  And he describes in detail the minute 
reactions in the soil that transform excreted waste back into nourishment for 
plants and food for animals in turn.  
But Liebig interlinks digestion and decay even more directly in his 
previous volume, Animal Chemistry, where he defines the former as a subspecies 
of the latter: “the digestive process . . . is here reckoned among those chemical 
metamorphoses which have been called fermentation and putrefaction” (114).  
                                                 
13 Noble also argues that Whitman’s “materialist mechanics of subjectivity” (257) was influenced 
by other contemporary scientific works in addition to Liebig, including Alexander von 
Humboldt’s Kosmos, Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, and the 
experiments of Michael Faraday (256). 
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Both are forms of “division into simpler compounds;” the difference, he explains 
in both volumes, is that digestion is driven by vitality, whereas in decay, “vital 
force takes no share” (Animal Chemistry 115).14  Both processes continually take 
place within the body and disease results when the latter gains the upper hand.  
Although no direct evidence suggests that Whitman read the earlier volume, its 
1843 publication in Boston meant that he would have had access to it, and given 
his enthusiasm for its sequel, it’s not unlikely that he would have read it.  In any 
case, because the two volumes consistently link digestion and decay as similar 
and interdependent processes within the nutrient cycle, Chemistry alone would 
have sufficed to familiarize Whitman with this idea.  And given that Whitman 
was probably familiar with Emerson’s first two books of essays by the time of the 
review (Loving 62-65), it seems likely that Liebig’s ideas would have resonated 
with the transitional dynamic of Emersonian nature, grounding it in a scientific 
theory of material transformation.   
But nature’s transitional power works slightly differently in the context of 
Whitman’s metaphysics.  Like Emerson, Whitman believes in the co-presence of 
the metaphysical and the physical.  And he, too, treats nature’s material flux as 
evidence in support of this belief.  Moreover, Whitman likewise finds symbolic 
                                                 
14 See also Chemistry (267-73). 
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value in the lowly, the commonplace, and the seemingly insignificant, which it is 
the poet’s duty to “discorrupt” (Poetry and Prose 250).  But Whitman’s 
metaphysics more closely resembles a traditional dualism of matter and spirit 
(Asselineau 738).  As Carla Billitteri explains, “where Emerson conceives of the 
intellect as a measure of the distance between matter and spirit, Whitman allots it 
the role of articulating their conjunction” (54).  Hence, Emerson negotiates the 
gap between the material and the ideal by relating them through the dynamic of 
transition, which shoots the gulf between them, enabling their momentary co-
presence while preventing any settling of their relations.  As we have seen, the 
Emersonian poet purges the lowly fragment of its grossness in the transitional 
moment when, making it a symbol, his mind shoots the gulfs between material 
and ideal, world and mind, part and whole.  Whitman, in contrast, closes these 
gulfs by treating the material world as inherently saturated with the ideal, such 
that any part of the world symbolizes the ideal whole at any time.  Whitman’s 
ubiquitous catalogs accumulate evidence of metaphysical unity wherever the 
poet finds it.  By listing the prostitute’s “tipsy and pimpled neck” and the 
“malform’d limbs” that “dro[p] horribly” into the surgeon’s pail, Whitman 
discorrupts these things and many others by rendering them symbols in his 
poetry (Poetry and Prose 202, 201).   
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For Whitman, nature’s transitions function as mundane miracles, 
sensuous revelations of a ubiquitous and steady metaphysical unity that exceeds 
rational comprehension.  In the poem “Miracles,” he includes “animals feeding 
in the fields” as well as his own “dinner” in a catalog of miracles that culminates 
in the workings of the soil: “Every square yard of the surface of the earth is 
spread with the same / Every foot of the interior swarms with the same.”  By 
virtue of their very finitude, these pointedly ordinary transitions testify to the 
existence of the supersensible whole through the interaction of its parts.  As 
Whitman puts it, “These with the rest, one and all, are to me miracles, / The 
whole referring, yet each distinct and in its place” (Poetry and Prose 513-14).  In 
this sense, Whitman treats the structure of organic relation as inherently 
miraculous and symbolic. 
For example, in “Democratic Vistas,” he characterizes American 
democracy as an organic whole with a miraculous power to shape itself by 
digestively composting its individual members.  He writes, “as, by virtue of its 
kosmical, antiseptic power, Nature’s stomach is fully strong enough not only to 
digest the morbific matter always presented, not to be turn’d aside . . . .—but 
even to change such contributions into nutriment for highest use and life—so 
American democracy’s” (Poetry and Prose 973).  As shown in Figure 3, this simile 
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blends three input spaces: digestion, composting, and American democracy, each 
of which is structured by the generic space of a whole that extracts value from its 
parts.  First, Whitman uses digestion and composting to set up the metaphor of 
the soil as “Nature’s stomach,” as shown in blended space 1.  The “stomach” is 
projected from the source domain of digestion, the “antiseptic power” and 
“morbific matter” from the target domain of composting, and the “nutriment” 
and “life” from both domains at once.  Then Whitman uses this metaphorical 
blend of digestive composting as the source domain for the simile, as shown in 
blended space 2.  And by running the blend, we can fill in the mappings that it 
implies.  Individuals are compared to “morbific matter,” democratic process 
becomes the “antiseptic power” of digestion, and American culture as “life” 
becomes vital power. 
  
223 
 
Figure 3: American Democracy as “Nature’s Stomach” 
 
This complex blend represents democracy as an organic system of 
nutrient exchange between the social whole and its individual members.  As the 
digestive composting of “Nature’s stomach,” allows life to transcend the material 
limitations of any mortal organism by liberating nutrients for new organisms in 
perpetuity, so too democracy feeds a vital national character that transcends any 
of the individual characters that make it up.  Democracy’s “antiseptic power,” 
like that of the soil, inheres in its transitional agency—its ability to transmute 
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unwholesome, septic matter into wholesome nutriment.  Even society’s most 
abject members, for Whitman, contribute to the democratic whole.   
Like any other citizen, the poet contributes nourishment to America’s 
collective cultural soil, helping to shape the emerging national character from 
within.  But his imagination also replicates democracy’s “kosmical antiseptic 
power” on an individual level, as it performs the sanitizing and unifying work of 
the Emersonian poet.  When Whitman makes the prostitute and “the venerealee” 
into symbolic everyman-figures, as in “Song of Myself,” he purges these wasted 
individuals of their grossness, enacting within his imagination one of the myriad 
transitions that power democracy’s digestive inclusiveness (Poetry and Prose 205). 
In keeping with the “Nature’s stomach” metaphor, Whitman conceives of 
his individual contribution to American culture in terms of nutritional exchange, 
whether it’s through metaphorical digestion, composting, or a blend of the two.  
Often, he uses the familiar mappings of THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, as in 
“Song of Myself,” when he combines THE TEXT IS FOOD with COMMUNICATING 
IDEAS IS SERVING FOOD (Table 1, mappings (c) and (h), respectively).  Leaves of 
Grass becomes “the meal equally set, . . . the meat for natural hunger,” as the poet, 
Christ-like, feeds the American multitude with his inclusive poetry of 
democracy: “I will not have a single person slighted or left away” (emphasis 
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added, Poetry and Prose 205).  Elsewhere, he nourishes the national character less 
directly, through a more diffuse and longer-term cultural influence represented 
as the feeding of an infant nation.  In the preface to the first edition of Leaves, he 
famously claims that the “proof” of a poet’s merit “is that his country absorbs 
him as affectionately as he has absorbed it.”  Then, amplifying the alimentary 
connotations of “absorbs,” he claims that we can assess a poem’s merit by asking, 
“Is it for the nursing of the young of the republic?  Does it solve readily with the 
sweet milk of the nipples of the breasts of the mother of many children?” (Poetry 
and Prose 26).  Whether we take the mother as an exemplary individual who, 
having read and mentally digested Leaves, passes its wisdom to her children, or 
as a personification of America as the mother country who, having assimilated 
Leaves, disperses its wisdom through culture as metaphorical breast milk, the 
thrust of the rhetorical question is the same: Leaves will enable Whitman’s 
assimilation by his growing nation. 
Twenty years later, as the poet contemplates his failing health while he 
pens the preface to his 1876 edition, he recasts the metaphor of influence-as-
assimilation in terms of cultural composting, folding death and decomposition 
into the cycle of nutrient exchange in order to envision his personal lateness as a 
perpetuation of America’s cultural earliness.  In keeping with his famous poetry-
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as-grass metaphor, which unifies his sprawling oeuvre, both as its title and as one 
of its recurrent images, Whitman describes his present edition as a product of his 
mental composting of earlier editions, which make up “the deep soil, or basis out 
of which only, could come the roots and stems more definitely indicated by these 
later pages” (Poetry and Prose 1032).  Although they remain as yet immature, 
Whitman gathers his roots and stems while he may.  Still suffering the effects of 
his paralytic stroke in 1873 and mourning the death of his mother the same year, 
he is acutely aware of his own mortality and unaware that he will live another 
sixteen years and publish three more editions of Leaves.15 
At the eleventh hour, under grave illness, I gather up the pieces of prose 
and poetry left over since publishing my first and main volume, ‘Leaves of 
Grass’—pieces, here, some new, some old—nearly all of them (sombre 
[sic] as many are, making this almost death’s book) composed in bygone 
atmosphere of perfect health . . . .   (Poetry and Prose 1029) 
Recognizing, like Emerson, the value of leftovers and remains, Whitman collects 
his fragments into “the present melange,” a textual compost heap of sorts (Poetry 
and Prose 1029). 
                                                 
15 This figure includes the two subsequent American editions of Leaves, in 1871-72 and 1881-82, 
plus the 1891-92 reprinting of the 1880s edition with annexes, which is commonly referred to as 
the “deathbed edition.” 
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This “death’s book,” he claims, will nourish America’s juvenile character: 
“I bequeath poems and essays as nutriment and influences to help truly 
assimilate . . . and especially to furnish something toward what the States need 
most of all, and which seems to me yet quite unsupplied in literature, namely, to 
show them, or begin to show them, themselves distinctively” (emphasis added, 
Poetry and Prose 1033-34).  Like the first edition of Leaves, this one offers “chyle” 
for America’s collective imagination, but now the language of digestion becomes 
imbricated with that of the earth and of decay as the poet “bequeath[s]” his 
textual legacy under “grave” circumstances (Poetry and Prose 1029).  In effect, 
Whitman substitutes, in place of the familiar trope of the text as immortal 
prodigy, a text whose enduring value lies precisely in its mortality—its future 
contribution to an imaginative economy figured as nutritional exchange. 
The poet’s impending death both interrupts and continues this cycle, 
marking the moment when composting activity makes the transition from 
Whitman’s personally late imagination to America’s culturally early collective 
imagination.  Had he world enough and time, he claims, he would create 
a further equally needed volume, based on those convictions of perpetuity 
and conservation. . . . estimating death not at all as the cessation, but as 
somehow what I feel it must be, the entrance upon by far the greatest part 
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of existence. . . . But the full construction of such a work is beyond my 
powers, and must remain for some bard in the future.   (Poetry and Prose 
1030) 
Such a volume would have reworked the latest Leaves by absorbing it into a 
corpus that, reconciling life and death, would have represented an ideal organic 
whole.  In addition to presenting Leaves as a collection of reworked fragments, 
then, the1876 preface frames the whole volume as itself a fragment—one half of a 
lifelong project.  Thus, Whitman places Leaves on the shelf reserved for fragments 
of unrealized masterpieces, alongside Wordsworth’s Recluse and Coleridge’s 
Magnum Opus. 
But Whitman’s seeming regret is somewhat disingenuous; he exploits the 
romantic fragment to advance literary history’s next transitional turn.  
Romanticism’s oft-planned yet never-finished textual wholes testify to the 
unattainability of the ideal organic unity at which they ostensibly aim.  But, as 
Lee Rust Brown demonstrates using examples from Coleridge, their extant 
fragments establish a “kind of contract” with the reader, in which the part stands 
for the whole it both invokes and defers (24).  By “[substituting] historical 
accidents of composition . . . for the unanswered question of how to complete an 
organically unified text,” this contract defers organic unity, rendering it an open 
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question, “the topic, rather than, as New Criticism had it, the automatic attribute 
of a literary text” (Brown 25, 26).  The fragment, as Whitman fully comprehends, 
charges its reader with the task of imagining what the whole might look like and 
how its extant part might contribute to its meaning.  In “Democratic Vistas,” he 
calls for a new American theory of literature that promotes active, “athletic 
minds” by treating all works as fragments: “the text furnishing the hints, the 
clue, the start or frame-work.  Not the book needs so much to be the complete 
thing, but the reader of the book does” (Poetry and Prose 1017).  If the 1876 Leaves 
remains incomplete, so much the better. 
Substituting the “historical accident” of failing health for the 
materialization of his second volume, Whitman shifts the task of imaginative 
composting to his readers, including the “bard in the future.”  As he prepares to 
consign his body to the earth, where its decomposition will yield nutrients for 
new life, he likewise consigns his work to the literary past, that cultural 
composting might furnish “nutriment” and “chyle” for future minds.  In this 
sense, death marks an Emersonian transition from the individual to the 
collective—the moment when Whitman’s corpus—his body and his body of 
work—becomes fully available to nourish others.  By deferring his revelation 
that death is a beginning rather than an end, Whitman’s digestive compost 
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imagery realizes the organic unity of life and death more fully than any 
completed text might have done, allowing it to remain open-ended and 
contingent upon the moment of our reading.   
If the “proof” of the poet’s merit “is that his country absorbs him as 
affectionately as he has absorbed it,” this absorption signals not simply 
institutional preservation in libraries or anthologies, nor even permanent 
retention within the nation’s cultural memory, but the dissolution and dispersal 
of the ideas from these works throughout a dynamic and forward-moving 
transitional system of ideational exchange.  Whitman would influence Americans 
in perpetuity—even those who never read his work firsthand—as his ideas are 
taken up and reworked by myriad other imaginations.  In this way, Whitman 
would contribute to the growth of America’s national character as, in keeping 
with Coleridge’s definition of organic form, it “shapes, as it developes itself from 
within”— not by prescribing its ultimate form, but by nourishing its organic self-
determination.  
If this conception of literary influence as a figurative nutritional exchange 
depends upon a temporal cycle of transition, Whitman’s 1882 remarks on 
Emerson’s death acknowledge his predecessor’s influence on this point.  
Whitman credits Emerson with a contribution to America’s cultural compost that 
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closely resembles that which he has prematurely anticipated for himself in the 
1876 preface.  By referring to the “ripened grandeur of that event,” he compares 
the philosopher’s death to the falling of a fruit—the return of its nutrients to the 
soil.  And he casts Emerson’s passing, like his own, as a passing on: “We can say, 
as Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, It is not we who come to consecrate the 
dead—we reverently come to receive, if so it may be, some consecration to 
ourselves and daily work from him” (Poetry and Prose 946).  In language that 
vaguely suggests Communion, Emerson’s death consecrates us because we 
“receive,” or take into ourselves, his work—both in the sense that we read his 
texts and in that we continue their project.  Furthermore, Whitman invokes the 
soil imagery that lends the Gettysburg Address much of its power:  
We are met on a great battle-field of that war . . . . to dedicate a portion of 
that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that 
that nation might live. . . . But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we 
can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground.  The brave men, 
living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our 
poor power to add or detract. . . . It is for us the living, rather, to be 
dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have 
thus far so nobly advanced.   (Lincoln 536) 
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For Lincoln, the soil figures the site of contact and exchange between the dead 
and the living, the past and the future.  So too, does Emerson’s grave for 
Whitman—even more so as Emerson’s contribution to America’s cultural 
compost belatedly prefigures his own, mirroring the future passing that 
Whitman has imagined for himself in the 1876 preface.  As if, surprised to find 
himself still alive, Whitman slips Emerson’s corpus into the figurative grave he 
has prepared for his own. 
 
“What Chemistry!”: Whitman’s Sublime Compost 
 Although Whitman’s digestive compost metaphor appears throughout his 
poetry and prose, it finds its most explicit and elaborate expression in “This 
Compost,” when the poet refuses a Wordsworthian return to nature out of his 
abject fear of that the earth as an infinite digesting power.  Most scholars of 
Whitman overlook this poem altogether or marginalize it as the poor cousin of a 
supposedly richer poem on the theme of decay.16  Among the few who have dug 
                                                 
16 For example Michael Moon reads “This Compost” as evidence of an oedipal “infantilization” 
and a “childlike naiveté” that mediate life and death “by a simple process of organic renewal” 
(137). For him, the poem is useful only to contrast with Whitman’s more successful treatment of 
textual decomposition in “As I Ebb’d with the Ocean of Life” (137). Even Noble, who insightfully 
reads Whitman’s dynamic model of subjectivity as an adaptation of Liebig’s chemistry, considers 
“This Compost” only in passing, as a simple “fantasy of a subject made immortal by virtue of its 
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beneath the surface of “This Compost,” Ed Folsom argues compellingly that the 
chemical process of composting represents Whitman’s organic models of 
language and poetic composition (Whitman’s Native Representations 15-20).  David 
Reynolds and Harold Aspiz each recognize the Liebigian underpinnings of 
Whitman’s representation of soil chemistry.17  And given the poem’s treatment of 
organic growth and decay, “This Compost” has not surprisingly begun to 
interest scholars of ecopoetics and green romanticism.  For instance, Jimmie 
Killingsworth calls it “perhaps the most remarkable nineteenth-century 
contribution to the poetry of ecology in America” (19).18  Based on the speaker’s 
alternating identification with and alienation from the earth, he concludes that 
Whitman anticipates the lesson of twentieth-century environmental activism by 
“keeping the personifying impulse in check . . . by refus[ing] to allow the human 
imagination to fully possess the earth and reduce it to a mere reflection of self-
                                                                                                                                                 
transformation into grass,” before turning his attention to the supposedly richer dynamics of 
“Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” and “As I Ebb’d” (256). 
17 Reynolds traces the earth’s power to dissolve infectious matter to Liebig’s claim that contagious 
matter is neutralized by absorption in the soil (240-41). Aspiz likewise notes the poem’s themes of 
renewal and resurrection, situating them in the scientific contexts of Liebigian chemistry and the 
nineteenth-century theory that infectious diseases were spread by miasma (Walt Whitman 63-4; So 
Long! 98-102). See also Anthony Marriage, who briefly compares “This Compost” to 
Beaudelaire’s “A Carrion,” observing that both poems use rotting flesh to demonstrate life’s 
dependence on death (149). 
18 In another ecocritical perspective, Maria Farland argues that “This Compost” reflects 
Whitman’s anxiety that rapid urbanization might produce more waste than the earth can handle 
(801). 
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serving desires” (83-4).19  Granted, the earth’s otherness is key to the poem’s 
visceral power, but ultimately, Whitman personifies the earth in a way that 
renders her his digestive double and an image of his own sublime imagination.20  
Moreover, to press Whitman’s nature into the service of a distinctly modern-day 
sociopolitical agenda is to make the mistake that Paul Outka warns against; it is 
“to aspire to rise out of our constructions to an essentialized authority” by 
crediting Whitman with an impossible knowledge of what nature truly, that is, 
objectively and essentially, is (44).   
In what I consider one of the most compelling readings of Whitman’s 
nature imagery to date, Outka uses Whitman to intervene in green criticism’s 
debate over the extent to which nature is a human construct.  Whitman, he 
argues, circumvents this question by treating nature as a liminal, queer space—a 
“free margin”—where human subjectivity interacts with the world in 
exploratory and provisional ways (Whitman quoted by Outka 43).  For example, 
Whitman “understand[s] the grass ecosystematically, as an interconnecting green 
force that joins what is separate, that undoes the rigid human constructions of 
                                                 
19 Christine Gerhardt similarly reads “This Compost” as evidence of Whitman’s “environmental 
humility” (141). By calling attention to the otherness of nature, she claims, Whitman’s opening 
line resists the “inherent mysticism” (140) of the nineteenth-century model of the environment in 
a way that anticipates the rise of ecology “as a serious science” in the 1930s (136). 
20 Likewise Jimmie Killingsworth identifies “This Compost” as “one of the finest instances of the 
Whitmanian sublime,” but he neglects to explain wherein its sublimity lies (22). 
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race and place that brought the nation to civil war” (Outka 47).  Indeed, 
whenever Whitman mentions grass, we cannot be wholly sure whether he refers 
to actual plants, the organic vitality of his imagination or of nature, his poems, a 
democratic polity, or even humanity in general.  Instead, we usually discover an 
indeterminate complex of such meanings that, because it shifts with our own 
changing perspectives and contexts, illuminates the dynamic relations among 
them.  In Emersonian terms, Whitman’s nature, as “free margin,” is a transitional 
realm where meanings continually emerge. 
How surprising, then, that Outka concludes by reading “This Compost” 
much as others do, as a moment when nature is “threatened,” a “nightmare 
vision of the earth refusing our waste” in which Whitman fears mankind on the 
earth’s behalf (54, 56).  The poem itself nowhere suggests that nature is 
threatened by a surplus of human waste.  Instead, the Whitman persona is 
threatened in the sense that he finds himself overwhelmed by the earth’s infinite 
digestive power.  As that which eventually consumes all bodies, the earth 
confronts him with his mortality, inducing an ontological panic.  Eventually, he 
resolves this crisis by exerting his superiority through the experience of the 
Kantian sublime, as a kind of “self-preservation [that] . . . . keeps the humanity in 
person from being degraded” (Kant 121).  Recognizing that the digestive power 
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of his mind equals that of the earth ultimately enables him to treat nature’s 
stomach as a personification of his own digesting mind. 
As a meditation on burial that moves from fear to acceptance of death, 
“This Compost” responds to William Cullen Bryant’s “Thanatopsis” (1817), 
which Whitman admired (Traubel 3: 515).  Bryant’s speaker advises those who 
“grow sick at heart” at the thought of death to take comfort in the knowledge 
that “not to thine eternal resting-place / Shalt thou retire alone” (13, 31-32).  All 
men return to the same soil:  
. . . . Earth, that nourished thee, shall claim 
Thy growth, to be resolved to earth again, 
And, lost each human trace, surrendering up 
Thine individual being, shalt thou go 
To mix for ever with the elements,   (22-26)  
At the opening of “This Compost,” Whitman finds himself sick at heart, like 
Bryant’s addressee, as well as sick to his stomach at the thought of death.  But the 
dissolution that comforts Bryant terrifies Whitman: 
O how can it be that the ground itself does not sicken?  
How can you be alive you growths of spring? 
How can you furnish health you blood of herbs, roots, orchards, grain? 
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Are they not continually putting distemper’d corpses within you? 
Is not every continent worked over with sour dead?   (Poetry and Prose 495) 
Whitman cannot conceive of a power great enough to digest a world’s worth of 
“sour dead,” and yet, the earth’s fresh produce suggests that nature’s stomach is 
such a power.  What frightens Whitman is not so much the thought “that there 
may be a limit to the number of bodies that can be put into the ground” (Farland 
799), but on the contrary, the thought that such a limit might not exist—that the 
earth will actually digest all of mankind, including himself.  It is his capacity, not 
the earth’s that is exceeded.  And because the earth does not “sicken,” he does. 
Unable mentally to master the earth, Whitman is mastered by it instead, 
experiencing what Jed Rasula calls a “fluid terror of Being” (57).  The earth 
becomes, in effect, the Kristevan abject—that which, in confronting the subject 
with its own physical and mental limitations, threatens to dissolve it utterly.  
Accordingly, he recoils in fear and disgust: 
Something startles me where I thought I was safest, 
I withdraw from the still woods I loved, 
I will not strip the clothes from my body to meet my lover the sea, 
I will not touch my flesh to the earth as to other flesh to renew me.  (Poetry 
and Prose 495)  
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Whitman refuses the amorous sea bathing of “Song of Myself” (Farland 800), 
where he invites the waves to “Dash me with amorous wet, I can repay you” 
(Poetry and Prose 208).  Retaining his clothing as a protective barrier, he avoids 
any such intimate exchange of fluids.  And whereas, in “Song of Myself,” 
Whitman celebrates everything including human remains, “As to you Corpse I 
think you are good manure, but that does not offend me” (Poetry and Prose 245), 
here, the thought of decaying bodies poses an immediate psychic threat. 
In order to restore his subjective integrity, the poet tries in various ways 
conceptually to master the earth.  First he looks around for something—
anything—that the earth cannot digest, for such evidence would, by proving the 
finitude of nature’s stomach, render it comprehensible and therefore safe.  
“Where have you disposed of their carcasses?,” he demands, “Those drunkards 
and gluttons of so many generations?”  Surely, he implies, if there were anything 
the soil could not consume, it the corpses that housed the most capacious human 
appetites; to swallow a glut of gluttons must surely glut (Poetry and Prose 495).  
But finding no telltale leftovers, Whitman switches tactics, now accusing the 
earth, his “lover,” of deceit:  
Where have you drawn off all the foul liquid and meat? 
I do not see any of it upon you to-day, or perhaps I am deciev’d, 
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I will run a furrow with my plow, I will press my spade through the sod 
and turn it up underneath, 
I am sure I shall expose some of the foul meat.   (Poetry and Prose 495) 
Whitman interrogates the voiceless, feminine earth, threatening to tear her open 
with his phallic tools to expose her contents.  This desire for mastery by physical 
force suggests rape.  But the demand for empirical proof also suggests 
vivisection; Whitman would “murder to dissect” the earth (Wordsworth, Lyrical 
149).  With these violent lines, the poem’s first numbered section comes abruptly 
to an end, as if the poet hurries away to fetch a spade.  Indeed, the space 
preceding the second section invites us to envision a half-crazed Whitman 
desperately tearing up his beloved grass to uncover her dirty secrets.   
But by the beginning of the next stanza, Whitman’s attitude has changed 
from skepticism to belief in the earth’s digestive powers.  Evidently, he has taken 
a leap of faith by treating vegetable growth as one of nature’s mundane miracles, 
palpable proof of a vital power that exceeds his comprehension:21 
Behold this compost! behold it well! 
Perhaps every mite has once form’d part of a sick person—yet behold! 
                                                 
21 See also Aspiz, who claims that, in these lines, Whitman “perceives the earth’s cyclic 
regeneration and renewal as symbols of the miracle of existence and the deathlessness of the 
human spirit” (So Long! 99). 
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The grass of spring covers the prairies, 
The bean bursts noiselessly through the mould in the garden,  
The delicate spear of the onion pierces upward, 
The apple-buds cluster together on the apple branches, 
The resurrection of the wheat appears with pale visage out of its graves, 
(Poetry and Prose 495-96) 
The material transitions of growth evidence the complete digestion of the earth’s 
foul repast.  And because Whitman’s catalog starts with diseased bodies and 
ends with an array of edible plants, it folds mankind into the nutrient cycle and 
into the metaphysical vitality that it enacts.  The bean bursts “through” the mold 
not only in the sense that the soil’s surface provides the temporal and spatial 
threshold between past and future organisms, but also in the sense that the soil 
functions as the enabling means “through” which human bodies are moldered 
that the bean may grow, and so, feed new human bodies.  Believing in the 
mundane miracle of nature’s stomach lets Whitman overcome his Kristevan 
panic by acknowledging the limitations of his rational mind even as he intuits 
that which lies beyond its reach.  In effect, Whitman experiences his organic 
relation to nature as a miracle.  His limitations—mortality and 
incomprehension—come to signify the infinite wholes that exceed them—the 
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eternal continuity of the life cycle and the boundless digestive capacity of the soil 
that underpins it.  In this way, Whitman’s leap of faith works like Kant’s sublime, 
that which “even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing 
any standard of sense” (Kant 111).  Confronted by the earth’s unthinkable power, 
the poet’s mind rises to meet this challenge by thinking beyond rational 
comprehension.   
 However temporally and spatially distant his readers may be, Whitman 
folds us into his imagined unity by aligning our experience with his own 
through deictic language that enacts the transitional temporality of the present.  
His catalog of active, present-tense verbs creates what John Lynen aptly 
identifies as Whitman’s characteristic “effect of presentness” (322), in which, 
[T]he poet’s now and the reader’s must unite, . . . . not as the same time 
but as the same experience in the same world, a world whose historical 
phases are different, so the times are distinct, yet a world which is always 
realizing the same meaning, so that each present contains the other.   (323) 
Apple blossoms “cluster” and onions “pierce upward” now as their forebears 
did in 1856.  The imperative, “Behold!,” speaks directly and particularly to us 
even as the phrase, “this compost,” points to the soil under our boot soles as the 
material basis of our shared experience.  The plants that we eat today grow out of 
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the same stuff as those that Whitman ate—and for that matter, our bodies are 
made of the same stuff as his.  In this way, Whitman renders present for us the 
proof that lets him believe in the earth’s infinite digestive power.   
In addition to restoring the poet’s ontological integrity, belief in the 
miracle of nature’s stomach assuages his fear of death because its perpetual 
vitality metaphorically represents the immortality of the soul.  “This Compost” 
recalls 1 Corinthians 15 (Aspiz, Walt Whitman 64; So Long! 99-100), where St. Paul 
uses the germination of wheat as an analogy to illustrate Christian Resurrection 
to skeptics. 
Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: 
And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but 
bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: 
But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own 
body. 
. . .  
So also is the resurrection of the dead.  It is sown in corruption; it is raised 
in incorruption: 
. . . 
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It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body.  There is a natural 
body, and there is a spiritual body.  (King James, 1 Cor. 15. 36-44) 
According to Paul, the mortal “natural body” gives rise to the immortal 
“spiritual body” by dying, as a seed gives rise to a plant by ceasing to be a seed.  
Death “quickens” new life on both the material and spiritual levels.  And because 
a corpse is buried—much like a seed—the source and target find their common 
ground in the soil, wherein both are transformed.  When Whitman mentions the 
“resurrection of the wheat . . . with pale visage out of its graves,” he alludes to 
this passage and to the Resurrection that it illustrates.  As a result, the wheat 
functions both as an instance of nature’s perpetual vitality and as an implicit 
metaphor for the soul’s immortality.   
In keeping with this biblical imagery, Whitman uses the “antiseptic 
power” of nature’s stomach as a metaphor for Christian redemption.22  The earth 
exercises a salvific power that undoes Whitman’s former violence.  When “the 
delicate spear of the onion pierces upward,” its tender green phallus reverses the 
downward penetration of his plow and spade.  Despite its figurative rape, the 
earth remains inviolable; it “turns harmless and stainless on its axis” and “all is 
                                                 
22 Aspiz similarly notes, in connection with this poem, that “Composting can . . . symbolize the 
process of purifying the soul from corruption” (So Long! 101). But he neglects to explain how 
Whitman’s compost imagery suggests this kind of redemption. 
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clean forever and forever,” including Whitman, whose guilt is absolved by 
acceptance of this fact.  The earth’s Christ-like power of forgiveness, lets “[t]he 
summer growth” remain “innocent and disdainful” of any human corruption 
(Poetry and Prose 496). 
Once he recognizes the soil’s sanitizing powers to dissolve material 
corruption and, metaphorically, to absolve spiritual corruption, Whitman 
welcomes renewed intimacy with nature.  In a veritable paean to Liebigian flux, 
he exclaims, 
What chemistry! 
That the winds are really not infectious, 
That this is no cheat, this transparent green-wash of the sea which is so 
amorous after me, 
That it is safe to allow it to lick my naked body all over with its tongues, 
That it will not endanger me with the fevers that have deposited 
themselves in it, 
That all is clean forever and forever,   (Poetry and Prose 496) 
No longer guilty or afraid, the poet readies himself for Communion with the 
earth, in which he allows the mouth-like sea to engulf his body even as he savors 
the earth’s produce.  He marvels that “blackberries are so flavorous and juicy, / 
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That the fruits of the apple-orchard and the orange-orchard, that melons, grapes, 
peaches, plums, will none of them poison me.”  The “fevers” and “catching 
disease” that sparked his initial panic remain in the forefront of his mind as he 
eats, but they no longer disgust him because he has mentally mastered the 
earth’s infinite power (Poetry and Prose 496).  This exuberant confidence suggests 
that in addition to enjoying the earth’s produce, Whitman enjoys the “negative 
pleasure” of the Kantian sublime, in which the mind discovers that it is, after all, 
“a match for nature’s seeming omnipotence” (98, 120).  The earth is no longer a 
threat, but a lover and an equal.  
But the poet soon finds this confidence tempered.  Because the negative 
pleasure of the sublime depends upon “a feeling of displeasure that arises from 
the imagination’s inadequacy,” it results in a continuous mental agitation, “a 
rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one and the same object 
(Kant 114, 115).  In the concluding lines, the fear of the earth returns, now 
tempered with reverential awe:  
Now I am terrified at the Earth, it is that calm and patient, 
It grows such sweet things out of such corruptions, 
It turns harmless and stainless on its axis, with such endless successions of 
diseas’ed corpses, 
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It distills such exquisite winds out of such fetor, 
It renews with such unwitting looks its prodigal, annual, sumptuous 
crops, 
It gives such divine materials to men, and accepts such leavings from 
them at last.   (Poetry and Prose 496-97) 
Having confirmed his worst fear, that nature’s stomach has no limit, Whitman 
realizes mankind’s comparative insignificance.  These lines reduce all human 
activity to a temporary transformation of the earth’s rich produce into its own 
excremental “leavings:” filth, garbage, and corpses.  In effect, mankind rather 
than the earth turns out to be the poem’s abject digestive power, the inferior 
opposite of the soil, which calmly and patiently swallows our waste ad infinitum.  
As Folsom notes, the deictic “such leavings” exemplifies Whitman’s penchant for 
self-referential puns on leaves of grass (Whitman’s Native Representations 15).  But 
in the context of the poem’s imagery of abject waste, the phrase acquires an 
excremental valence that identifies “This Compost” and Leaves of Grass as a 
whole as another human residue: a product of Whitman’s digesting mind.  
Insofar as the earth functions as another metaphor for literary history as cultural 
composting, the vast transitional process that will absorb Whitman’s poetic 
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corpus, “This Compost” reveals a residual psychic discomfort that attends the 
poet’s ambition to nourish American culture. 
 Although the poem ends by deprecating human activity including 
Whitman’s work, its various parallels between the poet and the earth invite a 
second reading in which the relations of power are inverted even as they 
continue to operate in their more straightforward senses.  In this way, the poem’s 
digestive and compost imagery acquires an ironic double valence.  For example, 
the following catalog creates two antithetical effects at once: 
What Chemistry! 
. . .  
That the cool drink from the well tastes so good, 
That the blackberries are so flavorous and juicy, 
That the fruits of the apple-orchard and the orange-orchard, that melons, 
grapes, peaches, plums, will none of them poison me,   (Poetry and 
Prose 496) 
As a list of produce, on one hand, this catalog provides a cornucopia of evidence 
of the earth’s transformative power.  But on the other hand, it casts the Whitman 
persona as a bottomless pit—an all-consuming and all-digesting stomach.  If a 
melon or a plum could see, it might tremble at this gigantic maw leaning and 
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loafing at its ease, swallowing every fruit in sight, just as Whitman trembled at 
the poem’s outset.  In this sense, the poet embodies a transitional power that is 
equal and opposite to that of the earth. 
Likewise, the earth’s sublime digestive power becomes a metaphor for the 
poet’s mind.  By titling his work “This Compost,” Whitman deictically points to 
the poem itself, comparing it to the nutrient-rich loam produced in nature’s 
stomach.  And if, as Aspiz notes, “composting can imply the poet’s gift of 
transforming the most common and repulsive matter into the stuff of inspired 
poetry” (So Long! 101), the poem’s subject matter demonstrates this point as 
Whitman’s Emersonian imagination renders rotting bodies poetic, “purg[ing] 
their grossness.”  In the antiseptic power of nature’s stomach, the poet recognizes 
the mirror image of his mind.  As Kant explains, we judge nature sublime 
“because it calls forth our strength” such that “. . . . the mind can come to feel its 
own sublimity”(121).  Accordingly, when Whitman proclaims, “Now I am 
terrified at the Earth, it is that calm and patient, / It grows such sweet things out 
of such corruptions,” he marvels as much at himself as at the earth.   
Like Wordsworth, whose climactic vision atop Mount Snowdon reveals 
“The perfect image of a mighty mind, / . . . that feeds upon infinity,” Whitman 
experiences his own imagination’s power through an encounter with nature that 
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reflects his own mind as an infinite digestive capacity.  Although we lack 
conclusive proof that Whitman read the Prelude, this similarity is one of many 
echoes in Leaves that suggest that he probably did.23  In “This Compost,” as in the 
Snowdon scene, the analogy between mind and nature hinges on their shared 
similarity to the digestive system as a permeable and transformative boundary—
a liminal mediator of self and other.  But whereas Wordsworth’s mind, having 
achieved an apocalyptic power by carefully regulating its diet, can swallow 
infinity without worrying about its abject parts, Whitman’s Emersonian 
transitional aesthetic requires his mind to seek nourishment in precisely these 
parts.  Whereas Wordsworth must climb a mountain to raise his mind above the 
mouth-like rift in the clouds, Whitman must look downward, into the bowels of 
the earth.  In effect, Whitman answers Wordsworth’s positive or “egotistical 
sublime” with the negative, Kantian sublime grounded in the finitude of the 
human mind figured as physical mortality.24 
This allusion to the Prelude, as it mixes with St. Paul’s resurrected wheat 
and the chemical dissolution of “Thanatopsis,” reveals Whitman’s composting 
                                                 
23 Many critics have identified echoes of the Prelude in Leaves. See for instance Weisbuch (chapter 
8), Gravil (chapter 8), and Moores (chapter 2). 
24 Thomas Weiskel distinguishes between these two forms of the romantic sublime, aligning what 
Keats famously called Wordsworth’s “egotistical sublime” with the positive sublime and the 
Kantian sublime with its negative counterpart (chapters 1-2). Weiskel uses the Snowdon scene as 
a paradigmatic example of the positive sublime (49-50). 
250 
 
imagination in action, breaking up his literary heritage and recycling its remains 
into “This Compost.”  But because it incorporates fragments of Whitman’s 
former work as well, the poem anticipates the composition-as-composting 
metaphor in the 1876 preface.  For example the catalog of plants includes “the 
grass of spring,” which alludes to the poet’s perennial revisions of Leaves of Grass, 
and “the lilacs bloom[ing] in the dooryards,” which recall his elegy for Lincoln 
(Poetry and Prose 496).  First transplanted to “This Compost” in the 1871-72 of 
Leaves, six years after the publication of “When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard 
Bloom’d,” the flowers evoke in their new context the connotations that they 
acquired in the old.  At the beginning of the elegy, the reappearance of the lilac in 
spring represents the renewal of grief, a cycle that is never quite complete.  But as 
Whitman contemplates the pivotal role of death in the renewal of life, the flower 
comes also to represent the mind’s power to heal itself through the imaginative 
work of elegy.  In “This Compost,” the contemplation of organic renewal, 
exemplified by the lilac, similarly enables the psychic transition from distress to 
acceptance.  But as a proof of the soil’s digestive power that also invokes the 
mind’s power to renew itself through elegy, it further aligns the poet’s mind with 
nature’s stomach.  
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Whitman sees himself in the soil in several senses, in each case using 
nature’s transitions to conceptualize the copresence of the physical and the 
metaphysical, the finite and the infinite.  As that which will eventually digest his 
body, the earth reflects his mortality, confronting him with his personal finitude 
even as it reveals his participation in the flux of vital power.  Similarly, as a 
metaphor of ideation-as-nutritional exchange, the earth’s digestive composting 
mirrors Whitman’s individual creative process and the collective process of 
American culture that nourishes it and to which it will contribute in turn.   
Like Emerson, Whitman folds the digesting mind into the broader 
metaphor of culture as nutrient exchange by using composting to complete the 
material cycle of the source domain.  Like Wordsworth and Coleridge, Whitman 
and Emerson often link readers, writers, and texts through mappings of the 
digesting mind such as READING IS EATING and THE TEXT IS FOOD.  But by 
completing the nutritional cycle by routing it through the soil, they conceptualize 
American literary history as a perpetual fresh start in which the remains of the 
past lie at the disposal of the present writer who nourishes future minds.  In the 
next chapter, this future-oriented transitional temporality informs William Carlos 
William’s use of the digesting mind in the service of his pragmatic revision of 
Coleridge’s organic form. 
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5. Of Poems as Plums: The Organic Experience of Williams’s “Machine Made 
of Words”  
 
In his 1944 introduction to The Wedge, William Carlos Williams famously 
makes “two bald statements”: “There’s nothing sentimental about a machine.  
And: A poem is a small (or large) machine made of words.”  “I mean,” he 
explains, “that there can be no part, as in any other machine, that is redundant” 
(Selected Essays 256).  In adapting the efficiency and speed of twentieth-century 
technology to artistic form, Williams endorses an aesthetics of the machine that, 
in many ways, seems diametrically opposed to romantic organicism.1  As Cecilia 
Tichi explains, “the machine world of gears and girders displaced the dominant 
Romantic view of a holistic, spiritual world of vegetative and bodily being.”  To 
support this claim, she points out that Williams’s machine made of words stands 
in marked contrast to Thoreau’s claim that poetry is the “natural fruit” of 
mankind (xiii).  However, Tichi overlooks poems like “This is Just to Say,” in 
which Williams figures his poetry as fruit.  The poem, as Williams recalled in a 
1950 interview, originated as “a passing gesture” that “actually took place just as 
it says.”  While his wife Flossie was out of the house one day, he “raid[ed]” the 
                                                 
1 See, for example Tichi (chapters 1 and 5), Steinman (chapter 4), and Sayre (“American” 313-37). 
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icebox and consumed her whole supply of plums.  Then “feel[ing] a little sorry,” 
he left her the following note (Wallace 140-41): 
“This is Just to Say” 
I have eaten  
the plums  
that were in the icebox  
 
and which you were probably 
saving 
for breakfast  
 
Forgive me 
they were delicious 
so sweet and so cold  (Collected Poems 1: 372) 
Williams’s placement of the note in or near the space formerly occupied by the 
plums implicitly compares the two.  Here and in many other poems such as “To 
a Poor Old Woman” and “The Dish of Fruit,” Williams participates not only in 
the romantic organic tradition of representing the text as a plant, but also in the 
tradition of the digesting mind, in which the text becomes mental food.  For 
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Williams, as for Coleridge, Wordsworth, Emerson, and Whitman “poetry feeds 
the imagination” (Collected Poems 1: 231).   
Although Tichi acknowledges Williams’s penchant for mixing organic and 
mechanical images, “join[ing] trees, animals, and engines together because 
he . . . . sees them as categorical equals” (17), she sidesteps Williams’s frequent 
mixing of mechanical and organic metaphors for poetry, which would seem to be 
crucial to any discussion of his aesthetics.  For example, in a 1937 article for the 
Columbia Review, Williams writes, “Think of the poem as an object, an apple that 
is red and good to eat—or a plum that is blue and sour—or better yet, a machine 
for making bolts” (quoted Dijkstra, “Introduction” 1).  Although mechanism 
wins out here, elsewhere it coexists with organicism, as when, immediately 
following his claim that the poem is a “machine made of words,” Williams 
writes, “Prose may carry a load of ill-defined matter like a ship.  But poetry is the 
machine which drives it, pruned to a perfect economy” (emphasis added, Selected 
Essays 256).  In general, we “prune” not engines, but plants.  For Williams, the 
hallmark of art is an organic vitality that arises from its man-made form: “When 
a man makes a poem . . . . [i]t isn’t what he says that counts as a work of art, it’s 
what he makes, with such intensity of perception that it lives with an intrinsic 
movement of its own to verify its authenticity” (Williams’s emphasis).  Similarly, 
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Williams explains, “it is in their intimate form that works of art achieve their 
exact meaning, in which they most resemble the machine, to give language its 
highest dignity, its illumination in the environment to which it is native.  Such 
war, as the arts live and breathe by, is continuous” (Selected Essays 257).  For 
Williams, a work of art is an engineered machine that somehow manages to “live 
and breathe” as an organic part of its environment.   
But how can a machine made of words live and breathe?  And can 
Williams’s poetics be simultaneously mechanical and organic without 
contradicting itself?  To date, these questions remain unanswered.  Critics who 
consider Williams’s aesthetics as either organic or mechanical have tended to 
explain away one set of metaphors or the other, thus underestimating the 
sophistication of Williams’s simultaneous engagement with the these two 
analogues.2  Those who have recognized the mechanical and organic dimensions 
                                                 
2 For example, Breslin, Markos, and Beyers dismiss Williams’s mechanical metaphors in order to 
treat him as an organicist. According to Breslin, Williams attempts to capture a “movement . . . 
that is an organic extension of immediate experience,” but he “uses the machine metaphor to 
suggest the clean efficiency . . . with which this physical thrust must be rendered” (41-42). Markos 
claims that “Paradoxically, Williams uses a machine metaphor to say something about organic 
form, namely that all parts of the poem are essential to its existence” (120). Beyers argues that 
Williams’s organicism incorporates mechanism because his “poetic is one long testament to 
ardent organic faith . . . . that the artist's creativity partakes of Creation" (182). Conversely, 
Janowitz and Sayre treat Williams as a mechanist plagued by the lure of organicism. For 
Janowitz, Williams is “nostalgically drawn” to romanticism’s “organic metaphor” (312). Sayre 
argues that as Williams matured, his poetic form became less organic and more mechanical, but 
that “the times were so prejudiced in favor of an organic theory that Williams tended to believe 
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of Williams’s aesthetic have yet to articulate fully the relationship between the 
two.3  In the most thorough of these attempts, Stephen Tapscott argues that 
Williams modernizes romantic organicism, associated with an effeminate, free-
flowing formlessness, by imposing a masculine, mechanical structure on top of it.  
Thus Williams “combines . . . organic formal process with a modernist, objective, 
self-consciously mechanical form” (Tapscott 169).  In Paterson, Tapscott argues, 
Williams allows his content to develop organically, but then imposes several 
mechanical formal structures, such as the human lifespan, the course of the 
Passaic River, and the cycle of the seasons (166-68).4  But Tapscott seems unaware 
                                                                                                                                                 
he had one himself, even when he apparently forsaken it” (Visual 53). In other words, Williams’s 
organic metaphors are symptomatic of self-delusion at worst, or a profound misunderstanding of 
his own aesthetics at best.  
3 Likewise attempting to credit Williams with an aesthetic that is mechanical and organic, Mike 
Weaver reads his Objectivist “machine made of words” as “a poetic application of [Alfred North] 
Whitehead’s theory of organic mechanism” (70). Williams read Whitehead’s Science and the 
Modern World (Weaver 48), which argues, in Weaver’s words, that “the general laws of 
mechanistic science [are] modified according to the organic situation” in which they are located 
(50). Accordingly, Weaver claims, Williams treats the poem as “an abstract design of 
interconnected working parts, where the projective power of verse was derived entirely from the 
organisation of those parts” (70). However, Weaver offers no explanation of how the components 
of Williams’s poems resemble Whitehead’s mechanistic organisms or how these components are 
modified by an organic situation—that which Whitehead refers to as a “the plan of the whole” 
(Whitehead’s emphasis, 79). Given the pragmatic aesthetics outlined in this chapter, it seems 
plausible that Williams would have sympathized with Whitehead’s desire to reconcile 
mechanism and organicism (see Whitehead 76-79) and with his general focus on interactive 
processes rather than material objects and abstract essences. But I see little to suggest that the 
particular elements of Whitehead’s theory of “organic mechanism” contributed to Williams’s 
Objectivist poetry. 
4 Peter Halter makes a similar claim for Williams’s organic and mechanical visual patterning in 
his shorter poems: “in these poems an arbitrary pattern interacts with an organic form in the 
sense of Coleridge, who defined the latter as a form that “shapes, as it develops, itself from 
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that each of these formal structures is based on a very traditional organic 
metaphor.  As a result, the basic tension between mechanism and organicism 
remains largely unexplained.  Without an explanation of Williams’s mixed 
metaphors, his relationships to the aesthetic traditions of romantic organicism 
and modernist mechanism must remain a self-contradiction, or at best, a 
mysterious paradox. 
Reading Williams’s Objectivist poetics through the lens of conceptual 
metaphor theory reveals that rather than contradicting each other, the 
mechanical and organic dimensions of his aesthetics jointly articulate a deeply 
pragmatic and sensuously embodied view of how a reader engages with a poem.  
I focus specifically on Williams’s Objectivist theory because in foregrounding the 
ontological status of the poem as a man-made object, it enables us to distinguish 
the mechanical form of the poem from the reader’s organic interaction with it.  In 
the early- to mid-1930s, Williams explains, he, along with Louis Zukofsky, 
George Oppen, and Charles Reznikoff, “inaugurated . . . the Objectivist theory of 
the poem,” which grew out of Ezra Pound’s Imagism, but had more “formal 
necessity implicit in it” (Autobiography 264):  
                                                                                                                                                 
within’” (184). But Halter does not explain how the mechanical and organic components of form 
“interact.” 
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The poem being an object (like a symphony or cubist painting) it must be 
the purpose of the poet to make of his words a new form: to invent, that is, 
an object consonant with his day.  This was what we wished to imply by 
Objectivism, an antidote, in a sense, to the bare image haphazardly 
presented in loose verse.   (Autobiography 265) 
This definition, insofar as it mixes the mechanical image of invention with the 
organic image of an antidote, begins to reveal Williams’s treatment of art, 
whether poem, symphony or painting, as an organic technology.  Like medicine, 
the doctor-poet suggests, art is a man-made material that produces organic 
effects.   
As a finite, static object—a “rested totality,” as Zukofsky puts it, the 
Objectivist poem appears to have the kind of unity and formal completion that 
has traditionally been attributed to organic form (“Sincerity” 274).  But the 
Objectivists do not, in general, fetishize the poem as an immortal being endowed 
ab extra with self-sustaining vitality.  Instead, they often treat it as a mechanical 
thing.  In the 1931 issue of Poetry, Zukofsky names and defines the movement in 
terms of the mechanical process of photography:5 “Objective: (Optics)-The lens 
                                                 
5 On the comparison of Objectivist poetics to photography, see Monique Vescia’s Depression Glass, 
a study of Objectivism in relation to documentary photography. See also Halter (188) and Kenner 
(166). On the mechanical associations of photography Halter (164-67) and Vescia (18, 39, 101-02).   
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bringing the rays from an object to a focus” (“Program” 268).  Accordingly, the 
mechanical dimension of Williams’s Objectivist poems has been usefully 
discussed through analogy with photography.6   
Objectivist theory also foregrounds the poem’s sensuous availability as a 
material object.  Hence Williams frequently compares his poems to things in 
order to present them as invitations to first-hand experience, which he often, 
especially in his early work, refers to as “contact.”  Although this strategy 
becomes most explicit during his self-proclaimed “Objectivist” phase, it begins to 
emerge in the anti-mimetic Imagiste poetics of his early career and continues to 
inform much of his later work as well.  As a result, the relationship between 
organicism and mechanism that emerges through his Objectivist poems also 
applies to later works including Paterson, whenever he compares a poem to an 
object available to us here and now.  But I do not mean to suggest that Williams 
stalled in the thirties, or to flatten out the useful distinctions that others have 
made among the various phases of his career.  Rather, I would point out that 
Williams’s thought during the Objectivist period, about the materiality of poetry 
and its ontological status as an artifact, continues to inform his thinking about 
the ways in which poets and readers interact with poetry.  
                                                 
6 For example, see Vescia (chapter 4).  
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I have chosen “This is Just to Say” and “To a Poor Old Woman” to 
illustrate the organic dimension of Williams’s poetics because, by comparing 
themselves to fruit, these poems participate in the romantic-organic tradition of 
representing the mind as a digesting body—but with an Objectivist twist.  By 
invoking the inferential structure of the conceptual metaphor, these poems call 
on us to fill in its subordinate mappings, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD and READING IS 
EATING, in ways that extend the metaphor through our own sensuous 
engagement with the poem.  Using formal and rhetorical strategies such as deixis 
and enjambment to call attention to the embodiedness of our reading, Williams 
prompts us to experience reading as an act of consumption that parallels acts of 
eating in the poems.  Whereas conventional expressions of the digesting mind 
usually encourage us to take a conceptual shortcut, bypassing the blended 
mental space in order to map the source directly onto the target, these poems 
encourage us to activate the blended space by making our sensuous experience 
of the poem a third input space.  By letting us experience the embodied basis of 
the mapping READING IS EATING, Williams makes this conventional conceptual 
metaphor feel alive.  These poems, then, locate organic vitality not in poetic form, 
but in our felt experience of reading; they are verbal machines, engineered by 
Williams, that encourage us to make organic contact with them as parts of the 
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world.  As if in response to Emerson’s question in Nature, “Why should we not 
also enjoy an original relation to the universe?,” these poems seem not only to 
respond that indeed we should, but also to demonstrate, in a palpable way, that 
we can (Essays & Poems 7).   
Despite Williams’s infrequent and ambivalent remarks about Emerson, 
scholars have begun to acknowledge the broad range of his debt to the Concord 
Sage.7  But the Emersonian basis of Williams’s organicism emerges most clearly 
when we read his work alongside that of the pragmatic philosopher, John 
Dewey.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Emerson’s organic model of 
selfhood locates the self’s vital power in its perpetual leaping outward, beyond 
its own boundaries, as it engages with the world around it in the cyclical 
temporality of the present.  Following Jonathan Levin, we termed the self’s ideal 
power “transition.”  In Art as Experience, Dewey develops an Emersonian model 
of selfhood into a fully-fledged organic aesthetics by treating the art object as an 
opportunity for the self to experience its vital, transitional power through its 
                                                 
7In addition to the scholars discussed below, who find evidence of Williams’s Emersonianism in 
his pragmatic stance, others have found evidence of a more direct influence. In William Carlos 
Williams and Transcendentalism, Ron Callan argues that Williams’s sense of the dynamic relations 
between subject and object is rooted in Emersonian Transcendentalism (7-10). Ian Copestake’s 
The Ethics of William Carlos Williams’s Poetry argues compellingly that Williams’s Unitarian 
upbringing informs his Emersonian “stance against dogma and . . . embrace of truth’s mutability” 
(88). Copestake’s third chapter also insightfully argues that Williams’s sparse and contradictory 
remarks about Emerson constitute an “enactment of an Emersonian attitude,” in that they reject 
the ideas of the past in order to allow the dynamic thought of the present to unfold (71).  
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engagement with the material world.  Time and again, Dewey demonstrates the 
transitional dynamic of aesthetic experience through analogy with eating; the 
pleasurable transfer of material into the body models the intimate, multi-sensory, 
affective and intellectual engagement with the world that happens during the 
contemplation of art.  Although Williams does not subscribe to a Deweyan 
program, his similar uses of the digesting mind reveal the Emersonian basis of 
his Objectivist aesthetic.  If Dewey pragmatizes organic aesthetics by locating its 
ideals of unity and vitality within the imminent experience of transitional 
selfhood, Williams likewise shifts these ideals inward, from the properties of the 
poem as completed verbal construct to the reader’s imaginative and open-ended 
experience of the poem. 
But Williams departs from Dewey by integrating modernism’s avant-
garde machine aesthetic into his organicism.  In “Fine Work with Pitch and 
Copper” and “A Dish of Fruit,” I will argue, Williams metapoetically compares 
his poems to the mechanical structures of a building and a table.  In addition to 
illustrating Williams’s mechanical theory of form, these poems include food 
imagery that gestures outward, toward the reader’s felt experience.  In effect, 
they demonstrate how, for Williams, the digesting imagination enables the 
organic experience of a mechanical form.   
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A Pragmatist with Emersonian Roots 
Reading Williams as a pragmatist with Emersonian roots clarifies his 
relationship to the romantic tradition of organicism by reconciling the idealist 
and empiricist dimensions of his poetry.  Several scholars have attempted to 
place Williams firmly in one philosophical camp or the other.  In Poets of Reality, 
J. Hillis Miller reads Williams as an empiricist whose refusal of transcendence, or 
“leap into the world” of imminent particulars, “goes beyond” the romantic 
idealist struggle to unify subject and object (7, 1).8  For Williams, he claims, “the 
mind must efface itself before reality” and “[abandon] the will to power over 
things” (Poets 8).  But in a poem like “This is Just to Say” or “To a Poor Old 
Woman,” the focus on material particulars works not to deny but rather to 
explore and even to celebrate the poet’s will to power over things such as plums, 
poems, or even other people.9  Most of Williams’s poems sustain a dynamic 
tension between subject and object from beginning to end. 
                                                 
8 See also Miller’s “Introduction” to William Carlos Williams: a Collection of Critical Essays (1-14). 
9 As James Breslin points out, Miller too quickly dismisses the “tension between subject and 
object,” which provides “the starting point for most of [Williams’s] major work” (23). But the 
same could be said of Breslin, for whom this tension serves as a mere starting point after which 
Williams finds “a way out of romantic subjectivity” by turning “toward a sharp rendering of the 
physical object” (33). 
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Others have addressed Williams’s negotiation of this tension by placing 
him on the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum.10  Donald Markos rightly 
emphasizes the importance of objects in relation to the poet’s subjectivity (25).  
But his claim that Williams believes in the existence, outside the mind, of 
universal platonic forms—nontemporal ideal essences that are “perpetually 
being reembodied in particulars” (Markos 188-89)—flatly contradicts the poet’s 
frequent denials of idealism such as “no ideas but in things” and “I utterly reject 
metaphysics” (quoted Markos 196).  To explain such statements, Markos can 
only conclude that Williams deliberately misrepresents his poetics: he is a “closet 
Platonist” (15), who “all but disguises the spiritual vision at the core of his 
worldview” (27).   
Recognizing Williams as a pragmatist11 lets us account for the empiricist 
and idealist dimensions of his poetry in a way that treats the tension between 
                                                 
10 In addition to Markos, see Carl Rapp, who treats Williams as a platonic idealist whose works 
enact a thoroughly romantic “drama of consciousness” (85). According to Rapp Williams’s poems 
open with the poet exerting mastery over the object world and end with him discovering his 
participation in “the one mind, which is God” (23). Although, indeed, “Williams cannot be 
properly understood apart from . . . romanticism and idealism,” Rapp’s drama of consciousness 
sounds more like Coleridge and Wordsworth than Williams (6). And as Markos points out, 
Rapp’s treatment of Williams as a subjective idealist “goes too far in negating the importance of 
things-in-themselves in order to emphasize the priority of the perceiving mind” (26). 
11 In addition to John Beck and Kristen Case, whose readings of Williams are discussed below, 
several others have productively read Williams in the pragmatic tradition. For example, see Ann 
Mikkelsen, “The Truth About Us: Pastoralism, Pragmatism, and Paterson”; and Alec Marsh, 
Money and Modernity: Pound, Williams, and the Spirit of Jefferson. 
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them neither as a symptom of an underlying philosophical inconsistency nor as 
evidence of personal disingenuousness, but as the grounding systematics of a 
coherent aesthetics.  On a fundamental level, pragmatism seeks to reconcile 
idealism and empiricism.  As Levin explains, “the pragmatists reject all explicitly 
supernatural trappings while retaining and cultivating a naturalized, imminent 
idealism” (5).  Although they deny the objective existence of eternal, 
transcendent forms such as truth, beauty, or unity, ideals “remain important to 
pragmatists . . . because these qualities have always been and still remain 
psychologically and dramatically compelling” (Levin 6-7).  That is, for 
pragmatists, ideals exist only in our imagination of them but they are 
nevertheless real in the sense that they arise from and inform our experience of 
the object world.  In effect, pragmatism circumvents the impasse between 
idealism and empiricism by treating felt experience, the realm in which ideals 
operate, as a dynamic interaction between the subject and the object world.  It 
“shift[s] . . . focus from the correspondence between world and mind to the ways 
in which mind and world are always integrated in active experience” (Levin 4).   
Williams enacts a similar set of shifts.  He pays careful attention to the 
ideal qualities that emerge in the experience of particular things, such as the 
sweetness and coldness of a plum or the ineffable beauty of Paterson’s Beautiful 
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Thing.  The tension between subject and object gives rise to felt experience 
through the interaction of the two.  Williams’s desire to reconcile the empirical 
and the ideal also underlies his famous refrain, “The local is the only universal,” 
adapted, not coincidentally, from the pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey 
(Autobiography 391).12  This claim suggests that there are no universals—no 
transcendent ideals—apart from their manifestation in the empirical experience 
of locality.  As Dewey explains, “The universal is not something metaphysically 
anterior to all experience but is a way in which things function in experience as a 
bond of union among particular events and scenes” (298).  As we shall see, by 
invoking a particular temporal and spatial context, the word “local” implies a 
perceiving subject who brings the universal into being through his experience 
here and now.  Williams’s other famous refrain, “No ideas but in things,” works 
to similar effect, insisting that ideation depends upon the object world (Paterson 
1, 9).  But since objects cannot think, the phrase invokes a perceiving mind whose 
experience unifies subject and object in what Williams calls “an / interpenetration 
both ways” (Paterson 1, 4). 
                                                 
12 In his “Americanism and Localism,” published in a 1920 issue of Dial, Dewey claimed that “the 
locality is the only universal” (Middle Works 12.15). For more on Williams’s appropriation of 
Dewey’s phrase, see Beck (82). 
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By revealing that the ideal emerges through the poet’s or the reader’s 
particular experiences of the object world, a pragmatic reading of Williams’s 
Objectivism further clarifies his relationship to the organic ideal of vital unity.  
Although they disagree about Williams’s attitude toward romantic ideals, 
several critics have correctly identified his Objectivism as organicist.  But by 
locating the poem’s vitality in its form as a completed object, each shortchanges 
the reader’s active role in real-izing the ideal.  For instance, Markos locates 
organic unity within the “special coherence and wholeness” of the poem as 
object (125), which ultimately results from the poet’s romantic relation to the 
object world—his Emersonian status as “cocreator with nature” (116).13  But 
Williams’s relation to the object world is only half of the picture.  Markos 
                                                 
13 James Breslin also recognizes the organicism of Williams’s Objectivist poetics. Like Markos, he 
focuses on the poet’s relation to the object world as he allows the poem to shape itself as an 
organic extension of his experience (42). Although Breslin slights the reader’s experience of the 
poem, he correctly concludes that “in objectivist art, ideas are not asserted but experienced” (43). 
Only marginally more willing to grant the audience a role in bringing the poem to life, Altieri 
claims that Objectivist poems are “vital material objects literally manifesting organizations of 
mental energy that culture could make available to subsequent generations” (“Transformations” 
303). But Altieri still grounds vitality in the poem itself, succumbing to the very romantic 
impulses that he maligns when he defines Objectivism as, “first of all a discipline of the poetic 
will” against the romantic urge to “[pursue] dialectical symbolic structures capable of reconciling 
discordant elements into satisfying conceptual wholes” (“Objectivist Tradition” 30, 28).  Unlike 
the romantics, he claims, the Objectivists allow “a sense of formal order [to] emerge not from 
some imposed framework but from the specific ways the poem brings into an internal balance the 
range of perceptions, desires, and contradictory impulses with which it has to deal.” In other 
words, the romantics achieved only mechanical simulacra of vitality but the Objectivists actually 
created “vital material objects” (“Transformations” 302-03). In his eagerness to distance the 
Objectivists from the romantics, Altieri seems to forget that aesthetic vitality can only ever be a 
metaphor. 
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overlooks his own equally important relation to the world through the poem as a 
part of that world.  As a result, no matter how astutely he analyzes the 
cooperation of each poem’s thematic contents and formal structures, its unity 
eludes him, leaving us not with an understanding of the poem as a living whole, 
but with a snapshot of the poem from a single angle.  In contrast, a pragmatic 
reading of Williams treats organic unity not as a property of the poem-as-object, 
but rather as a quality of the felt experience of the poem-as-object, whether on 
the part of the poet or the reader.  Hence, if Markos experiences organic unity, it 
emerges only in his imminent experience of the poem.  It cannot be recorded or 
transferred.   
 
Dewey’s Aesthetic Experience of Eating 
Although several scholars have noted the striking similarities between 
Williams’s and Dewey’s aesthetic programs, the extent of the latter’s influence on 
the former remains an open question.  Few would deny that Williams’s repeated 
invocation of Dewey’s local universal proves that some degree of direct 
influence, if only in choice of words, persists throughout Williams’s career.  The 
poet admitted as much in a 1944 letter to Horace Gregory: “there is no universal 
except in the local.  I myself took it from Dewey.  So it is not new” (Selected Letters 
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224).14  Williams first encountered Dewey’s claim in a 1920 article for Dial, 
entitled “Americanism and Localism,” where, in response to James Oppenheim’s 
claim that an American national literary identity had yet to emerge, Dewey 
explained that America was too large and diverse to have a distinctive national 
character.  Instead of striving for a vapid, universal American-ness, Dewey 
claims, the novelist should “dig down in some locality mentioned in some 
gazetteer till he strikes something” because “. . . . we are discovering that the 
locality is the only universal” (Middle Works 12.15). 15  Dewey’s original statement 
was offered more tentatively, and with little of the brash bravado that Williams 
gives it when he transforms it into his personal aesthetic credo.  But these words 
became “an important touchstone in Williams’s concern with contact and 
locality” (Beck 82).  Moreover, Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy was not fully 
articulated until 1934, when he published Art as Experience.  And although 
Williams read the book that year, he had by that time developed a mature poetics 
of his own (Beck 57).  Hence, John Beck wisely cautions, “the connection between 
                                                 
14 In his Autobiography, Williams is somewhat less willing to acknowledge Dewey’s influence. 
Although he admits borrowing Dewey’s words, he claims to have arrived at the basic idea on his 
own: “the poet’s business,” he explains is “. . . . . in the particular to discover the universal. John 
Dewey had said (I discovered it quite by chance), ‘The local is the only universal, upon that all art 
builds’” (391). 
15 For more on Dewey’s response to Oppenheim, see Beck (82). 
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Williams and Dewey is . . . not so much one of influence as of ideological 
confluence” (3).16 
But if Williams’s Deweyan resonances cannot be wholly attributed to 
direct influence, the poet may have been more receptive to the philosopher’s 
influence than critics have been willing to grant.  In 1933, Kenneth Burke 
reviewed a draft of what would eventually become The Embodiment of Knowledge, 
a collection of polemical reflections on the modern system of education.  In his 
response to Burke’s comments, Williams bristled at the suggestion that he was 
following a Deweyan program: “If I could convince myself or have anyone else 
convince me that I were merely following in the steps of Dewey, I’d vomit and 
quit—at any time.  But for the moment I don’t believe it—the poetry is offered 
not too confidently as proof” (Selected Letters 138).  Case and Beck rightly read 
this remark as Williams’s attempt to stake a claim for his originality.17  But when 
                                                 
16 Kristen Case agrees. But whereas Beck accounts for the confluence on the basis of Williams’s 
and Dewey’s shared democratic ethos and middle class values, Case points to their “shared 
propensity for the interrogation of received ideas” and in their familiarity with the modern 
scientific theories of evolution and relativity, which “contributed to a new conception of human 
beings’ relationship to their environment” (83).  
17 Beck claims that Williams’s “defensiveness” reflects an awareness of Dewey’s influence on the 
one hand and his distrust of Dewey as a member the academic elite on the other (57). But because 
Beck demonstrates at length that Williams’s critique of academia “is . . . completely at one with 
Dewey’s own position,” his interpretation charges Williams with a disingenuous and even self-
serving misreading of Dewey (57-58). More in keeping with Williams’s own explanation, Case 
reads his “ambivalence” as an insistence that he goes beyond Dewey’s anti-foundationalist 
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read in light of the conceptual metaphor, THE MIND IS A DIGESTING BODY, this 
remark opens the door for Dewey’s limited influence even as Williams stakes his 
claim.   
Although Williams denies merely copying Dewey, he does not deny 
having read him.  His reference to his poetry as proof of his departures from 
Dewey implies familiarity with the philosopher’s ideas, which Williams 
elsewhere explicitly acknowledges.  In keeping with the metaphor of the 
digesting mind, as activated by the word “vomit,” Williams tacitly admits to 
having taken in Dewey’s ideas in the sense of the familiar mapping, READING IS 
EATING.  But in declining to “vomit,” he refrains from rejecting him outright, an 
inverse expression of REJECTING IS PURGING (Table 1, mapping (o)).  “[F]or the 
moment” at least, Dewey’s ideas pose no immediate threat to Williams’s 
originality because he has not, as Burke seems to think, swallowed him whole 
(Table 1, mapping (j)).  In effect, Williams invokes the “vomit” metaphor not to 
denigrate Dewey, but rather to underscore the difference between two kinds of 
mental ingestion: READING IS EATING and ACCEPTING WITHOUT CONSIDERATION IS 
SWALLOWING WHOLE (mappings (i) and (j), respectively).  An argument that I 
have eaten up is neutral in connotation; it may eventually prove helpful or 
                                                                                                                                                 
linguistics by more effectively enacting similar ideas within his poems, “on the level of the words 
themselves” (84). 
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harmful or have no effect at all.  But an argument that I have swallowed whole 
decidedly bodes ill.18  In declining to “vomit” Dewey, Williams holds open the 
possibility for influence-as-assimilation, provided that it does not hamper his 
originality.  In Emersonian terms, Williams decides tentatively to trust the 
strength of his “intellectual digestion” (Collected Works 8: 18).  And, as we shall 
see, the poems support Williams’s claim for originality; while they reflect ideas 
consistent with Deweyan pragmatism, they are in no way subservient to it, and 
in some ways, go beyond it.   
Regardless of the extent to which Williams acknowledged Dewey’s 
influence, the similarities between their values and beliefs make the fully 
developed aesthetics of Art as Experience a useful context for Williams’s poetry.  
Dewey’s pragmatic reconciliation of idealism and empiricism helps to elucidate 
the complex subject-object relations that drive Williams’s Objectivism with its 
peculiar mix of organic and mechanical metaphors.  But the precise extent to 
which this confluence bespeaks direct influence is moot insofar as it more 
importantly bespeaks the two writers’ shared inheritance of an Emersonian 
model of selfhood.   
                                                 
18 For a detailed analysis of the negative connotations of the primary metaphor ACCEPTING IS 
SWALLOWING, see Grady’s “Foundations” (82-86). 
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In the previous chapter, I used Levin’s argument to show that Emerson’s 
dynamic model of selfhood gives rise to a transitional aesthetics.  For Emerson, 
beauty is the power to facilitate the self’s transitional leap outward, beyond its 
boundaries: 
the statue is beautiful when it begins to be incomprehensible, when it is 
passing out of criticism, and can no longer be defined by the compass and 
measuring-wand, but demands an active imagination to go with 
it . . . . The god or hero of the sculptor is always represented in a transition 
from that which is representable to the senses, to that which is not.  Then 
first it ceases to be a stone.  The same remark holds of . . . . poetry, the 
success is not attained when it lulls and satisfies, but when it astonishes 
and fires us with new endeavors after the unattainable.   (Emerson’s 
emphasis, Essays & Poems 332-33) 
For Emerson, in effect, “Beauty is invariably in transition.  It belongs not to any 
realized form, but to those energies set in play by realized forms” (Levin 38).  
Similarly, Dewey locates the value of an artwork in its power to provoke mental 
activity: “The actual work of art is what the product does with and in 
experience” (1).  If Emerson insists that art’s value inheres not in what it is but in 
what it enables us to do, Dewey makes a similar claim by pointing out that the 
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familiar compound noun “artwork” includes the verbal noun “work,” and that, 
as a verb, “work” applies to audience and artist alike.  Accordingly, as Levin 
argues, Dewey’s aesthetics “should be recognized as another variation of the 
Emersonian poetics of transition” (85).19  The same is true for Williams’s 
Objectivism, as we shall see.   
Although he uses a different vocabulary to discuss the dynamics of 
Emersonian selfhood, Beck provides a valuable precedent for comparing Dewey 
and Williams on the basis of their transitional relations between subject and 
object.20  He demonstrates that each continues, in his own way, Emerson’s 
organic vision of the “Romantic communion of the self with the universe.”  As a 
result, “What Dewey calls consummatory experience Williams describes as 
contact,” and each “is a version of Emerson’s search for an ‘original relation to 
the universe’” (Beck 79).  Recognizing this ideal of immediacy as a transitional 
power—the ability to achieve organic unity with the object world through the 
self’s momentary leaping beyond itself—allows us to read the digestive imagery 
of Dewey and Williams as further developments in the Emersonian tradition of 
                                                 
19 In addition to Levin, several other scholars have elucidated the Emersonian roots of 
pragmatism. See, for example, Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of 
Pragmatism, Richard Poirier’s Poetry & Pragmatism and Joan Richardson’s A Natural History of 
Pragmatism and Pragmatism and American Experience: An Introduction. 
20 Similarly, Case links Williams and Dewey through Emerson in a distinctly anti-dualist 
American epistemological tradition that insists that “mind and world are inseparable” (xi).  
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the digesting mind outlined in the previous chapter.  For Dewey and Williams, 
no less than for Emerson, the body’s alimentary processes provide a conceptual 
model for a selfhood that perpetually changes as it shapes itself through 
interaction with its environment.  But if Emerson’s transitional temporality 
locates power in the present moment—the ever-fleeting instant of the self’s 
outward leap—Dewey and Williams more fully explore the implications of this 
temporality for organic aesthetics.  The ideal of organic unity, for them, can be 
considered a property of a poem only insofar as it is imminently realized in a 
reader’s present experience of active and imaginative reading.  In effect, they 
render organic unity contingent upon myriad contextual factors in each reader’s 
particular time and place.   
In Art as Experience, eating and drinking, among other biological 
processes, furnish the analogical basis of Dewey’s aesthetics, which aims to 
“restore” the organic continuity between the experience of art and that of 
ordinary embodied life (2).  Dewey decries the institutionalization of art in 
museums, galleries, and so on, because the removal of the aesthetic from the 
realm of everyday experience reinforces metaphysical dualisms, such as mind vs. 
body and ideal vs. real, which according to Dewey, dull our capacity for active 
engagement with the world.  He therefore sets out to prove that our loftiest 
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aesthetic contemplations are of a piece with the mundane satisfaction of our 
material needs: “every experience is the result of interaction between a live 
creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives” (Art 45).  To prove this 
claim, he begins with an account of basic biological processes and progressively 
works toward the acme of complex human experience, the perception of art, 
arguing that experience at any of these levels takes the same form as a rhythmic 
and transitional cycle of need and satisfaction that organically relates the 
individual and its environment.  Time and again, he uses eating as a 
paradigmatic example.  
In his first chapter entitled, “The Live Creature,” Dewey uses the material 
exchanges of nutrition and respiration to exemplify the transitional dynamics 
and organic relations that shape the most basic forms of experience.  In his 
Darwinian vision, the individual organism is a part within the larger whole of 
nature’s self-balancing system:  
The first great consideration is that life goes on in an environment; not 
merely in it but because of it, through interaction with it.  No creature 
lives merely under its skin; its subcutaneous organs are means of 
connection with what lies beyond its body, and to which, in order to live, 
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it must adjust itself, by accommodation and defense but also by conquest.   
(Dewey’s emphasis, 12)   
The permeability of the internal organs illustrates that the organism’s unity is 
constituted by a self-shaping agency that enables it to change in response to its 
environment.  Life is defined by its contextual contingency.  Hence, “Every need, 
say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary 
absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings.  But it is also a demand, a 
reaching out into the environment to make good the lack . . . by building at least 
a temporary equilibrium” (Art 12).  The transition from disequilibrium to 
equilibrium, Dewey claims, brings a satisfying pleasure and a heightened sense 
of vitality (Art 16), as in the example of “a dog crouching over his food” (Art 12).  
But because any such equilibrium is only temporary, it perpetuates a rhythmic 
cycle of want and fulfillment. 
In the course of ordinary human experience these cycles tend to interrupt 
each other or merge such that they feel like a stream of general, sometimes 
random, experience rather than a rhythmic sequence.  But occasionally, when the 
individual consciously and deliberately fulfills a lack, he or she experiences one 
or more turns of the cycle as an organic whole that is complete unto itself and yet 
forms an integral part of the larger experience of life.  Dewey calls this kind of 
278 
 
consummated experience “an experience.”  For instance, “There was that meal in 
a Paris restaurant of which one says ‘that was an experience.’  It stands out as an 
enduring memorial of what food may be” (Dewey’s emphasis, Art 37).  In 
contrast to the dog’s perfunctory feeding, an experience of this sort requires an 
“esthetic quality that rounds [it] out . . . into completeness and unity” (Art 43).  
This “esthetic quality,” Dewey explains, is emotional for “[e]motion is the 
moving and cementing force.  It selects what is congruous and dyes what is 
selected with its color” (Art 44).  An experience feels like a coherent whole in part 
because it is united by a single emotion that defines its overall aesthetic effect.  
But its unity also depends upon its temporal movement toward consummation, 
which Dewey conceives as organic “growth.”  In every integral experience, he 
argues, “there is inception, development, fulfillment,” and in effect, “there is 
form because there is dynamic organization” (Art 57).   
Although an aesthetic quality unites every consummated experience as an 
organic whole, not every experience qualifies, for Dewey, as primarily aesthetic.  
Only the active, engaged perception of art, whether on the part of the artist at 
work or of the audience during reception, constitutes an aesthetic experience.  
Any consummated experience requires that the individual arrive at the 
perception of his or her organic relation to the environment through the 
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perception of experience as an organic whole.  But the experience is not primarily 
aesthetic unless its end has no value apart from the perception of these unities 
(Dewey, Art 57).  For example, the diner who has enjoyed “an experience” of a 
Parisian meal, has not had “an aesthetic experience” because his full stomach has 
value apart from its quality of aesthetic unity.  Even if the meal had not delighted 
him with a sensation of organic unity, he might still have considered his need 
satisfied.  In contrast, an epicure who approaches a meal as a work of art has a 
primarily aesthetic experience if he eats solely for the experience of organic unity 
that it provides.  He might not even be hungry; what he craves is the perception 
of organic unity itself.   
For Dewey, the aesthetic experience of the perceiver of art is no less active 
and engaged than that of the creator.  The perceiver brings his own values, 
desires, and past experiences to the table in a way that actively shapes the 
experience.  For instance, Dewey writes,  
Even the pleasures of the palate are different in quality to an epicure than 
in one who merely ‘likes’ his food as he eats it.  The difference is not of 
mere intensity.  The epicure is conscious of much more than the taste of 
the food.  Rather, there enter into the taste, as directly experienced, 
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qualities that depend upon reference to its source and its manner of 
production in connection with criteria of excellence.   (Art 50-51)   
Because it unites the physical senses with mental processes such as imagination, 
judgment, concentration, and abstraction, Dewey’s aesthetic experience enacts an 
organic union of body and mind in that it involves the active participation of 
“the total organism.”  As a result, “a beholder must create his own experience” of 
art (Dewey’s emphasis, Art 56).  However, Dewey insists that the perception of 
art is not purely subjective; its basic structure, as an interaction of a live creature 
with its environment, renders it an organic unity of subject and object.  “[A]t its 
height,” as in the enjoyment of art, experience “signifies complete 
interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events” (Art 18).   
From the dog at his kibble to the Parisian diner and, ultimately, to the 
epicure, Dewey uses the material exchange of eating to illustrate the basic formal 
dynamic of experience.  This repeated use of eating to exemplify the emergence 
of vitality through processes of exchange suggests that nutrition operates as a 
metaphorical concept through which Dewey conceives of the transitional, 
cyclical dynamic that unifies his aesthetics across various levels.  The transfer 
and transformation of material from the object world into the body of the live 
creature model the dynamic interpenetrations of subject and object, mind and 
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body, and immaterial and material, which Dewey uses to dismantle various 
dualisms.  
Dewey’s aesthetic theory is thoroughly organic, but not because it claims 
for the art work a rested totality or metaphysical vitality.  The transitional 
interactions that structure it resist at every turn ideals like these that have arisen 
from traditional philosophical dualisms.  On these grounds, Levin counters 
Stephen C. Pepper’s 1939 criticism of Dewey: “Whereas Pepper takes terms like 
wholeness, organic, and universal to imply Dewey’s confused trafficking in idealist 
aesthetic principles, these terms, inflected by Dewey’s pragmatism, echo in a 
double register that at once invokes and disturbs their organic meanings” 
(Levin’s emphasis, 83).  As Levin demonstrates, organic unities and universals, in 
Dewey, are only achieved momentarily, through the dynamic interactions of 
particular elements in the material world—that is, through the Emersonian 
shooting of the gulf between subject and object within the transitional 
temporality of the present.  But in his eagerness to diffuse the odor of “organic 
idealism,” Levin reinforces the common critical assumption that the traditional 
“organic meanings” of these words denote static closure (83).  Rather than using 
organicism’s vocabulary “in a double register” that works against itself, Dewey 
more accurately furthers Emerson’s project of rendering explicit the double 
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register that implicitly structures organicism as a network of metaphorical 
concepts.  In other words, Dewey furthers organic aesthetics by laying out the 
ramifications of the dynamic and aporetic interpenetrations among parts and 
wholes that make biological processes suitable analogs for mental processes in 
the first place.  
For Williams’s poetics, one of the most useful of these ramifications is the 
way in which Dewey’s transitional aesthetics locates an artwork’s organic unity 
not only in its physical qualities as an object, but in the perceiver’s experience of 
those qualities.  Any work of art, whether a performance or an artifact, embodies 
an organic unity of form and content because, as the product of an aesthetic 
experience, it comes about through the artist’s organic interaction with his or her 
environment (Dewey, Art 110-14).  But these unities attain vitality only through 
the transitional dynamics of an individual’s aesthetic experience of them: “A 
work of art no matter how old and classic is actually, not just potentially, a work 
of art only when it lives in some individualized experience” (emphasis added, Art 
113).  Because this vitality unfolds in the transitional temporality of the present, it 
can be revived ad infinitum  
That Williams similarly shifts the vitality of art to the audience’s 
subjective experience suggests that his poetics is deeply if not deliberately 
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pragmatic.  In one of his most fully articulated statements of his aesthetics, the 
1939 essay “Against the Weather,” Williams alludes to Dewey’s universal locality 
in order to explain the apparent immortality of art: 
A life that is here and now is timeless.  That is the universal I am seeking: 
to embody that in a work of art, a new world that is always “real.”  All 
things otherwise grow old and rot.  By long experience the only thing that 
remains unchanged and unchangeable is the work of art.  It is because of 
the element of timelessness in it, its sensuality.  The only world that exists 
is the world of the senses.  The world of the artist.   (Selected Essays 196) 
At first glance, Williams might seem to deny organic aesthetics by refusing 
Emerson’s and Whitman’s metaphor of cultural composting as he exempts art 
from the temporality of the life cycle on the basis that it does not “grow old and 
rot.”  But he does so only to endorse a pragmatic and transitional aesthetic in 
which the power of art resides perpetually in the perceiver’s present.  Art’s 
“timelessness”—its immortality—resides in its “sensuality,” as felt “here and 
now.”  Hence, Williams writes, “It is not an ‘essence,’ . . . I am seeking but a 
sensual ‘reality’” (Selected Essays 197).  And for Williams, as for Dewey, this 
experience of vitality comes about through the transitional unities of past and 
present, mind and body, and self and world.  As “the solvent . . . of old 
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antagonisms,” art effects a pragmatic reconciliation of philosophical dualisms 
(Selected Essays 198). 
Furthermore, Dewey’s aesthetics illuminates the way in which Williams’s 
poetry effects a transitional unity between the poet and reader.  Dewey explains 
that although art does not work toward communication as an end, it nevertheless 
communicates by virtue of its transitional means: “Because the objects of art are 
expressive, they communicate.  I do not say that communication to others is the 
intent of an artist.  But it is the consequence of his work—which indeed lives 
only in communication when it operates in the experience of others” (Art 108).  
For Dewey, an artwork is expressive in that it is the product of the artist’s 
experience of organic unity with the object world, in the form of his or her 
materials.  And it communicates in the sense that, by allowing a perceiver to 
experience a parallel organic unity with the art object, as shaped by the artist’s 
experience, the artwork enables a separate but analogous aesthetic experience for 
the perceiver.   
Williams explains a similar point more eloquently in “Against the 
Weather”: “The artist is . . . the most effective of all men, by test of time . . . Dig 
up his carvings in the center of the Sahara Desert, where there was once a lake 
and forests, his effectiveness remains intact” (Selected Essays 197).  In the context 
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of Williams’s poetics of contact, “intact” takes on a double valence; in addition to 
the material integrity of the work, which preserves the artist’s communication, it 
also suggests that the effectiveness of that communication continues to depend 
upon the audience’s sensuous contact with the work.  That is, as long as the art 
object remains available to an audience, the artist retains his “effectiveness,” not 
simply to convey a message, but physically to effect sensations and affects within 
others. 
But if an artwork enables the audience and artist to share an aesthetic 
experience, Williams consistently avoids collapsing their experiences, instead 
situating them in a pragmatic and organic relation that preserves the distinctness 
and particularity of each.  In “Against the Weather,” he further appropriates 
Dewey’s universal locality to illustrate the way in which art functions as “the 
solvent . . . of old antagonisms,” such as past and present, self and other, and 
universal and particular, even as it retains the distinctness of their terms: 
Being an artist I can produce . . . universals of general applicability.  If I 
succeed in keeping myself objective enough, sensual enough, I can 
produce . . . the concretions of materials by which others shall understand 
and so be led to use—that they may the better see, touch, taste, enjoy—
their own world differing as it may from mine. . . . That—all my life I have 
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striven to emphasize it—is what I meant by the universality of the local.  
From me where I stand to them where they stand in their here and now—
where I cannot be—I do in spite of that arrive! through their work which 
complements my own, each sensually local.   (Williams’s emphasis, 
Selected Essays 197-98) 
The temporal and spatial particularity of “the local” necessarily grounds 
aesthetic experience in an embodied subjectivity at a particular time and place.  
When he indicates the reader’s locality, Williams enacts this particularity on the 
level of syntax within the conspicuously awkward phrase “their here and now.”  
The more expected alternative, “there and then,” would have lumped all of our 
localities into an undifferentiated time and place defined only by its distance 
from the poet as the deictic center.  Instead, Williams uses the third-person 
possessive to displace the deictic center from himself to the reader, allowing the 
phrase to point to our particular time and place.  But the locality of each of our 
experiences also links it to every other in that all are equally local: the only 
universal aspect of aesthetic experience is that it is always particular.  In this 
sense, Williams treats the universality of art, as a pragmatic ideal that exists 
neither in some Platonic realm apart nor in the perfection of a material form, but 
that emerges as the individual perceives that his or her own experience of the 
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work resembles all other possible experiences of it in its radical particularity.  In 
Emersonian terms, we might say that Williams conceives of the universality of 
art as a transitional power realized only in the reader’s present.  
 
The Organic Experience of Reading 
If Williams’s nonfiction prose reveals the pragmatic underpinnings of his 
Objectivism, his poetry, as he tells Burke, more fully demonstrates the way in 
which he makes these ideas his own in artistic practice.  Whereas Dewey uses 
eating to characterize the transitional dynamic and organic form of aesthetic 
experience, Williams uses eating in the service of an anti-mimetic poetics that 
invites readers to enjoy an actual aesthetic experience.  For example, in “This is 
Just to Say” and “To a Poor Old Woman,” he fosters an intimate sense of contact 
between poet and reader by tacitly invoking the conventional conceptual 
metaphor, READING IS EATING, to compare the reader’s aesthetic experience of the 
poem to another’s experience of eating fruit.  But at the same time, he studiously 
separates these experiences in space and time, playfully juxtaposing the plums’ 
absence with the poem’s presence, drawing our attention to the role of our 
body’s felt experience in aesthetic perception.  Although the juxtaposition of 
present poem and absent plums involves a host of binary oppositions such as 
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those between present and past experience, presentation and representation, 
sensation and intellection, and poet and reader, neither poem attempts 
discursively to resolve them.  Instead, when read as examples of the pragmatic 
Objectivism described above, the poems offer themselves as opportunities for the 
reader to resolve these dualisms by experiencing the ideal of organic unity as it 
emerges through his or her particular aesthetic experience.   
Each poem’s ability to offer a Deweyan aesthetic experience of this sort 
hinges upon its careful limitation of the kind of traditional mimesis that had 
characterized Williams’s early poetry.  For example, in the 1909 poem “For Viola: 
De Gustibus,” Williams blazons his the object of his youthful affections with a 
somewhat fishy catalog of foods: 
Belovéd you are 
Caviar of Caviar 
Of all I love you best 
O my Japanese bird nest 
 
No herring from Norway 
Can touch you for flavor.  Nay 
Pimento itself 
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Is flat as an empty shelf 
When compared to your piquancy 
    O quince of my despondency.   (Collected Poems 1: 25) 
This poem describes in detail the mixed pleasures and pains of infatuation, as if 
to recreate the poet’s emotion for his love.  And because the poem’s stilted 
diction and strong rhymes awkwardly mimic a courtly love poem, the overall 
effect falls as flat as Williams’s tasteless “empty shelf.”   
By 1914 however, as Williams gains exposure to the modernist visual arts 
and to the Imagiste movement in poetry, he begins to avoid this kind of mimetic 
representation.  “Don't be ‘viewy,’” Ezra Pound advises would-be Imagistes in 
his 1913 manifesto, “Don't be descriptive; remember that the painter can describe 
a landscape much better than you can, and that he has to know a deal more 
about it” (203).  In Spring and All (1923), Williams takes an even stronger anti-
mimetic stance:  
[N]early all writing, up to the present, if not all art, has been especially 
designed to keep up the barrier between sense and the vaporous fringe 
which distracts the attention from its agonized approaches to the moment.  
It has always been a search for the “beautiful illusion.”  Very well.  I am 
not in search of “the beautiful illusion.”   (Collected Poems 1: 178)   
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Instead, he insists, “works of art . . . must be real, not ‘realism’ but reality itself” 
(Collected Poems 1: 204).  In place of the traditional subordination of art to reality 
Williams endorses an alternative relationship in which art participates in reality, 
becoming the occasion for the audience’s first-hand experience.   
If these remarks anticipate Williams’s treatment of the poem as an object 
the 1930s and beyond, they also anticipate Dewey’s rejection of mimetic 
language in Art as Experience: “Not only is it impossible that language should 
duplicate the individualized qualities that exist, but it is wholly undesirable and 
unneeded that it should do so.  The unique quality of a quality is found in 
experience itself; it is there and sufficiently there not to need reduplication in 
language.”  However, Dewey insists, language can itself become the occasion of 
experience in its own right, and even of an aesthetic experience: “words serve 
their poetic purpose in the degree in which they summon and evoke into active 
operation the vital responses that are present whenever we experience qualities” 
(Art 224).  Williams’s Objectivist poems put this idea into practice. 
In Spring and All, Williams also rejects mimesis on the grounds that poetry 
should not impede the poet’s first-hand aesthetic experience by burdening him 
with the requirement to recreate it later.  If, in “Poetry and Imagination,” 
Emerson calls for “poetry which tastes the world and reports of it,” Williams 
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responds, in equally alimentary terms, that an obligation to report dulls the 
tasting (Collected Works 8: 36):  
“Writing is not . . . . a conscious recording of the day’s experiences. . . . The 
writer of imagination would find himself released from observing things 
for the purpose of writing them down later.  He would be there to enjoy, 
to taste, to engage the free world, not a world which he carries like a bag of 
food, always fearful lest he drop something or someone get more than he.  
A world . . . with which he has bitter and delicious relations” (emphasis 
added, Collected Poems 1: 207).   
The words “taste” and “bitter and delicious” establish the digesting mind as the 
conceptual framework for this passage by invoking PERCEPTION IS INGESTION and 
QUALITY IS FLAVOR (Table 1, mappings (i) and (d), respectively).  But Williams 
pushes us beyond these conventional mappings by including an unconventional 
element from the source domain: the “bag” that holds the food.  As THE MIND IS A 
DIGESTING BODY does not typically involve containers, the bag has no ready-made 
counterpart in the target domain of the mind.  As a result, it prompts us to 
activate a blended mental space in order to figure out in what sense a poet might 
carry the world “like a bag of food.”  Given that I hear echoes of “Poetry and 
Imagination” in this passage, I envision a man who looks a lot like Emerson, 
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carrying a miniature planet earth—“the world” of sensuous experience—in a 
brown paper bag, much as one carries one’s lunch to work.  The function of the 
bag is to defer consumption: to enable the world-as-food to be transported while 
slowing its decay.  Like a non-functional, alternative stomach, it contains the 
food until the Emerson figure is ready to let his body take over that function.  
Thus, the bag suggests a thrifty concern for the future at the expense of present 
pleasure: a willingness to let experience begin to stale.  If the bag maps onto 
whatever performs an analogous function in the target domain, it represents that 
which defers the writer’s immediate, sensuous contact with the world: the 
mimetic imperative to record and to report.21  Like Emerson, Williams uses 
eating as a metaphor for “an original relation to the universe,” but if the former 
demands “poetry which tastes the world and reports of it,” Williams reminds 
him that, for the sake of freshness, the tasting must take priority over reporting.   
 In “To a Poor Old Woman,” Williams encounters a woman having such a 
fresh experience.  Insofar as she removes her food from its bag and eats it here 
and now, the old woman demonstrates the sensuous contact with the world that, 
for Williams, is necessary for the poet: 
                                                 
21 For academic scholars, Williams offers an analogous warning that situates their intellectual 
produce at an even further remove from fresh experience: “Fruitless for the academic tapeworm 
to hoard its excrementa in books” (Collected Poems 1: 215). 
293 
 
TO A POOR OLD WOMAN  
munching a plum on 
the street a paper bag  
of them in her hand  
 
They taste good to her 
They taste good 
to her. They taste 
good to her 
 
You can see it by  
the way she gives herself  
to the one half  
sucked out in her hand  
 
Comforted  
a solace of ripe plums  
seeming to fill the air  
They taste good to her   (Collected Poems 1: 383) 
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Indifferent to and even unaware of her audience, the old woman evidently 
enjoys a Deweyan aesthetic experience complete with an organic 
interpenetration of subject and object; as she bites the plum, “she gives herself” 
reciprocally “to the one half / sucked out in her hand.”  This experience, although 
it takes place in public, before the prurient gaze of at least one stranger, is 
nevertheless intensely private—radically inaccessible to the poet and to us.  Four 
times Williams insists that the plums “taste good to her,” using enjambment to 
emphasize a different dimension of her experience with each iteration: its 
subjectivity, its goodness, its taste.  Tapscott claims that this repetition “reaffirms 
the power of language to re-create and to complete the experience it describes” 
(58).  But insofar as the repetition insistently attributes the experience only to the 
woman, it actively denies the possibility of such mimetic recreation.  The heavy 
emphasis on the line beginning, “to her,” underscores the subjective quality of 
the woman’s experience, effectively reminding us, as Von Hallberg puts it, that 
“sense-experience is a personal thing” (144).  That Williams avoids collapsing the 
woman’s experience into his or our own bespeaks a respect for its particularity 
and privacy.  In this sense, he treats her as an equal—a dignified individual 
whose keen perception empowers her to contact the world and, despite its many 
obstacles, wrest from it substantial gratification.  That the old woman engages in 
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the aesthetic experience for her own benefit, not so that she can recreate it for 
others later, makes her a figure of the nonmimetic poet during the moment of 
Emersonian contact with the object world, before the act of composition.   
Williams follows her example.  The word “you,” which points to us, 
indicates that he is at least slightly more aware of his audience than is the old 
woman.  After all, Williams’s publication of the poem indicates his desire for an 
audience.  But we do not get the sense that he observes the woman with the 
intent to reproduce the event in a poem.  Rather, he enjoys his serendipitous 
aesthetic experience as it unfolds in the middle of the street, as does the old 
woman herself.  For this reason, the word “you” might be addressed less to us 
than to himself, as he contemplates, during composition, how he perceived the 
woman’s pleasure although he could not taste the plums.  “You can see it,” he 
says, as if working through his visual memory.  But of course, we readers cannot 
see the old woman any more than Williams can taste her plums.  The pleasures 
of seeing and remembering are as private and un-recreatable as the woman’s 
experience of the plums. 
Nevertheless, the poem aligns the experiences of woman, poet, and reader 
in a system of causally related, parallel, and resonating pleasures that coexist in 
the blended space of our imagination.  Because the old woman’s body language 
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indicates her aesthetic experience, she becomes, in turn, the object of the poet’s 
equally engrossing if somewhat more ideologically suspect, aesthetic experience.  
Having deliberately positioned himself as a voyeur in the third stanza, 
Williams’s language of giving, tasting, and sucking conveys the erotic charge of 
his gaze.22  But Williams derives further pleasure from his appropriation of the 
woman’s marginal social status for his artistic self-image.  Given that the poem 
was written in 1934, the woman is disempowered in at least four ways: she is 
poor, old, a woman, and on top of it all, living during the Great Depression.  And 
although Williams’s “title expresses a certain sympathy for the poor,” as Bob 
Johnson notes, “the poem itself aestheticizes poverty, sensualizing the old 
woman, focusing on her experience of a piece of fruit rather than giving any 
sustained attention to her poverty” (203).  Such a woman would likely eat her 
plums on the street, but probably not out of desire for a transcendentalist contact 
with the object world.  More likely, she would be hungry and have nowhere else 
to go.  And yet Williams enjoys the spectacle of her pleasure as confirmation of 
his ideal self-image.   
                                                 
22 In the phrase, “the way she gives herself,” Cushman detects “an erotic force in the pleasure that 
the plums give the old woman” (24). But given that these words reflect the poet’s interpretation 
of the woman’s body language, it would be more accurate to say that Williams projects his own 
erotic pleasure onto her. See also Dietrich (134). 
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 But beyond these ideologically dubious pleasures, Williams also enjoys 
the aesthetic experience of poetic composition as he recollects the encounter later.  
You can see it by the way he gives himself to the parts of syntax, broken across 
the lines:  
They taste good to her 
They taste good 
to her.  They taste 
good to her 
Turning the memory over in his mind’s eye, the poet plays with the semantic 
effects of enjambing the same sentence in various positions, “as though he has 
been savoring the possibilities of English syntax as she savors the plums” 
(Cushman 24).  It is therefore tempting to read these lines as simple mimesis, in 
which “the old woman’s eating motion presents a natural rhythm that the 
grammatical form of the poem mimics” (Beyers 199).  But such a reading 
mistakenly presumes that Williams intends to recreate the woman’s experience.  
And by falling back on mimesis to explain the resemblance between poetic form 
and content, this reading precludes our discovery of Williams’s innovative use of 
conceptual metaphor as a formal technique.   
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These enjambments signal the poet’s pleasure by enacting, on a formal 
level, the primary metaphor CONSIDERING IS CHEWING (Table 1, mapping (l)).23  By 
letting this metaphor remain tacit, Williams exploits our largely unconscious 
familiarity with it, inviting us to make the comparison based on our own 
experience of reading the poem.  That is, we only perceive Williams’s pleasure in 
chewing the line, repeatedly fragmenting it on the page, if we feel an analogous 
pleasure in playing with its shifting emphasis as we read.24  Like the old woman 
and the poet, we partake in an intimate, sensuous, aesthetic experience; we see 
the poem on the page, hear its sound, and feel it in our mouth.  But because our 
object is the poem itself, rather than the plums or the sight of the old woman, our 
experience remains distinct.   
                                                 
23 According to Lakoff and Turner, the term “iconicity” denotes such resemblances between 
formal structure and the conceptual structure of metaphorical meaning. A poem is iconic, they 
explain, when the metaphorical structure of its meaning is understood through analogy with the 
structure of its language. Thus iconicity is itself a second-order metaphoric structure because the 
form (the source domain) is mapped onto the meaning (the target domain) (146, 156-157). 
24 Many critics have evidently enjoyed this kind of play, offering diverse explanations of how 
repetition and enjambment shape the meaning of these lines. Most enumerate the ways in this the 
enjambment multiplies the connotative meanings of the sentence. Cushman claims, for example, 
that the “enjambment leads the reader to interpret lineation as a guide to meaning, but it does not 
dictate that meaning” (23). See also Halter (146-47), Markos (143-44), and Kaplan (117). Others 
argue that the repetition signals one overall meaning. For instance, Tapscott claims that it “makes 
us see the sentence as a verbal ‘thing,’” the meaning of which “resides in all the collected 
possibilities” of its shifting emphasis (57). Von Hallberg claims that Williams’s “toying with the 
lineation” demonstrates that “no matter how the emphases are shifted around, the plums simply 
tasted good” (144). 
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By setting up this nested system of causally related yet distinct aesthetic 
experiences, Williams prompts us to compare our own act of reading to the 
woman’s act of eating, tacitly invoking CONSIDERING IS CHEWING, READING IS 
EATING and THE TEXT IS FOOD.  In our everyday language, expressions of these 
mappings tend to disappear into the background of conventional usage.  But by 
treating the poem as an object, like a plum, Williams lets us experience, in our 
tongue, teeth, and jaws the similarities between the source and target domains.  
In this way, Williams counters the stale language of convention by putting us in 
Emersonian contact with the poem as a part of the world around us.   
Insofar as it compares eating, seeing, and reading, “To a Poor Old 
Woman,” like Dewey’s Art as Experience, links ordinary bodily experience and 
aesthetic experience, whether in the creation or the perception of art.  But 
whereas Dewey argues that consummated experiences of any sort are structured 
by the rhythmic form of a live creature’s interaction with its environment, 
Williams demonstrates a similar point by involving the reader in an experience 
that resonates with the experiences of others in the blended space of his or her 
imagination.  Both writers rely on the material process of eating conceptually to 
model the more complex process of aesthetic perception.  And for both, 
experience is consummated by a feeling of unity, as in the end of the poem:  
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Comforted  
a solace of ripe plums  
seeming to fill the air 
They taste good to her 
The “solace of ripe plums” that seems “to fill the air” suggests an 
interpenetration of subject and object; the flavor of the plums is a subjective 
impression of a particular object that is then projected onto the object world as a 
whole.   
To whom this solace belongs, Williams does not exactly specify.  Many 
readers attribute it to the old woman for whom “[s]ensual pleasure is, evidently 
a solace for both poverty and age” (Von Hallberg 144).25  But others have noted 
that the solace extends to the poet, whose pleasures likewise suggest an 
interpenetration of subject and object as he observes the woman and projects his 
desires onto her.26  He finds a twofold solace in the possibility of pleasure, even 
for the depression-era poor, and in the woman as a mirror for his self-image as 
an Emersonian poet of contact.   
                                                 
25 Juhasz (42-43), Kaplan (118), and Marsh (39) likewise attribute the solace to the old woman. 
26 Critics who extend the woman’s solace to Williams include Miller (317), Cushman (24-25), and 
Halter (147). 
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But the comfort also applies to “You”—that is, to us.  By folding our 
experience of the poem into a larger pattern of human experience, the poem 
prompts us to feel an organic unity in turn.  It demonstrates that others have felt 
pleasures akin to ours even though no two people can enjoy the same experience.  
Although in revising the poem, Williams removed his reference to the woman’s 
“lusty appetite,” which “lifts her up - a dignity” (Markos 142-43), the poem 
retains its Whitmanian affirmation of bodily appetites and pleasures that unite 
humanity and connect it with the rest of the cosmos.  In a vocabulary closer to 
Williams’s own, we might say that the old woman embodies the universal in the 
local as she instantiates the general human conditions of desire, satisfaction, and 
pleasure.  And by comparing our experience to hers, Williams urges us to 
perceive our own experience as a local instance of the universal.  Hence, the 
solace is figured as a diffuse, atmospheric effect that, in the blended space of the 
reader’s imagination, envelops woman, poet, and reader alike as each enjoys his 
or her private experience of unity with the object world.   
“This is Just to Say” likewise compares poetry to fruit and reading to 
eating.  But it uses a more nuanced interplay of presence and absence to 
foreground the role of the poem’s material thingness in setting up a system of 
parallel but distinct aesthetic experiences.  In the background of the poem lurks 
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the seldom-noticed but crucially important icebox: another food container that, 
like the bag from Spring and All, defers the sensuous experience of eating.  
Having chosen to save her plums for breakfast, Flossie has jeopardized an 
opportunity to enjoy an “original relation to the universe,” and now she unjustly 
suffers the consequences.  In her absence, Williams has followed the poor old 
woman’s example and consumed the plums on the spot, leaving an apology in 
their place.  And given his palpable pleasure in remembering this transgression, 
he has evidently enjoyed a full-blown Deweyan aesthetic experience at Flossie’s 
expense.   
Many readers treat this poem as Williams’s attempt to make amends by 
recreating the missing plums or by allowing Flossie to experience them 
vicariously through description.  But Williams avoids detailing the fruit’s size, 
number, color, weight, texture, and so on, which might signal an attempt to 
conjure up an ersatz plum in words.  Rather than recreating a complex gustatory 
pleasure as in “For Viola: De Gustibus,” his minimal description, “so sweet and 
so cold,” seems to acknowledge—even nostalgically to lament—the inability of 
language to capture the plenitude of sensation.  Ultimately, part of the poem’s 
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understated poignancy comes from the fact that Williams can no more recover 
the fruit, for himself or for Flossie, than could Adam and Eve.27   
Moreover, insofar as the note announces the fruit’s absence, its raison d’être 
is to distinguish poem from plums; it signifies the stolenness of what would have 
been Flossie’s pleasure.  And although Williams admits wrongdoing by 
requesting forgiveness, he neither expresses regret nor promises better self-
control in the future.  Instead, as Altieri notes in one of the poem’s most 
perceptive readings, he justifies the theft by its pleasures (“Presence” 501).  If he 
feels “a little sorry,” as he later admits, it is not in the sense of remorse but of 
pity; he knows what Flossie is missing out on because he has experienced it in 
her stead.   
Nevertheless, “This is Just to Say” succeeds as an apology because 
Williams offers it as an alternative to the fruit rather than a reproduction of it—a 
thing with the same ontological status that the plums formerly had.  In fact, the 
plums’ absence throws the poem’s presence into relief, foregrounding its 
sensuous materiality.  Williams’s deictic “this” in the opening phrase points to 
the note as a thing that Flossie can pick up, look at, and contemplate.  In place of 
one opportunity for aesthetic experience, Williams offers her another.  For us, the 
                                                 
27 Similarly, Altieri reads “This is Just to Say” as “a minimal, secular version of the loss of origins 
Milton dramatized” (“Presence” 499). See also Dietrich (131-32). 
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poem is further removed from the fruit in both space and time, but “this” 
nevertheless indicates the plum-like thingness of the text on our page or screen.  
Whoever the reader may be, the poem reaches beyond itself to anchor its diegesis 
in “their here and now.” 
By aligning the experiences of poet, addressee, and reader, this poem, like 
“To a Poor Old Woman,” tacitly invokes the mappings READING IS EATING and 
IDEAS ARE FOOD by prompting us, like Flossie, to compare our reading to 
Williams’s eating.  “This is Just to Say” becomes plum-like only as we 
conceptualize our reading as metaphorical eating.  Its organic quality—its 
simultaneous sense of formal completion and open-ended changeability—does 
not reside in the poem, but rather arises through our active engagement with it.  
In this sense, Williams treats organic unity and vitality as pragmatic ideals that, 
contingent upon the reader’s context, are necessarily temporal, ephemeral, and 
unrepeatable, yet paradoxically renewable in perpetuity.   
By comparing the poem not to a single plum, but to an unquantified 
group of “plums,” Williams suggests that each reading is finite and 
unrepeatable, like the consumption of a particular plum.  Indeed, each reading is 
unique—even if only because its context includes recollections of any prior 
readings.  To quote Gertrude Stein, “there is no such thing as repetition” (288).  
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We can, however, read a poem repeatedly, just as Williams can eat plum after 
plum.  In this way, the implied poem-as-plums metaphor casts reading as a 
paradoxically singular and plural experience in which individual readings 
contribute to a larger, overarching understanding of the poem.  
An account of my own particular experience of the poem, as I read and re-
read it today, will demonstrate.  I begin with a question that has been on my 
mind: “why do my students so often want to treat the poem as an ersatz plum?”  
As I read from start to finish, I notice that the poem somehow manages to feel 
sweet and cool although I have neither tasted it nor felt a coolness of 
temperature.  Re-reading for the cause of this effect, I notice that Williams’s 
minimalist syntax and short lines combined with his bald statement of fact and 
the self-justification noted above, create an emotionally reserved tone that we 
tend to conceptualize through a metaphorical coldness.  Form and content 
conspire to chill the poem.  But I note that the tone is not altogether frigid 
because the poet’s humble and forthright confession bespeaks a consideration for 
others—perhaps with a touch of sentimentality—that we often discuss in terms 
of a figurative warmth.  These images are expressions of the related metaphorical 
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concepts, AFFECTION IS WARMTH and INTENSITY (OF EMOTION) IS TEMPERATURE.28  
But instead of warmth, which would seem like the obvious choice to temper 
coolness, Williams chooses sweetness, which invokes the mapping QUALITY OF IS 
FLAVOR (Table 1, mapping (d)).  Reading the poem again, asking what he gains 
from this unexpected mix of conceptual metaphors, I discover that by using two 
senses, touch and taste, as source domains for the same target, the poem’s 
affective tone, Williams activates a blended space where synesthesia allows the 
joint operation of two feelings that, although opposite, do not cancel each other.  
Had he qualified coolness with warmth, he might have portrayed a more 
agonized conflict of emotions—a feeling of guilt clashing with an unrepentant 
hedonism.  Or worse—his tone might have come out merely tepid.  Instead, the 
apposition of sweetness and coldness suggests Williams’s delight in his 
ambivalence; sorry to have deprived Flossie of pleasure, he is glad to have 
experienced it himself, and moreover to have created a further opportunity for 
the pleasures of composition.  This self-satisfaction lets me experience anew the 
poem’s mischievous humor, which I have often felt but never accounted for.  The 
same spare description that, as I argued above, reflects the inability of language 
to reproduce sensory experience, succeeds in producing a highly nuanced affect 
                                                 
28 For a brief account of these conceptual metaphors, see Lakoff et al, “Master Metaphor List” 
(143). 
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of its own—and it does so precisely through its juxtaposition with the absence of 
a sweet taste and cool temperature. 
Perhaps my students want to conflate the poem and plums because they 
very astutely feel Williams’s Objectivism at work.  The poem activates a set of 
conventional conceptual metaphors for affective qualities that, when the students 
intuitively run the blend, yield a sweet and cold tone that the students perceive 
on the level of affect, even though they do not articulate it as such.  Experiencing 
the poem as material object, they seek to account for this cold-sweet effect, and 
light on the correct solution, the metaphor of poem-as-plums, by a shortcut of 
intuition, whereas I have taken the academic scenic route, via problematization, 
close reading, and the application of a theoretical framework.  Hence I have 
discovered a new appreciation for my students’ perceptiveness.  Such, at least, 
have been my sensuous, affective, and intellectual pleasures this time around.29   
In keeping with Dewey’s cyclical, rhythmic flow of experience, particular 
readings stand alone as finite temporal experiences, as repetitions with a 
difference, while also rolling up into a progressively expanding, overall 
understanding of the poem.  Each reading differs from and builds on its 
predecessors, occasionally circling back to question, deepen, and revise prior 
                                                 
29 If I have dwelt on them too long, forgive me; I have enjoyed, perhaps most of all, discovering 
my own complicity in Williams’s self-indulgence at a reader’s expense. 
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conclusions.  Of course, each reading is also the same—not simply in its word 
order, provided we read from beginning to end, but more importantly in that the 
poem surprises and delights us every time.  Or, to be more consistent with 
Williams’s poetics, we might say that the poem enables us to delight ourselves 
anew, for the elements of surprise that distinguish each reading come from 
changes in the context of reading that we bring to the poem: the questions we 
ask, our memories and associations, the environment in which we read, and so 
on.  In this way, Williams’s poem-as-plums metaphor treats reading, and 
aesthetic experience more generally, as an iterative, cyclical process in which 
particular experiences collectively shape an understanding of the poem that 
remains flexible, open-ended, and contingent upon a changing context.  In short, 
it conceptualizes aesthetic experience in terms of the aporetic interdependence of 
part and whole that, as we have seen, characterizes organic form itself.   
 
Machines Made of Words 
In “To a Poor Old Woman” and “This is Just to Say,” Williams 
foregrounds the sensuous materiality of the poem in order to invite us to 
participate in a shared organic aesthetic experience of the object world.  But 
elsewhere, he calls attention to poetry’s materiality to illustrate his mechanical 
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theory of form.  For example, he figures a poem as a building in “Fine Work with 
Pitch and Copper” and as a four-legged table in “The Dish of Fruit.”  By 
emphasizing the poem’s physicality as an artifact, these metaphors cast the poet 
as a craftsman who builds a tangible thing.  All of the activity, creativity, and 
vitality resides in the poet; the poem itself is lifeless, inert, and instrumental.  As 
a result, such metaphors dismantle the basic premise of traditional organic 
aesthetics, which holds that vitality emerges through the coherence of a poem’s 
form and content.  But in the context of Williams’s pragmatic, experientially 
based aesthetics, these mechanistic metaphors do not vitiate organic vitality 
altogether.  Rather, they relocate it to the realm of the poet’s experience, where it 
precedes and prefigures the experiences of readers.  In “Fine Work with Pitch 
and Copper” and “The Dish of Fruit,” Williams signals this shift using food 
metaphors that illustrate the interaction between organic experience and 
mechanical poetic form. 
Reflecting on his 1936 collection Adam & Eve & the City, Williams wrote, 
“[T]his was a time when I was working hard for order, searching for a form for 
the stanzas, making them little units, regular, orderly.  The poem ‘Fine Work 
with Pitch and Copper’ is really telling about my struggle with verse” (I Wanted 
57).  Accordingly, critics have treated “Fine Work” metapoetically, as an 
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extended metaphor comparing the poem to a building and Williams himself to 
the roofer who emerges at the end of the poem: 
Now they are resting 
in the fleckless light 
separately in unison 
  
like the sacks 
of sifted stone stacked 
regularly by twos 
  
about the flat roof 
ready after lunch 
to be opened and strewn 
  
The copper in eight 
foot strips has been 
beaten lengthwise 
  
down the center at right 
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angles and lies ready 
to edge the coping 
  
One still chewing 
picks up a copper strip 
and runs his eye along it    (Collected Poems 1: 405-06)  
Henry Sayre explains, “The poem is literally about roofing a house.  Before the 
‘flat roof’ of the house can be graveled, the top edge of the masonry wall, the 
‘coping,’ must be edged with pitch and copper in order to waterproof the roof” 
(Visual 85).  Sayre locates the source of Williams’s poem-as-house analogy in a 
1923 collection of essays by Swiss-French architect, Le Corbusier.  Contrasting 
the flat roofs of modern houses with earlier pointed designs, Le Corbusier claims 
that “we have had during the last forty years not so much houses as poems” (Le 
Corbusier’s emphasis, quoted in Sayre, “American” 336).  But Le Corbusier is not 
Williams’s only source for the architectural metaphor.  Along with George 
Herbert’s “The Altar,” Wordsworth’s “Nuns Fret Not at their Convent’s Narrow 
Room,” Hart Crane’s The Bridge, and many other poems, “Fine Work” 
participates in the long tradition of poems comparing themselves to architectural 
structures.  In keeping with the primary conceptual metaphor, ORGANIZATION IS 
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PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, poets have often understood their work with language 
through analogy with architectural design and the craftsmanship of construction.  
The conventionality of this metaphor lets us easily map the elements of 
Williams’s source domain onto his target.  The house maps onto the poem; the 
worker figures the poet; the copper strip suggests a completed line; and the other 
building materials, the stone and pitch, represent the raw material of language.  
The worker’s eye even traces the length of the strip as a poet reads his completed 
line, inspecting and admiring his work.  The comparative logic of this metaphor 
is familiar enough that we do not need Williams to explain his metapoetic 
subtext.  
But what is unconventional in this instance of the poem-as-architecture 
metaphor is the way in which Williams uses it to distinguish the mechanical 
form of poetry from its creation in the poet’s organic experience.  The building is 
a mechanical device—even though it is static.  Modernist writers and engineers 
often included stationary structures as well as moving machinery in the category 
of mechanical technology (Tichi xii-xiii).  As an engineered thing—an order 
imposed upon natural materials for man’s instrumental purpose—a house is, as 
Le Corbusier puts it, “a machine for living in” (quoted in Sayre, “American” 
336).  By representing a poem as a metaphorical house, then, “Fine Work” 
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anticipates Williams’s claim that a poem is “a machine made of words” (Sayre, 
“American” 336). 
But this mechanical form emerges through the roofer-poet’s organic 
experience of the world.  The poem takes place just at the end of “lunch,” when, 
“still chewing,” the builder transitions seamlessly from rest to work, taking up a 
piece of coping and “run[ning] his eye along” its length.  Copestake claims that 
“[n]o action or movement, indeed no actual work, is described in the poems as a 
whole” (25).  But movement and work do occur here, albeit on a very intimate 
scale.  The eyes move along the coping, assessing its readiness for installation; 
food is broken up for impending digestion.  The utter stillness of the other 
roofers and their materials throws these minute motions into relief, inviting us to 
compare and contrast the types of work that they perform.  The simultaneous 
occurrence of looking and chewing aligns them as acts of taking in, invoking the 
digesting mind through the implication that PERCEPTION IS INGESTION (Table 1, 
mapping (i)).  Chris Beyers notes Williams’s implied pun on rumination and 
applies it to the roofer and the poet alike: “The artisan is chewing over in his 
mind the form he thinks the copper ought to take.  The metaphor links the 
gustatory with the intellectual and the artist’s conception with his creation.  He is 
figuratively digesting the form” (186).  That the builder’s looking and chewing 
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span the transition from lunch hour to the afternoon shift conveys “a set of 
harmonious links . . . between the workers’ cycle of rest and work, stasis and 
motion” (Copestake 26).  Furthermore, both actions situate the roofer-poet in 
reciprocal, organic relation with his environment.  The food nourishes his body, 
allowing him to shape his environment in turn, by building the house.   
When read as a metaphor for poetic composition, the roofer’s little labors 
enact two organically unified dimensions of the artist’s aesthetic experience—a 
Deweyan double interpenetration of subject and object.  In the source domain, 
the roofer engages with two objects: the strip of copper and the food (a plum, 
perhaps?).  Because the copper strip is a component of the house, the logic of the 
poem-as-architecture metaphor suggests that it maps onto a component of the 
poem; I read it as a poetic line rather than the raw material of language because it 
has been “beaten lengthwise” into a definite form.  Accordingly, the roofer’s 
inspection of the strip maps onto Williams’s inspection of his “fine work.”  
Taking his partially composed poem as an object, he undergoes the aesthetic 
experience of artistic creation.   
But what, if anything, does the food represent in the target domain?  The 
poem-as-architecture metaphor leaves us at a loss to account for it.  However, as 
we have seen in “To a Poor Old Woman,” “This is Just to Say,” and Spring and 
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All, Williams repeatedly uses eating as a metaphor for the poet’s sensuous 
contact with the world that is a prerequisite for composition.  The same 
metaphor might apply here.  If the food maps onto the raw material of 
experience that enables Williams to write “Fine Work,” then it represents the 
sight of a roofer transitioning with satisfaction from his lunch hour back to work.  
In effect, the image of the worker chewing while eying the strip conveys the 
relationship between two dimensions of the poet’s aesthetic experience: 
sensuous, organic contact with the world around him and the mechanistic 
composition that it enables.  The sight of the roofer fuels Williams’s composition 
as the roofer’s lunch fuels his work. 
“The Dish of Fruit” likewise compares poetic form to a static, mechanical 
structure.  Although this poem makes no direct reference to eating, it uses fruit to 
represent the opportunity for organic, aesthetic experience as it is presented by 
the poem as a mechanical arrangement.  The poem, in its entirety, reads, 
The table describes 
nothing : four legs, by which 
it becomes a table.  Four lines 
by which it becomes a quatrain, 
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the poem that lifts the dish 
of fruit, if we say it is like 
a table—how will it describe 
the contents of the poem?   (Collected Poems 2: 143) 
Williams relates three objects—a table, a dish of fruit that sits on the table, and a 
poem, written in quatrains, about a dish of fruit—in order to pose a rhetorical 
question that might be paraphrased as follows: “If a poem in quatrains (such as 
this one) is like a table, to what extent does it describe its content?”  At first 
glance, the poem-as-table metaphor seems to prompt us to respond, “Not at all.”  
If we take the poem’s content to be the titular dish of fruit, then its quatrain form 
is “a purely formal and abstract design” that “has nothing whatever to do with 
subject matter” (Sayre, Visual 38).  But the poem’s subject matter also includes the 
table, which, as a metaphor for a quatrain structure, rolls form into the domain of 
content.  In consequence, the poem is not only about the dish of fruit, but also 
about its own form and the relations between its form and content.  By 
juxtaposing the natural fruit with the man-made table and dish, Williams invites 
us to consider these relations in terms of organicisim and mechanism and to 
conclude that the form-content relation itself is a mechanism: an arrangement of 
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the poet’s materials that facilitates the reader’s organic experience of reading—
here figured as the fruit waiting to be eaten. 
The source domain for Williams’s extended metaphor,30 a table holding a 
dish of fruit, is an arrangement of mechanical and organic objects in spatial 
contiguity.  The table is a mechanism, an instrumental, physical structure: it 
“describes / nothing : four legs, by which / it becomes a table.”  It “lifts the dish / 
of fruit” without making any reference to it.  In other words, the table’s structure, 
or form, and content are independent; the table might hold anything, or nothing 
at all, and it would still be the same structure.  The word “lifts” underscores its 
mechanical instrumentality by attributing a metaphorical motion to a stationary 
thing.  The dish of fruit, in contrast, is both organic and mechanical because it 
consists of produce that has been gathered from its native environment and 
arranged using at least two man-made structures: the dish and the table.  The 
relationships among these three items are mechanical in the sense that they are 
imposed ab extra, presumably by a person who has arranged them for some 
purpose, whether in anticipation of a snack, for decorative effect, or in 
                                                 
30 Most literary scholars would consider this expression a simile rather than a metaphor because 
“the poem is . . . like / a table.” But cognitive linguists treat both kinds of comparison as linguistic 
expressions of conceptual metaphors in which one concept is understood through analogy with 
another. The difference lies in the strength of the connection asserted: “simile simply makes a 
weaker claim” (Lakoff and Turner 133).  
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preparation to paint a still life or perhaps to write a poem after the manner of a 
still life, as Williams does here.31  In each of these ways, the arrangement of 
mechanical and organic objects offers the potential for aesthetic experience, such 
as that modeled by “To a Poor Old Woman,” “This is Just to Say,” and “Fine 
Work.”  But the very existence of “The Dish of Fruit” indicates that the vignette 
has already been the object of Williams’s aesthetic experience.   
In the target domain of poetry, the table maps onto form and the dish of 
fruit onto content.  When Williams compares the legs to the four-lines of the 
quatrain, he maps the table’s mechanical structure onto poetic form.  By 
concluding his first four-line stanza with the words, “Four lines / by which it 
becomes a quatrain,” he further announces that this poem in particular is a 
mechanical form, thus folding the poem’s form into its content.  If this content is 
represented in the source domain by the dish of fruit, then the analogy suggests 
that the content is a mechanical arrangement.  It includes mechanical 
components (such as the table, the quatrain form, form-content relations) and 
organic components (such as the fruit and the oblique reference to the poet’s 
                                                 
31 On Williams’s relationship to the still life tradition in the visual arts see Dijkstra’s Cubism, 
Stieglitz, and the Early Poetry of William Carlos Williams (chapter 7), Halter (174-81), and Costello’s 
Planets on Tables (chapter 2). 
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experience of composition), but these components have been arranged by the 
poet into a machine made of words. 
As a result, the “The Dish of Fruit” resembles the table not because its 
form and content are unrelated, but because they are related mechanically, ab 
extra, and for a purpose.  In the source domain, as we have seen, the purpose of 
the arrangement is to present an opportunity for experience, whether the 
savoring of a plum or the composition of a poem about fruit on a table.  The 
exact nature of that experience and whether or not it reaches aesthetic 
consummation of the Deweyan sort depends upon the individual in all of the 
ways discussed above.  According to the logic of its metaphors, then, this 
machine made of words has been engineered to present an opportunity for 
organic engagement with the world.  Williams’s mechanical poem-as-table lifts 
the fruit of aesthetic experience, placing it within our reach.  In reading the 
poem, we may choose metaphorically to help ourselves. 
 
Conclusion: Williams and the Digesting Imagination 
If, as I have argued, Williams’s treatment of the poem as a thing combines 
a mechanical theory of poetic form with an organic theory of the form of 
aesthetic experience, then it is the imagination that enacts the commerce between 
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them.  Williams never mentions the imagination in any of the poems examined 
here, but as we experience each poem, we feel our imagination at work, 
performing the conceptual leap that maps each source onto its target and linking 
our experiences to those of the poet and of his subject in the blended spaces of 
our minds.  Not unlike Whitman, Williams treats the poem as a fragment.  He 
aims to “leave a large part of the thing to the imagination of the spectator; this to 
arouse, also to give him work to do.  For that is the prime destiny of the thing 
produced: to have the beholder take part in it thus completely.  Thus and thus 
only to complete it” (Williams’s emphasis, quoted Halter 119).  But if, as Peter 
Halter claims, Williams treats his reader as a “co-creator,” it is not in the sense 
that “[i]nterpreting a poem means playing a part in the constitution of the 
aesthetic object” (119).  As an aesthetic object, the poem is, in most cases, finished 
before we read it; even if the poem encourages us to read it out of sequence, we 
do not change its words or their order on the page.  Rather, the reader is a co-
creator in the sense that his or her aesthetic experience “complete[s]” the poem 
by bringing it into organic relation with the imagination.  When the reader 
makes contact with the poem as a part of the object world, the resulting 
interpenetration of subject and object enables organic unity to emerge within his 
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or her felt experience.  In this sense, the reader’s imaginative experience 
“complete[s]” the machine made of words by bringing it to life.   
In each of the poems considered above, the intimate, sensuous act of 
eating provides a conceptual model for the organic interpenetration of subject 
and object during imaginative experience.  In this sense, Williams participates in 
the romantic tradition of using ingestion to figure the mind’s interaction with the 
world, especially in the process of reading.  And like Coleridge, Williams uses 
the metaphor of the digesting imagination in order to harmonize organic and 
mechanical form.  But Williams pragmatizes Coleridge’s ideal of organic unity.  
For Coleridge, organic unity is a property of a thing, such as the mind or a work 
of art, that is determined by the interdependence of the whole thing and its parts 
and by the thing’s interactions with its external environment.  A thing is organic 
to the extent that it functions as both a whole unto itself and as a part within a 
larger organic whole.  As a result, the organic unity of the Coleridgean mind is a 
precarious condition requiring regular nourishment and protection from the 
pernicious influences of mechanical literature.  But for Williams, organic unity is 
a pragmatic ideal that operates not in things themselves but only in the realm of 
the felt experience of things.  It inheres in our mind’s transitional power to 
imagine the universal based on the empirical experience of the local.    
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